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ORIGINAL MEANING AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 
Jack M. Balkin* 
One of the many benefits of having one's ideas analyzed by 
a group of intelligent and able commentators1 is that they im-
prove the work by showing the author which parts of the argu-
ment need to be clarified, which parts need to be adjusted, and 
which parts are really central to one's views. With gratitude for 
their careful attentions, I take this opportunity to clarify, adjust 
and foreground parts of my argument in Abortion and Original 
Meaning. 2 
In Abortion and Original Meaning I argued that fidelity to 
the Constitution requires fidelity to the original meaning of the 
constitutional text and to its underlying principles. I also argued 
that each generation makes the Constitution their constitution 
by calling upon its text and principles and arguing about what 
they mean in their own time. These claims are part of a larger 
argument about what makes our constitutional system legitimate 
and what functions a constitution like America's serves and 
should serve. In this response, I argue that a key element of con-
stitutional interpretation is our attitude of attachment to the 
constitutional project and our beliefs about its ultimate trajec-
tory. This is the question of our faith in the constitutional sys-
tem, which is also, as I shall explain, a faith in its redemption 
* Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment. Yale Law 
School. I would like to thank the contributors to this symposium for their very helpful 
critiques, and Bruce Ackerman. Akhil Amar. Sanford Levinson, Lawrence Solum and 
Kenji Yoshino for their comments on previous drafts. 
1. Randy Barnett. Underlying Principles. 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405 (2007); 
Mitchell N. Berman. Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus A Thought Or Two About 
Abortion). 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383 (2007): Dawn Johnsen. The Progressive Political 
Potency of "Text and Principle"". 24 CONST. COMMENT. 417 (2007): Ethan Leib. The Per-
petual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism. 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353 (2007): John 0. 
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport. Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of 
Originalism. 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371 (2007). 
2. Jack M. Balkin. Abortion and Original Meaning. 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 
(2007). 
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through history. Hence my theory of text and principle is also a 
theory of redemptive constitutionalism. 
I. WHY ORIGINAL MEANING? 
In Abortion and Original Meaning I argued that the choice 
between originalism and living constitutionalism is a false one, 
and that I regard myself both as an originalist and as a living 
constitutionalist. That may seem strange to some readers, who 
have grown accustomed to thinking that living constitutionalism 
is just a form of non-originalism. However what we call "non-
originalism" depends on what we think originalism entails.3 
Given any particular version of originalism, non-originalism 
means only that we reject that originalist's view of what fidelity 
to the Constitution requires. Now I argue that fidelity to the 
Constitution means fidelity to the original meaning of the Con-
stitution's text and to the principles that underlie the text. From 
my perspective, then, a non-originalist is a person who argues 
that we do not have to be faithful to the original meaning of the 
Constitution's text or to its underlying principles. But living con-
stitutionalists need not be non-originalists of that sort, and, in my 
view, they should not be. 
Several of the commentators objected that I did not provide 
an argument for interpreting the Constitution according to its 
original meaning, or indeed, for any form of originalism at all. In 
fact, I did make such an argument, but it was stated so briefly 
that it may have passed notice.4 Therefore I now offer a more ex-
tended argument for adhering to the original meaning of the 
text. 
3. Mitch Berman correctly sees this point. Berman, supra note 1, at 383 n.37. He 
assumes, incorrectly. that I seek to "contrast[] originalism to living constitutionalism," id .. 
identifying the latter with nonoriginalism, when in fact I mean to do the opposite. There 
are certainly forms of living constitutionalism that are non-originalist, but I believe that 
the best versions of living constitutionalism are also originalist in my sense. 
4. The argument was premised on two simple assumptions: 
(First,] we have a written Constitution that is also enforceable law. (Second,] 
[w]e treat the Constitution as law by viewing its text and the principles that un-
derlie the text as legal rules and legal principles .... We look to the original 
meaning of the words because if the meaning of the words changed over time, 
then the words will embrace different concepts than those who had the author-
ity to create the text sought to refer to. We look to underlying principles be-
cause when the text uses relatively abstract and general concepts, we must know 
which principles the text presumes or is attempting to embrace. If we read the 
text to presume or embrace other principles, then we may be engaged in a play 
on words and we will not be faithful to the Constitution's purposes. 
Balkin. supra note 2. at 303-04. 
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A. THE ARGUMENT FROM A WRIITEN CONSTITUTION 
The American Constitution is a written constitution, and it 
is enforceable law. Both of these facts are worthy of note. 
Americans did not have to choose a written constitution. The 
most obvious model in 1787 would have been the British Consti-
tution, which consisted largely of customary practices and prece-
dents. In addition, the American Constitution did not have to be 
enforceable law. It could have been just be a political statement 
of principles, like the Declaration of Independence. But if we 
consider our written Constitution to be law, then we should in-
terpret and apply it as we do other kinds of laws, and, in particu-
lar, statutes. This has two consequences. 
First, generally speaking, once statutes are legitimately en-
acted by those authorized to enact them, the statutes continue to 
bind us as laws until they are amended or repealed. That is so 
even though the people who originally had authority to create 
the laws are long dead and gone. That is why even statutes 
passed many generations ago are still law today. I do not argue 
that this is necessary to the conception of law. One could have a 
legal system with a generally recognized metarule that all stat-
utes expire after fifty year's time. (Presumably, the metarule 
would not apply to itself). But we do not have such a metarule 
for statutes in the United States.' 
Second, we normally try to interpret the statutory terms ac-
cording to the concepts the words referred to when the statutes 
were first enacted.6 We do this to preserve legal meaning over 
time. Why is it important to preserve meaning over time? It fol-
lows from the assumption that law continues in force over time 
until it is amended or repealed. If the law states a directive, rule, 
or norm that continues in force over time, we must preserve the 
meaning to preserve the directive, rule, or norm that the law 
5. Although Judge Guido Calabresi famously suggested that we should adopt spe-
cial interpretive rules for older. outmoded statutes. See GUIDO CALABRESI. A COMMON 
LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). 
6. Here. just as in debates about constitutional interpretation. we should distin-
guish the original meaning of words from their original expected application. Textualists. 
purposivists and intentionalists alike all begin with the original meaning of statutory 
words as best they can determine it. They disagree among themselves about how and 
whether to recognize gaps. ambiguities or vagueness in statutory language. They also dis-
agree about what to do in the case of gaps. ambiguities or vagueness. William Eskridge's 
dynamic theory of statutory interpretation. for example. allows interpretations different 
from what the original legislature might have expected or endorsed because of changing 
Circumstances. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE. JR .. DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 5. 
52-57 (1994 ). 
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states. Suppose we did not follow this practice. Then, if the 
commonly accepted meaning of the words changes over time, 
the legal effect of the statute will change as well, and it will 
change not because of any conscious act of lawmaking by anyone 
in particular, but merely because of changes in how language as-
signs concepts to words. 7 
Let me give a simple example. Article IV section 4, the 
Guarantee Clause, states that "The United States shall guaran-
tee to every State in this Union, a Republican Form of Govern-
ment, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on 
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the 
Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic Violence."8 
In 1787 the words "domestic Violence" generally meant riots or 
disturbances within a state (as opposed to foreign attack); today 
the words primarily refer to assaults and batteries by intimates 
or by persons living in the same household. If we used the con-
temporary meaning of the Guarantee Clause rather than its 
original meaning, the import of the Clause would be completely 
altered. Moreover it would be altered not due to any change in 
public values, but simply because linguistic usage had changed. 
Moreover, today the word "Republican"-the word is capital-
ized in the original text- refers both to representative govern-
ment and to the Republican Party, founded in 1856. If we were 
bound by contemporary meaning rather than original meaning, 
7. This argument is hardly original with me. James Madison himself made an early 
version: 
I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in which the Constitu· 
tion was accepted and ratified by the nation. In that sense alone it is the legiti-
mate Constitution. And if that be not the guide in expounding it. there can be 
no security for a consistent and stable. more than for a faithful. exercise of its 
powers. I{ the meaning of the text be sought in the changeable meaning of the 
words composing it. it is evident that the shape and attributes of the government 
must partake of the changes to which the words and phrases of all living lan-
guages are constantly subject. What a metamorphosis would be produced in the 
code of law if all its ancient phraseology were to be taken in its modern sense! 
And that the language of our Constitution is already undergoing interpretations 
unknown to its founders will. I believe. appear to all unbiased enquirers into the 
history of its origin and adoption. 
Letter from Madison to Henry Lee (June 25. 1824). in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 191-92 (Gaillard Hunted .. 1910). For modern versions, each with a slightly 
different emphasis. see RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, 100-
07 (2004) (emphasizing lock-in function of writings): Joseph Raz. Intention in Interpreta-
tion. in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249. 258 (Robert P. 
George ed .. 1996) (arguing that "it makes no sense to give any person or body law-
making power unless it is assumed that the law they make is the law they intended to 
make"): Steven Smith. Law Without Mind. 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 117 (1989) ("Present-
oriented interpretation ... makes law substantially the product of historical accident."). 
8. U.S. CONST. art. IV.§ 4 (The capitalization is as in the original). 
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one could argue that the Constitution guarantees each state a 
"Republican Form of Government,"- that is, a government con-
trolled by Republicans.9 
Here is a less fanciful example: Article I, section 8, cl. 3 
grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian 
tribes."Io Note that the Constitution uses the same word in the 
same clause- ''commerce"- to describe how Congress might 
regulate interactions "with foreign nations, and among the sev-
eral states, and with the Indian tribes. ,II When the Constitution 
was enacted, the word "commerce" meant more than purely 
commercial activity. It meant "intercourse"- that is, interac-
tions, exchanges, and movements back and forth, including, for 
example, conversation.I2 The Commerce Clause gave the federal 
government the power to regulate a wide range of interactions 
with the Indian tries and foreign nations. 13 Thus, the early Con-
gresses passed a series of Trade and Intercourse Acts beginning 
in 1790, which not only required licenses for trade with Indians, 
but also punished "any crime upon, or trespass against, the per-
son or property of any peaceable and friendly Indian or Indi-
ans. "I4 These crimes did not necessarily involve economic activ-
ity; they could involve assault, murder, or rape. (Note that even 
9. I have often supposed this was the underlying basis of Bush v. Gore. 531 U.S. 98 
(2000). 
10. U.S. CONST. art. I.§ 8. cl. 3. 
11. See Gibbons v. Ogden. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I. 194 (1824) (the word "commerce" 
"must carry the same meaning throughout the sentence. and remain a unit. unless there 
be some plain intelligible cause which alters it.": Saikrishna Prakash. Our Three Com· 
merce Clauses and the Presumption of /ntrasentence Uniformity. 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149 
(2003) (expanding on Marshall's argument). But see Adrian Vermeule. Three Commerce 
Clauses? No Problem. 55 ARK. L. REV. 1175 (2003) (responding to Prakash's argument 
and arguing that the same word could mean three different things in juxtaposition). 
12. Gibbons. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189-90: See AKHIL REED AMAR. AMERICA'S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107-DS (2005) (the Commerce Clause gives Congress 
powers to regulate "all forms of intercourse in the affairs of life. whether or not narrowly 
economic ... if a given problem genuinely spills across state or national lines.") 
13. See AMAR. supra note 12. at 107-D8 (arguing that under the original meaning of 
"Commerce" the Constitution gives Congress the power "to deal with noneconomic in-
ternational incidents" and "nonmercantile interactions and altercations that might arise 
among states."). 
14. An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes. ch. 33. 1 Stat. 
137 (1790) (expired). Congress passed new versions repeatedly during the antebellum 
era. with changing provisions: Act of Mar. I. 1793. ch. 19. 1 Stat. 329 (repealed 1796 ): Act 
of May 19. 1796. ch. 30. 1 Stat. 469 (expired 1799): Act of Mar. 3. 1799. ch. 46. 1 Stat. 743 
(expired 1802): Act of Mar. 30. 1802. ch. 13. 2 Stat. 139 (repealed 1834): Act of June 30. 
1834. ch. 161. 4 Stat. 729. The current version of the Trade and Intercourse Acts is 25 
U.S.C. § 177 (2005). which now covers only purchases and grants of land from Indian 
tribes. 
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if the point of regulating these crimes was because of their likely 
effects on trade with the Indian tribes. the activities regulated 
were themselves not economic.). If we adopted the contempo-
rary meaning of ''commerce," Congress might have reduced 
power in its dealings with Indian tribes and foreign governments 
not because of any change in public views about national power, 
but simply because of changes in linguistic usage. 
That change in meaning would also matter for regulation of 
"commerce ... among the several states." Despite the early ex-
ample of the Trade and Intercourse Acts, the Supreme Court 
has argued that Congress may not regulate non-economic activi-
ties (like crime) because of their cumulative impacts on com-
merce.15 For example, in 2000, the Court struck down portions of 
the Violence Against Women Act in United States v. Morrison; 16 
it rejected the government's argument that the cumulative im-
pact of violence against women hindered their ability to partici-
pate in the public life of the national economy because such vio-
lence, no matter how much it affected women's economic 
choices, was not itself economic activity. 17 As this example 
shows, that construction of "commerce" may not be consistent 
with the Constitution's original meaning. The proper question in 
Morrison was not whether Congress could regulate crime to pre-
vent deleterious effects on commerce-it did so from the very 
founding of the country in the Trade and Intercourse Acts. 
Rather, the question was whether the problem of violence 
against women was a problem "among the several states"- for 
example, because it featured significant spillover effects between 
states that individual states could not adequately handle on their 
!R 
own. 
B. THE COMPATIBILITY OF ORIGINAL MEANING AND 
LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM 
In fact, I think that the argument for contemporary meaning 
rests on a subtle confusion. When living constitutionalists argue 
that we should look to today's meaning rather than original 
15. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551, 560--61, 564--67 (1995); United States 
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,610-13 (2000). 
16. 529 u.s. 598. 
17. /d. at 613 ("Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not. in any sense of the 
phrase, economic activity."). . . . , 
18. In addition. the statute might also have been constitutional under Congress s 
section 5 power to enforce the equal citizenship guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 
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meaning, they usually do not have in mind the rule-like clauses 
of the Constitution, which they are normally happy to apply ac-
cording to their original meanings. Rather, they are usually 
thinking of the abstract or vague phrases of the Constitution: 
"due process," "equal protection," "cruel and unusual punish-
ments," and "freedom of speech." What living constitutionalists 
really object to is being limited by the original expected applica-
tion of these abstract terms and vague clauses. They are right to 
object, for reasons I have given in my article, and I agree with 
them that the original expected application is not binding on 
later generations. But this is not an objection to being bound by 
original meaning. 
My argument for the preservation of legal meaning over 
time applies whether the constitutional text states a relatively 
concrete rule or an abstract principle or standard. If the original 
meaning of the text requires "equal protection," then we enforce 
equal protection today because the text continues to require it, 
just as the text continues to require that the President must be 35 
years old. How we apply the principles of equal protection, how-
ever, may well be different from what people expected in 1868 
based in part on our contemporary understandings. That is the 
difference between applying rules and applying principles or 
standards in changed circumstances, and it is consistent with the 
preservation of the original meaning of enacted laws over time.19 
Living constitutionalists often object to original meaning 
because it binds present generations to the dead hand of the 
past. They worry that a written constitution enacted long ago 
limits the kind of laws that Congress can pass-including many 
important federal labor, environmental, and civil rights laws-
and it allows both the states and the federal government to vio-
late a panoply of rights that Americans regard as constitutionally 
protected. They worry that the dead hand of the past wrongfully 
limits contemporary democracy and allows majorities to run 
roughshod over important rights. 
19. One might object: Can principles really exist apart from their expected applica-
tions? Not only is this possible, it is precisely what makes them principles rather than a 
laundry list of concrete expectations. Principles are norms that are indeterminate in 
scope, that usually do not determine the scope of their own extension. and that can be 
balanced against other competing considerations. Although the persuasive power of 
principles may originate from how we expect they will apply when we argue for them, 
their jurisdiction, scope, and regulatory scene can shift over time. Jack M. Balkin & Reva 
B. SiegeL Principles, Practices, and Social Movements. 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006). 
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Here again it is important to distinguish between original 
expected application and original meaning. Many constitutional 
provisions are stated in relatively precise rules. There are only 
two Houses of Congress, each state gets two Senators, the Presi-
dent can veto legislation when it is presented to him, the Presi-
dent cannot be elected to more than two full terms, and the 
President serves only four years in each term and not as many as 
he (or the Congress) desires. In addition, when no candidate for 
President wins a majority of the electoral college, the election is 
thrown into the House of Representatives where each state gets 
one vote, while in similar circumstances the Vice-Presidency is 
determined by the Senate. 
All of these provisions were also passed long ago and they 
continue to limit what contemporary majorities can do. They 
also represent the dead hand of the past. Indeed, they are a far 
more powerful dead hand because of the relative precision of 
their language. 
When living constitutionalists complain about the dead 
hand of the past, they are generally not complaining about these 
structural provisions, even though these rules limit contempo-
rary expressions of popular will, and in some cases, can have 
very bad effects.20 Most living constitutionalists accept these 
structural clauses as stating relatively precise rules that we must 
follow today, even if we think them unjust or unwise. Rather, ob-
jections to the dead hand of the past tend to concern the inter-
pretation of the abstract and vague clauses in the Reconstruction 
Amendments and the Bill of Rights that I mentioned earlier. 
That means that the dead hand objection in practice is not pri-
marily directed against original meaning- it is directed against 
original expected application. Once that distinction is accepted, 
living constitutionalists have very little reason to object to being 
originalists as well. 
Living constitutionalists might also worry that fidelity to 
original meaning prevents them from making arguments from 
constitutional structure that are not tied to a particular piece of 
text. However, fidelity to text and principle does not prohibit 
such structural arguments, which are invoked by originalists and 
non-originalists alike. I noted in Abortion and Original Meaning 
that the Constitution contains a structural principle of democ-
20. For a bill of particulars. see SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE 
PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). 
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racy that is not tied to any particular part of the text but must be 
inferred from the logic and general purposes of the Constitu-
tion's plan of government. Ironically, the principle of democ-
racy- in particular deference to majority will- is the structural 
principle most often invoked by originalists who object to living 
constitutionalism. The proper question is not whether structural 
arguments not tied to specific texts are permissible, but what 
kinds of structural arguments we can make consistent with the 
text. 
In addition, living constitutionalists might worry that text 
and principle cannot account for governmental innovations like 
the administrative state or independent federal agencies like the 
Federal Reserve Bank. I disagree. The constitutional text pro-
vides a relatively open-ended framework for governance on 
which later generations must build, creating new institutions and 
practices to implement constitutional values and carry out gov-
ernmental functions. Much of the practical day-to-day opera-
tions of the United States government comes from what Keith 
Whittington has called constitutional construction- the creation 
and maintenance of new institutions and practices by the three 
branches and by the states.' 1 One of the earliest constitutional 
controversies was over such a constitutional construction- the 
creation of a public/private institution to help manage the fed-
eral government's fiscal resources- the Bank of the United 
States. 
The Constitution does not prohibit such constitutional con-
structions; indeed, it presumes that they will occur, and it places 
only fairly general limits on their design and implementation. 
The accumulation of these constructions over time, as one inno-
vation builds on another, produces a sort of institutional evolu-
tion; it has a path dependence that drives constitutional devel-
opment forward in ways that no one in 1787 would have 
predicted. That evolution is part of what we mean by a living 
Constitution. But, once again, the path of institutional evolution 
does not become unconstitutional merely because it is contrary 
to the Founders' concrete expectations. 
Although the method of text and principle can make sense 
of a wide range of admirable features of our present constitu-
21. KEITH WHITIINGTO~. CO~STITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 12 (1999) (offering creation of the Federal Reserve 
System as an example of constitutional construction by the political branches). 
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tiona! culture, it does not always guarantee "happy endings,"22 at 
least from my own perspective. To give only one example, I be-
lieve that the same history that shows that the Fourteenth 
Amendment established an anti-subordination principle also 
shows that the Second Amendment protected an individual right 
that applies to the states as well as the federal government.23 This 
is certainly not my preferred policy result, and it may have very 
bad consequences, depending on how the Second Amendment's 
guarantees are worked out. This is not an isolated example. I 
also think that our current method of electing Presidents is par-
ticularly poorly designed, although there may be awkward work-
arounds. Nevertheless, the point of constitutional interpretation 
is fidelity, and the test of a theory of constitutional interpretation 
is whether you are willing to accept the consequences of your 
preferred theory of interpretation, whether you like them or not. 
No theory of constitutional interpretation that actually seeks to 
interpret the document always produces happy endings. Consti-
tutions are by nature imperfect, born of political compromise 
and short-sightedness; they leave many injustices unremedied or 
facilitate injustices of their own. Rather, one adopts a theory 
with the goal of being faithful to the document, and with the 
hope that the document, so interpreted, offers sufficient possi-
bilities for redemption to make itself worthy of respect over 
time. One cannot know all the consequences of a theory when 
one adopts it; rather one learns those consequences over time, 
and either adjusts the theory of interpretation or learns to accept 
the consequences that come with it. Choosing an interpretive 
theory, like interpreting a Constitution, is an act of faith, and the 
importance of faith in constitutional interpretation is the theme 
to which I now turn. 
II. FAITH AND LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Beyond the arguments I have just offered for adhering to 
the original meaning of the Constitutional text lie deeper issues: 
22. The phrase is Sanford Levinson's. Sanford Levinson. Why I Do Not Teach Mar-
bury (Except To Eastern Europeans) and Why You Shouldn't Either. 38 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 553. 560-61 (2003): See Sanford Levinson. Bush v. Gore and the French Revolu-
tion. 65 LAW & Co:-.;TEMP. PROBS. 7.11 (2002). 
23. See COI'G. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866) (remarks of Sen. How-
ard) (listing "the right to keep and bear arms" as one of the •·personal rights guaranteed 
and secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution" that were privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States): AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: 
CREATION A:-.;D RECONSTRUCTION 259 (1998). 
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the legitimacy of the Constitution and faith in the constitutional 
project. These are Ethan Leib's major concern. He rejects my 
claim to be both a living constitutionalist and an originalist. Leib 
concedes that the method of text and principle might offer living 
constitutionalists most if not all of the results that they believe 
the Constitution rightly understood requires.24 Still, he argues, 
something is missing in my theory which prevents it from being a 
genuine form of living constitutionalism. 
Leib argues that, unlike originalists, living constitutionalists 
do not necessarily have faith in the Constitution or in the consti-
tutional project; rather they live in perpetual anxiety that the 
Constitution will fail the nation and therefore not deserve its le-
gitimacy. "Living constitutionalism's core animating anxiety is 
that the Constitution (and most especially its original meaning) 
may not be binding."2' "[P]essimism and anxiety" about the 
document, Leib suggests, "underwrite[] living constitutionalism 
itself. "26 
The Constitution, Leib explains "is only our Constitution 
because it is suffused with and supported by contemporary as-
sent."27 However, "living constitutionalists do not pledge 
faith ... before interpretation gets off the ground.""H "Without an 
effort to tether the contemporary generation's consent to the 
document and its principles, it might ultimately be legitimate to 
abandon it altogether. That threat is very real for the living con-
stitutionalist, who can revere and venerate the document only 
when it is unmoored from its original meaning. "29 Scratch a living 
constitutionalist, Leib seems to be saying, and you will find a 
constitutional skeptic-one who distrusts the Constitution and 
will break from it unless we can make it to conform to what is 
just (or, what may be a very different thing, what is acceptable to 
the present). 
Leib's version of living constitutionalism denies that the 
document can be binding on us before we know whether the 
Constitution generates results that make it legitimate in the eyes 
of the present generation. Hence, we cannot pledge faith in the 
Constitution until we are sure that it will give us more or less 
what we want. ''Our civic life," he explains. cannot "requir[ e] 
24. Leib, supra note 1. at 354. 367-69. 
25. !d. at 354. 
26. !d. at 359 n.19. 
27. !d. at 360. 
28. /d. 
29. !d. 
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adherence to our governing document just because it happens to 
exist and happens to help constitute us as a people. The docu-
ment and our life under it always stands in need of moral, practi-
cal, and political justification ... at the very moment when we 
ask for the meaning of the document. "30 Leib is nothing if not 
candid on this point: The "purported lack of fidelity (and actual 
lack of faith from time to time), disrespect for the document, and 
too substantial delegation to the judiciary go a long way in ex-
plainin~ why living constitutionalism is unattractive to so 
many." 1 If that is what living constitutionalism is, one can easily 
see why. 
Leib correctly understands that constitutional interpretation 
is deeply connected to questions of faith and legitimacy. The 
Constitution has been used to perpetrate great injustices in the 
past, and it may still permit very great injustices; therefore we 
must not turn it into an object of idolatry. 32 Even so, I think Leib 
does not describe the proper relationship between interpretative 
fidelity and faith in the Constitution. Interpretive fidelity cannot 
be premised, as Leib seems to suggest, on a basic distrust of the 
Constitution and continuing doubts about its legitimacy. Inter-
pretive fidelity, and in particular fidelity to a written Constitu-
tion, requires attitudes about the document and the constitu-
tional project that are the opposite of the qualities that Leib 
offers us. 
Interpreting the Constitution as members of a political 
community governed by the Constitution presupposes a desire to 
be faithful to it. If we do not seek to be faithful to the Constitu-
tion, we may be trying to improve the Constitution, but we are 
not trying to interpret it.33 But to be faithful to the Constitution, 
we cannot view it with perpetual distrust, much less perpetual 
anxiety. Quite the contrary: we must put ourselves on the side of 
the Constitution, so to speak. We must seek to defend it from 
those who would abuse it or misuse it, even-and perhaps espe-
cially-if our views about what the Constitution says are not the 
views of the majority or of the powerful. Above all, to be faithful 
30. /d. at 363. 
31. /d. at 362. 
32. I regard these themes as central to my work. See Jack M. Balkin. Agreements 
with Hell and Other Objects of our Faith. 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703 (1997) [hereinafter 
Balkin. Agreements with Hell); Jack M. Balkin, Idolatry and Faith: The Jurisprudence of 
Sanford Levinson. 38 TULSA L. REV. 553 (2003) [hereinafter Balkin, Idolatry and Faith). 
33. Balkin. Agreements with Hell. supra note 32. at 1705 ("To claim to interpret the 
Constitution is already to claim to be faithful to it .... When we say that fidelity is not 
important to us. we are no longer interpreting the Constitution. we are criticizing it."). 
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to the Constitution, we must see ourselves as continuing a consti-
tutional project that stretches back to the past and forward to 
the future. Perpetual anxiety and suspicion toward that project 
may be an important political or intellectual activity. But it is not 
interpretation. 
All constitutions are imperfect, in part because of the cir-
cumstances of their origin and the compromises necessary to 
bring them into being. All constitutions are "Agreements with 
Hell," to use William Lloyd Garrison's famous phrase.34 Pre-
cisely for that reason, fidelity to the document requires a leap of 
faith in the document and the institutions of government based 
on the document. To interpret the document faithfully, we must 
buy into the constitutional project and make it our own project. 
As I have explained in previous work, buying in too easily 
or in the wrong way to this project leads to ideological effects 
and to idolatry.35 I think that Leib is worried about these issues 
as well, and correctly so. Yet I believe that living constitutional-
ism can avoid those dangers by being unstintingly honest- both 
about the Constitution's failings and about its resources for re-
demption. 
The faith that constitutional interpretation requires is not 
blind faith. It is not idolatry, or a belief that our Constitution is 
the best and wisest constitution ever crafted by human hands. 
Rather, constitutional interpretation requires faith that even if 
some aspects of the document and its associated institutions are 
far from perfect, the latter are good enough to justify the bene-
fits of political union (and the use of force to compel obedience 
to the law), and that the system of constitutional government can 
and will become still better over time. What if we do not believe 
that the Constitution currently meets even the minimum stan-
dards of justice required for legitimacy? Then constitutional in-
terpretation requires the faith that, if we commit ourselves to the 
constitutional project, the Constitution will, in time, measure up 
to the appropriate standards.36 
34. The phrase comes from a resolution Garrison introduced before the Massachu-
setts Anti-Slavery Society in 1843. arguing that the Union should be disbanded: "That 
the compact which exists between the North and South is ·a covenant with death. and an 
agreement with hell' -involving both parties in atrocious criminality; and should be im-
mediately annulled." WALTER M. MERRILL, AGAINST WIND AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY 
OFWM. LLOYD GARRISON 205 (1963). 
35. Balkin. Agreements with Hell. supra note 32. at 1704. 1729-36; Balkin. Idolatry 
and Faith. supra note 32. at 55~5. 
36. These points are developed in Jack M. Balkin. Respect Worthy: Frank Michel-
man and the Legitimate Constitution. 39 TULSA L. REv. 485 (2004) [hereinafter Balkin. 
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In short, interpretive fidelity requires faith in the re-
deemability of the Constitution over time. That faith is three-
fold: faith in the possibilities contained in the document, faith in 
the institutions that grow up around the document, and finally, 
faith in the American people who will ultimately determine the 
interpretation and direction of the document and its associated 
institutions. All three forms of faith are necessary. We must be-
lieve that the text has sufficient adaptability to remedy the injus-
tices of the present and the challenges of the future, that our po-
litical institutions are not incorrigible, and that our nation is able 
to learn from its mistakes and improve itself over time. These 
elements of faith are not limited to faith in the U.S. Constitution; 
they are key elements of faith in constitutional democracy gen-
erally. If we do not believe these things, debates over interpreta-
tion are pretty much pointless; it is time to start over and engage 
in very different kinds of political activity.37 
The connections between interpretive fidelity and faith are 
clear in the etymology of the word "fidelity," whose Latin root, 
"fides," means trust or faith. To have fidelity to a person or a 
thing is to believe in them, in what they are now or what they 
could be in time. Moreover, fidelity is a two way street-we are 
faithful to others because we expect (or hope) that they will be 
faithful to us and not betray us. We believe this even though we 
do not know whether this will turn out to be the case; that is 
what makes our attitude faith rather than mere prediction based 
on reasonable evidence. Thus, to have faith in an institution like 
the Constitution is to believe that over time the Constitution will 
Respect Worthy]. 
37. That might be the case if the real source of the Constitution's illegitimacy is not 
in its open-ended clauses but rather in features that are not easily susceptible to later 
constitutional construction or statutory work-arounds. Like Leib. I have been deeply in-
fluenced bv mv friend Sanford Levinson's work on constitutional faith. SANFORD 
LEVI!\SON .. CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988). In 1988. Levinson was willing to sign the 
Constitution of the United States out of the belief that the constitutional conversation 
would develop into institutions that would respect human rights. !d. at 193. By 2006, Lev-
inson has given up his constitutional faith. and it is instructive to consider why. Levinson 
does not think the problem is with the open-ended clauses of the Constitution-the ones 
that most people fight about most of the time. Indeed. he thinks that the Constitution 
contains sufficient resources to provide whatever citizens might want for the protection 
of human rights. Rather. Levinson objects to the "hard-wired" features of the Constitu-
tional svstem embodied in determinate rules-like the Presidential veto. equal suffrage 
in the Senate. and the electoral college. These. he argues. are the real reason why we 
should abandon our Constitution. See LEVINSON. supra note 20. The irony is obvious. 
Most living constitutionalists do not quibble about these features of the Constitution or 
see them as the objects of aspirational interpretation. Rather. they spend most of their 
time worried about the contemporary meaning of the open-ended provisions like the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
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not let us down and betray our trust, that the Constitution can 
and eventually will live up to our hopes for it. This faith is not 
simply faith in the magical powers of constitutional texts, but a 
faith in the redeemability of political institutions and of a people 
over time. That faith, I think, is the very essence of living consti-
tutionalism. 
Conversely, to be "faithless" means both to lack faith and to 
betray. The two often go together. If we do not believe in an in-
stitution, we are less likely to feel we must play by its rules. If we 
lack faith in other people, we expect them to let us down or even 
betray us, and so it may be wise to protect our interests at their 
expense. Sometimes, of course, lack of faith in other people-or 
in institutions-may be a self-fulfilling prophecy. The institutions 
fail, the people betray us, because we and others were unwilling 
to believe in them. To interpret the Constitution in good faith as 
a member of the political community, one must buy into the con-
stitutional project. Constitutional interpretation cannot be prem-
ised on the attitude that we will only be faithful to the Constitu-
tion to the extent that we think it will say what we approve of. 
This is both a question of interpretive attitude and a question of 
procedural fairness to others in the community whom we expect 
to obey the Constitution and the law. If I do not commit myself 
to playing by the rules of the game, why should I expect other 
people in my community to do so, and what justifies my criticism 
of other people if I think they have twisted or warped the Con-
stitution to their own ends? I can certainly argue that what they 
have done is unjust or hypocritical. But I can hardly oppose their 
actions on the grounds that they have failed to abide by princi-
ples of faithful interpretation that I refuse to abide by. 
I do not accept Leib's description of living constitutionalism 
because it lacks features that I have always associated with living 
constitutionalism- an abiding faith in the American constitu-
tional project and in the redemption of the Constitution through 
history. Leib incorrectly describes these features as distrust, pes-
simism, and anxiety about the Constitution. He does this, I think, 
because he is trying to capture the aspirational elements of living 
constitutionalism, but he describes them in the wrong way. 
Aspirationalism does not begin with unqualified acceptance 
of the Constitution's legitimacy. It does not assume that the 
Constitution is perfectly fine just as it is. Rather, it starts with the 
assumption that the Constitution exists, and always has existed, 
in a fallen condition. It is a collection of moral and political 
compromises placed in an imperfect document and situated in 
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imperfect political institutions. Nevertheless, this document and 
these institutions form part of a project stretching throughout 
history, a project that contains resources for its own redemption. 
Aspirationalism holds that the Constitution contains commit-
ments that we have only partially lived up to, promises that have 
yet to be fulfilled. The point of aspirationalism is not to overlook 
the Constitution's faults or its promises- but to take both with 
the utmost seriousness. 38 To see the Constitution as aspiring to 
greater justice and moral legitimacy we must first recognize the 
past and present evils in our political institutions that the Consti-
tution has supported and still supports. There can be no redemp-
tion without the recognition of sin. At the same time, we must 
recognize those elements in the Constitution- both in the 
document itself and in its associated institutions-that make this 
redemption possible. I argue that we can find many of these re-
demptive elements in the Constitution's basic structure and in its 
text and underlying principles. I argue, in short, that one reason 
why our Constitution is redeemable is that parts of it were de-
signed to be redeemable-it contains language that can be 
adapted to changing times and circumstances and it contains 
moral and political principles that demand the continual im-
provement of our institutions. This, too, I regard as the very es-
sence of living constitutionalism. 
III. ORIGINAL MEANING AND ORIGINAL 
EXPECTED APPLICATION 
Mitch Berman is puzzled that I emphasize the distinction 
between original meaning and original expected application. 
Most originalists, he correctly points out, long abandoned origi-
nal intention in favor of some form of original meaning original-
ism. These originalists recognize that the original meaning of the 
text is not always limited to the concrete expectations of the 
framers; the framers could be mistaken about some applications 
and changed circumstances might lead to different results. Only 
Justice Scalia, Berman, argues, seems to assume that fidelity to 
original meaning requires fidelity to original expectations. If so, 
38. Balkin. Agreements With Hell. supra note 32. at 1716--17. 1719-20. See also Amy 
Kapczynski. Historicism, Progress, and. the Redemptive Constitution. 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1041, 1113 (2005) (arguing that progressive accounts of history "commit themselves 
to a narrative of improvement that blinds them to both the threats and possibilities of 
today. By cutting themselves loose from the aspects of the past that appear disastrous. 
progressives also fail to see that some of the historical forces they think have been over-
come in fact still operate."). 
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Berman asks, why do I pay so much attention to Scalia's form of 
originalism, and why do I assert that many originalists still con-
flate original meaning with original expected application?39 
Scalia's views are important for two reasons. First, not to 
put too fine a point on it, Scalia has more votes on the Supreme 
Court than either Berman or I do. Second, he is the most promi-
nent and public popularizer of original meaning originalism-
"the proverbial 500-pound gorilla in the interpretive debate," as 
Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen once put it.40 Origi-
nal meaning originalism is on the map today in large part be-
cause of Scalia's efforts,41 and so it is particularly important to 
pay attention to how he imagines the methodology should work 
in practice. 
Beyond Scalia's arguments, however, is the larger commu-
nity of original meaning originalists. There has been important 
theoretical work done on originalism since the 1980s which goes 
beyond Scalia's initial formulation.42 My article, which is a con-
tribution to both originalism and living constitutionalism, at-
tempts to move that analysis along, making salient the logical 
consequences of the turn to original meaning. Berman correctly 
notes that because original meaning is logically distinct from 
original expected application, originalists are not bound by 
original expectations; but because they are not logically bound 
by expected applications, he assumes that originalists are not 
strongly guided by them in practice. My claim is that although 
the two concepts are distinct in theory, the turn to original mean-
ing, particularly among conservative originalists, has not empha-
sized the distinction, in part because the distinction is not salient 
to the reasons why conservatives moved from original intention 
to original meaning in the first place. Quite the contrary: conser-
39. Berman. supra note 1. at 384-90. 
40. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen. The lnterprerive Force of rhe Consri-
rurion 's Secrel Drafring Hislory. 91 GEO. L.J. 1113. 1140 (2003). 
41. /d. 
42. E.g., BARNEIT. supra note 7: KEITH E. WHIITINGTON. CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING. ORIGINAL INTENT. AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1999): Ronald Dworkin. Commenr. in A MAITER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 115 (Amy Gutmann ed .. 1997): John F. Manning. The Eleventh 
Amendmenl and rhe Reading of Precise Consrirurional Texis. 113 YALE L.J. 1663 (2004): 
Caleb Nelson. Originalism and Interprerive Convenrions. 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (2003): 
Kesavan & Paulsen. supra note 40: Gary Lawson. Delegalion and Original Meaning. 88 
VA. L. REV. 327 (2002): Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman. The Meaning of Original 
Meaning. 86 GEO. L.J. 569 (1998): Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash. The 
Presidenr's Power To Execure rhe Laws. 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994): Lawrence B. Solum. 
Originalism as Transformarive Polirics. 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599 ( 1989). 
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vative originalist practices of argument tend to conflate original 
meaning and original expected applications. To explain why that 
is so, a little history may be in order. 
Contemporary originalism arose from efforts by conserva-
tive legal scholars and politicians to combat what they saw as 
overreaching by liberal judicial decisions in the Warren and 
Burger Courts, what is sometimes referred to as liberal judicial 
activism. 43 In the early 1980s conservative lawyers like Attorney 
General Edwin Meese argued for a return to a jurisprudence of 
"original intention"44 that would push courts back toward the 
proper path and show appropriate respect for democratic deci-
sionmaking. The argument for fidelity to original intention arose 
out of more general conservative political and social movements 
that sought to correct the perceived excesses of liberal policies.4; 
But even as the theory was announced by Meese and others, 
lawyers and legal scholars began refining it. Originalist theorists 
quickly moved from original intention to original understanding, 
and then to original meaning, in order to respond to difficulties 
with the original formulation.46 The first problem was that 
43. See DENNIS J. GOLD FORD. THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE 
OVER 0RIGINALISM (2005); JOHNATHAN O'NEILL. 0RIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW 
AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel. 
The Right's Living Constitution; 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006); Keith Whittington. 
The New Originalism. 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599, 601 (2004). 
44. See Edwin Meese III, Address before the American Bar Association, in THE 
GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 9 (Paul G. Castle ed .. 
1986): Edwin Meese III. Address before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Law-
yers Division. in OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE. ORIGINAL 
MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 91 (1987); Edwin Meese III. Construing the 
Constitution. 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 22.25-26 (1985) [hereinafter Meese. Construing the 
Constitution]. Meese sometimes used the terms "original intention" and "original mean-
ing" interchangeably. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, The Supreme Court of the United States: 
Bulwark of a Limited Constitution. 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455. 465-66 (1986) ("It has been 
and will continue to be the policy of this administration to press for a jurisprudence of 
original intention. In the cases we file and those we join as amicus, we will endeavor to 
resurrect the original meaning of constitutional provisions and statutes as the only reli-
able guide for judgment."). 
45. Post & Siegel. supra note 43; Whittington. supra note 43: Barry Friedman. 
Originalism and Judicial Activism (2007) (unpublished manuscript). 
Before Meese. Raoul Berger had advocated interpretation according to original in-
tention. RAOUL BERGER. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). Berger's originalism, however, did not arise 
from political objections to contemporary liberalism but from his positivism. formalism 
and hostility to natural rights jurisprudence. O'NEILL, supra note 43. at 112-13. Berger 
saw in both the Lochner era Court and in the later Warren and Burger Courts natural 
law and moral ideals overriding constitutional limitations and judicial restraint. !d. 
46. For accounts of the shift from original intentions to original meaning. see Kesa-
van & Paulsen. supra note 40. at 1137-40; BARNETT, supra note 7, at 90-91. See also 
O'NEILL. supra note 43. at 158 ("Originalists responded tactically by de-emphasizing the 
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"original intention" seemed to focus on the intentions of the per-
sons who drafted the document, but surely it was the ratifiers' 
views that counted because only they had the authority to make 
the proposed Constitution law. "Original understanding" better 
captured a focus on the authorizing audience for the text as op-
posed to the text's drafters. The second, and more important 
problem was the charge of psychologism. Critics argued that we 
cannot identify the law with the psychological states of particular 
historical actors-whether framers or ratifiers-because they 
may not have all shared the same mental states, because their in-
tentions might be unknowable, and because they may have had 
no intentions about states of affairs that did not or could not ob-
tain when they lived.47 In 1985 H. Jefferson Powell added an-
other criticism: the generation that framed the Constitution did 
not believe that looking to framers' intentions was an appropri-
ate interpretive strategy; they believed that purpose and inten-
tion should be derived from the public words of the text.48 
Original meaning originalism sought to address these prob-
lems by focusing not on the mental states of framers or ratifiers 
but on the general and publicly shared meanings of the text at 
the time of enactment.49 Spurred on by Justice Scalia and mem-
bers of the Reagan Justice Department,50 conservative lawyers 
and academics began to work out the details of the new theory. 51 
word intent. though of course not the jurisprudential approach associated with it.") (em-
phasis in original). 
47. For early and influential discussions. see Paul Brest. The Misconceived Quest 
for the Original Understanding. 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980): Mark V. Tushnet. Following 
the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles. 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 781. 793-804 (1983). For a response defending original intention originalism, see 
Richard S. Kay. Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: 
Three Objections and Responses. 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226. 244 (1988). 
48. H. Jefferson Powell. The Original Understanding of Original Intent. 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 885. 887-88 (1985): H. Jefferson Powell. Rules for Originalists. 73 VA. L. REV. 
659 (1987). 
49. Scholars have offered various formulations over the years. See, e.g .. Calabresi & 
Prakash. supra note 42. at 552 (meaning of the Constitution and other legal writings like 
statutes. contracts. wills and judicial opinions "depends on their text. as they were objec-
tively understood by the people who enacted or ratified them."): Gary Lawson. Legal 
Theory: Proving the Law. 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 859.875 (1992) (defining "originalist textu-
alism" as "a method which searches for the ordinary public meanings that the Constitu-
tion's words. read in linguistic. structural. and historical context. had at the time of those 
words' origin.'' (citing Gary Lawson. In Praise of Woodenness. 11 GEO. MASON U.L. 
REV. 21. 22 (1988))): Kesavan & Paulsen. supra note 40. at 1131 (originalist textualism 
requires "faithful application of the words and phrases of the text in accordance with the 
meaning they would have had at the time they were adopted as law. within the political 
and linguistic community that adopted the text as law."). 
50. Antonin Scalia. Address Before the Attorney General's Conference on Eco-
nomic Liberties (June 14. 1986). in ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A 
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Original intention originalism offered conservative lawyers, 
judges and legal scholars a jurisprudential account of why liberal 
judicial activism from the 1960's forward had been illegitimate. It 
was widely assumed that many, if not most, of these liberal deci-
sions were inconsistent with the Framers' intentions; this fact, 
SOURCEBOOK. supra note 44. at 101: OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE. supra note 44. at 14 ("'Our fundamental law is the text of the Constitution as 
ratified. not the subjective intent or purpose of any individual or group in adopting the 
provision at issue ... ): OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. 
GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL L!TIGA TION 3-6 ( 1988). For a discussion. see Nelson. 
supra note 42. at 555 (2003). 
51. Robert Bork's The Tempting of America represents a transitional document 
between original understanding and original meaning. One of his research assistants was 
Stephen Calabresi. who would later help champion the new textualism. See ROBERT 
BORK. THE TEMPTII'G OF AMERICA. at xvii (1990). Thus the work contains pronounce-
ments that endorse original meaning originalism. see. e.g .. id. at 144-45. while Bork's 
substantive views in the book reflect his previous attachment to the philosophy of origi-
nal intention and original understanding. Kesavan & Paulsen. supra note 40. at 1141 & 
n.96: Robert H. Bork. Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems. 47 No. 
L.J. 1 (1971) (offering positivist and majoritarian justifications for originalism): Robert 
H. Bork. The Constiwtion, Original Intent and Economic Rights. 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
823. 823 (1986) ("'I wish to demonstrate that original intent is the only legitimate basis for 
constitutional decisionmaking ... ). 
Bork argued that judges were bound by the principles intended by the framers. a 
formula that allowed judges to take into account technological changes and to apply the 
document to conditions unforeseen by the framers. /d. at 826. Although this did not 
mean that "'judges will invariably decide cases the way the Framers would if they were 
here today ... many cases will be decided that way ... /d. He argued that the framers· 
principles should be discovered and applied "'by choosing no level of generality higher 
than that which the interpretations of the words. structure. and history of the Constitu-
tion fairly support.'' /d. at 828. Hence the Equal Protection Clause could not protect ho-
mosexuals because .. equality on matters such as sexual orientation was not under discus-
sion.·· /d. In essence. Bork claimed that the scope of constitutional principles was defined 
by the framers· original expected application. but that such principles. once defined. 
could be applied to circumstances that the framers did not foresee. such as "'apply[ing] 
the first amendment's Free Press Clause to the electronic media:· or "'the Commerce 
Clause to state regulations of interstate trucking ... /d. at 826. At the same time, Bork ar-
gued that sufficient reliance had grown up around the construction of the administrative 
and regulatory state that courts had to retain New Deal Commerce Clause decisions that 
were inconsistent with the Framers· intentions: the same might be true of many other 
features of current doctrine. Philip Lacovara. A Talk with Judge Robert H. Bork. 
DISTRICT LAWYER. May/June 1985. at 29. 32: Nomination of Judge Robert H. Bork: 
Hearings before the Senate Commiuee on the Judiciary. 100th Cong. 112-13. 264--65, 292-
93. 465 (1987). reprinted in 14 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE. 1916-1987, at 292-
93. 444-45. 472-73. 645 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds .. 1989) [hereinafter 
HEARINGS AND REPORTS] (testimony of Robert H. Bork from Sept. 15. 1987- Sept. 19, 
1987). 
Bork gives no evidence in The Tempting of America that the change in terminology 
from original intentions of the framers to original understanding to original meaning 
would require a shift in his previous substantive positions. This conflation of original 
meaning and what I would call adherence to original expected application is hardly 
unique to Bork. although his example suggests why the conflation would occur. 
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and not mere political disagreement with the substance of these 
decisions, explained why they were illegitimate.'2 Adherence to 
original intentions would restrain judges and restore democracy. 
The turn to original meaning was designed to preserve these 
basic insights, not to undermine them. To be sure, it brought 
some changes. First, original meaning originalism might cause 
scholars to look to new kinds of historical evidence- for exam-
ple, dictionaries-and to look to other historical evidence differ-
ently than before- for example, as evidence of what a reason-
able and well-informed person living at the time of enactment 
would have understood the constitutional text to mean.53 Second, 
52. Meese, Construing the Constitution. supra note 44. at 29: Edwin Meese III. Dia-
logue: A Return to Constitutional Interpretation From Judicial Law-Making. 40 N.Y.L 
SCH. L. REV. 925. 930-33 (1996): WHITIINGTON. supra note 42. at 599: O'NEILL. supra 
note 43. at 133--60. The Office of Legal Policy's ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: 
A SOURCEBOOK. supra note 44. listed several examples of recent cases that employed 
"'non-interpretive jurisprudence:· id. at 58-64. including Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 
(1961) (announcing the exclusionary rule): Engel v. Vitale. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (striking 
down practice of nondenominational school prayer in public schools): Griswold v. Con-
necticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding unconstitutional prohibition on use of contracep-
tives by married couples): Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring specific 
procedures governing police interrogation of all criminal suspects): Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan. 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding features of the 1965 Voting Rights Act on grounds of 
Congress's authority to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment): Shapiro v. Thompson. 
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding that constitutional right to travel prevented denial of wel-
fare benefits to those who did not meet one-year residency requirement): Perez v. United 
States. 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding federal crime of ""loansharking"" under Commerce 
Clause): Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (striking down then-existing capital 
punishment statutes under Eighth Amendment): Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973): and 
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (holding that public school students had a con-
stitutional "'right to receive ideas"" in public school libraries). The Sourcebook cautioned. 
however. that "'[t]he ultimate results reached in these cases do not necessarily differ from 
the meaning. but the analysis in each case is both illegitimate and representative of the 
jurisprudence advocated by non-interpretivists today... ORIGINAL MEANING 
JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK. supra at 44. 
53. See Kesavan & Paulsen. supra note 40. at 1143-49. Gary Lawson's version of 
original meaning originalism is particularly worthy of note because he takes this premise 
further that most contemporary originalists. He argues that originalism ""is a hypothetical 
inquiry that asks how a fully informed public audience. knowing all that there is to know 
about the Constitution and the surrounding world. would understand a particular provi-
sion. Actual historical understandings are. of course. relevant to that inquiry. but they do 
not conclude or define the inquiry-nor are they even necessarily the best available evi-
dence." Gary Lawson. Delegation and Original Meaning. 88 VA. L. REV. 327. 398. Law-
son's "'ideal observer"" approach to original meaning gives him a different focus than 
other originalists: it means. for example. that the political statements and decisions of 
early politicians are not necessarily trustworthy guides to original meaning. In particular. 
"members of Congress. even those who participated in the drafting and ratification of the 
Constitution. are not disinterested observers. They are political actors. responding to po-
litical as well as legal influences. who are eminently capable of making mistakes about 
the meaning of the Constitution."" /d. Hence. early Congressional acts were ·•postenact-
ment legislative history that ranks fairly low down on the hierarchv of reliable evidence 
concerning original meaning" and ""whatever evidence can be gle~ned from early stat-
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adherents of original meaning insisted that the theory was per-
fectly consistent with applying constitutional guarantees to new 
technologies.54 Finally, although originalists often tied their cri-
tique of the Warren and Burger Courts to calls for judicial re-
straint, advocates of original meaning did not oppose courts 
striking down some laws- for example, laws that trenched on 
state sovereignty-where text, history, and structure supported 
it. This evolution in views on judicial restraint became particu-
larly important as conservative judges began to dominate the 
federal courts.55 
Nevertheless, the turn to original meaning was not designed 
to drive a wedge between the text's public meaning and how the 
frami11g generation would have expected the text would be ap-
plied.56 That distinction, which I call the distinction between 
original meaning and original expected application, was not par-
ticularly salient in the move to original meaning. Original mean-
ing originalism sought to put originalism on a stronger theoreti-
cal footing, not to undo the conservative critique of liberal 
judicial activism. Far from it: conservative lawyers and judges in 
the midst of a powerful social movement would hardly have 
turned to a theory of interpretation that they believed would 
subvert most of their settled views about constitutional law. 
They assumed that original meaning originalism, like the juris-
prudence of original intention, would discipline courts and pre-
vent them from new adventures. 57 As Caleb Nelson put it,"our 
utes-and there is evidence in both directions-is minimally relevant." /d. 
54. See ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK. supra note 44. at 
24-25. 
55. WHITIINGTON. supra note 42. at 167-168. 
56. For example. The Reagan Justice Department's Guidelines on Constitutional 
Litigation explained that in cases involving the Constitution's vague or abstract clauses. 
lawyers should look to the intended scope of a constitutional provision: 
[T)erms such as "equal protection" or "free exercise" are less easy to define. 
making a more detailed inquiry into the historical context or other evidence of 
the intent of those responsible for drafting or ratifying the provision not only 
useful. but necessary to discover the values and principles embodied in those 
terms. While there is no mechanistic formula for discovering underlying values 
and principles and applying them to particular issues, a genuine attempt is re-
quired to discover those values and principles and their intended scope from 
particular constitutional provisions (alone or in concert with other provisions), 
and then to apply them in a manner consistent with the original meaning. 
GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LiTIGATION. supra note 50, at 5. To assist lawyers in 
discovering these values and principles. the Guidelines included a helpful bibliography 
"of sources available for gleaning historical evidence of the Founders' intentions." /d. at 
11. 
57. As Justice Scalia explained at his confirmation hearings, there was "not a big 
difference" between the two ideas. Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia: Hearings before 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 99th Cong. (1986), reprinted in 13 HEARINGS AND 
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views of 'original meaning' and 'original intention' will tend to 
converge in practice even if the two concepts remain distinct in 
theory. "58 
That is where my argument comes in. Scholars like Ronald 
Dworkin,59 Randy Barnett,60 Mark Greenberg, and Harry Lit-
man"1 have pointed out that the move to original meaning had an 
unintended consequence. Fidelity to original meaning did not 
require following what the framing generation thought the con-
sequences of adopting the words would be. That is especially so 
when the text employs abstract principles. Abortion and Original 
Meaning demonstrates this with respect to one issue that few 
people believed was consistent with originalism of any sort: the 
abortion right. However, as I have argued, the abortion right (al-
though not the logic of Roe v. Wade"2 itself) is consistent with the 
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, for 
that matter, so are the results in Romer v. Evanl3 and Lawrence 
v. Texas. 64 Once we understand the logical consequences of mov-
ing from original intention and original understanding to original 
meaning, we see that original meaning originalism-or at least 
the version I offer here-is actually a form of living constitution-
alism. 
Although Berman is correct that most originalists have 
adopted some form of original meaning originalism, it does not 
follow that they all have adopted a form of original meaning that 
sharply distinguishes between original meaning and original ex-
pected application. Today's original meaning originalists often 
view original expected applications as very strong evidence of 
original meaning, even (or perhaps especially) when the text 
points to abstract principles or standards. That is why I argued 
that today's originalists often conflate the two ideas in practice. 
REPORTS. supra note 51. at 89. 142 (testimony of Antonin Scalia on Aug. 5. 1986). 
58. Nelson. supra note 42. at 558. 
59. Dworkin, supra note 42, at 115, 116. 119; RONALD DWORKIN. FREEDOM'S 
LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE CONSTITUTION 13. 291-92 (1996); Ronald 
Dworkin. The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve. 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1255-58 (1997); Ronald Dworkin. Reflections on Fidelity. 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1799, 1803--{)8 (1997). 
60. Randy E. Barnett. An Originalism for Nonoriginalists. 45 LOY. L REV. 611 
(1999). 
61. Greenberg & Litman. supra note 42. 
62. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
63. 517 u.s. 620 (1996). 
64. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In my view both laws would violate the principle against 
class and caste legislation. See Balkin. supra note 2, at 322-28. 
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Rather than try to offer a survey of contemporary original-
ists to prove this point, let me offer two illustrative examples. 
The first is Michael McConnell's well-known originalist defense 
of Brown v. Board of Education in 1995.65 Before McConnell's 
article, most people accepted Alexander Bickel's conclusion that 
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to 
prohibit segregated public schools. 66 In fact, there was consider-
able opposition to desegregated schools throughout the country 
at the time of the Amendment.67 However, McConnell showed 
that in the years following the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, many of the Congressmen and Senators who pro-
posed the Fourteenth Amendment argued for desegregation of 
schools in proposed federal legislation (what eventually became 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875).68 Moreover, they supported this 
legislation on constitutional grounds, because they believed that 
segregated public schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although scholars have pointed out various problems with 
the argument,69 my goal here is not to dispute McConnell's con-
clusions. My point, rather, is that his research, while admirable, 
is completely unnecessary once we accept the distinction be-
tween original meaning and original expected application. For 
an original meaning originalist- at least one of my persuasion-
Brown is a supremely easy case. The Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits class legislation and caste legislation.70 Segregation of 
public schools, like segregation of public facilities generally, was 
designed to single out a particular group for special burdens and 
disabilities, subordinate them and send a message about their in-
feriority. Therefore it violates the Equal Protection Clause. That 
is true whether or not the generation of 1868 believed or ex-
65. Michael W. McConnell. Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions. 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947 (1995) [hereinafter McConnell. Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions]: 
Michael W. McConnell . The Originalist Justification for Brown: a Reply to Professor 
Klarman. 81 VA. L. REV. 1937 (1995) [hereinafter McConnell. Originalist Justification for 
Brown]. 
66. Alexander M. Bickel. The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision. 
69 HARV. L. REV.l (1955). 
67. McConnell. Originalist Justification for Brown. supra note 65. at 1938-39 
( .. school desegregation was deeply unpopular among whites, in both North and South. 
and school segregation was very commonly practiced ... ): Earl M. Maltz. Originalism And 
The Desegregation Decisions-A Response To Professor McConnell. 13 CONST. 
COMMENT. 223. 228-29 (1996): Michael J. Klarman. Brown, Originalism, and Constitu-
tional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell. 81 VA. L. REV. 1881. 1885-94 (1995). 
68. McConnell. Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, supra note 65, at 953. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was struck down in the Civil Rights Cases. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
69. Maltz. supra note 67.224-228: Klarman, supra note 67. 1901-1928. 
70. See Balkin. supra note 2, at 313-16. 
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pected that segregation violated the principle against class and 
caste legislation. What matters is the original meaning of the text 
and its underlying principles, not how people expected the text 
would be applied. 
If that is so, all McConnell had to do was explain that the 
text of the Equal Protection Clause enacted the principles 
against class legislation and caste legislation and then apply 
these principles to the case of segregated schools in 1954. In the 
alternative, he could have used the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, which guaranteed civil equality for citizens. By 1954, 
McConnell argued, it was generally accepted that education was 
a civil right. 71 Hence segregated public schools violated the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause. In fact, because the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause also contains an anti-class 
legislation principle/' segregation of public schools also probably 
violates the Due Process Clause. Under my original meaning ap-
proach, the case for Brown is overdetermined by three different 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment! 
It takes about two paragraphs to explain this. 73 So why did 
McConnell take dozens of pages? The answer is that he assumed 
that the best way to prove the original meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment was to show how the Congress that pro-
posed it would have interpreted and applied it. That is, he 
thought that the best evidence of original meaning was evidence 
of original expected application. Equally interesting is that 
McConnell did not use evidence of original expected application 
by the ratifiers of the Amendment-whom McConnell conceded 
probably strongly supported school segregation.74 Rather, he 
used evidence of original expected application by the framers-
Republican supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment in Con-
gress. Ironically, McConnell made his case for original meaning 
71. McConnell. Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions. supra note 65, at 
1103--04. McConnelL Originalist Justification for Brown. supra note 65, at 1951. 
72. Balkin. supra note 2. at 314-15 & n.53: See James W. Ely Jr.. The Oxymoron 
Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process. 16 CONST. 
COMMENT. 315. 337-38 (1999): Melissa L Saunders. Equal Protection, Class Legislation, 
and Colorblindness. 96 MICH. L REV. 245. 258-59 & n. 58 (1997): Mark G. Yudof, Equal 
Protection, Class Legislation and Sex Discrimination: One Small Cheer For Mr. Herbert 
Spencers Social Statics. 88 MICH. L REV. 1366. 1376 (1990). 
73. Charles Black did it more elegantly in about eleven pages. And he did it 
roughly contemporaneous with Brown. See Charles Black. The Lawfulness of the Segre-
gation Decisions. 69 Yale LJ. 421 (1960). 
74. McConnelL Originalist Justification for Brown. supra note 65. at 1938-39. 
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by making a case based on the original intentions of the fram-
7" ers. · 
My second example of how original meaning and original 
expected applications run together in practice comes from this 
very symposium. John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport argue 
that a "strong dichotomy between original expected applications 
and original meaning" is "improbabl[ e). "76 "[W)hile the original 
meaning may not be defined by the expected applications," 
McGinnis and Rappaport explain, "these applications will often 
be some of the best evidence of what that meaning is."77 This is 
true, they argue, even "when a constitutional provision is best 
understood as adopting a general understanding or principle." 
because "verbal formulations often do not tell us which particu-
lar variation of a principle was intended. "78 Hence, even if the 
Equal Protection Clause enacts "an anticaste principle, ... it 
may not clearly indicate the version of the principle that was 
adopted-to what extent, and under what circumstances, the 
principle allowed distinctions between different groups. The ex-
pected applications will help us determine which version of the 
principle was adopted."79 Put in more concrete terms, we should 
not assume that the anticaste principle applies to legislation that 
burdens women or homosexuals if the generation that produced 
the Fourteenth Amendment would not have applied the princi-
75. One reason he did so is that McConnell believed that the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments were different from ordinary amendments. The views of Congress 
mattered more than the views of the ratifiers. so that even if '"school desegregation was 
deeply unpopular" among the ratifiers. it was the understandings of Congress that 
counted. McConnell. Originalist Justification for Brown. supra note 65. at 1939 ('"these 
were not ordinary times. This was a time when a political minority. armed with the pres-
tige of victory in the Civil War and with military control over the political apparatus of 
the rebel states. imposed constitutional change on the Nation as the price of reunion. 
with little regard for popular opinion."). As McConnell explained in his original article: 
[F]ar more than other amendments. the Fourteenth Amendment was a congres-
sional creation. The states and the people exercised little control. The state rati-
fication debates did not dwell on the details of the proposed Amendment. 
and-an important point-the margin of victory for the Amendment was at-
tained by coercion of the Southern states rather than by winning the support of 
the electorate in three-fourths of the States. When an Amendment obtains its 
supermajority through congressional exercise of its power to condition readmis-
sion of states to the Union. it is a fiction to treat the opinions of the people of 
the various states as controlling: it is Congress that effectively exercised the 
amendatory power. 
McConnell. Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions. supra note 65. at 1109. 
76. McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note 1. at 378. 
n Id. 
7fl.. !d. at 379. 
79. /d. This resembles the argument made in the Reagan Justice Department's 1988 
Gl'IDELI~ES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LiTIGATION. supra note 50. 
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ple to these groups. Thus, McGinnis and Rappaport argue that 
we should use original expected application to define the scope 
of constitutional principles so that they produce results that con-
form to the original expected application. This, they believe, is 
necessary to ensure fidelity to original meaning where the text 
points to an abstract principle. But to adopt this method is essen-
tially to reinstitute a new form of expectations originalism under 
the guise of original meaning. 
McGinnis and Rappaport's point is that without the con-
straining force of original expected applications, original mean-
ing originalism will not provide the necessary constraint against 
interpretive changes by unelected judges. It will not do what the 
turn to originalism in the 1980's was designed to do-limit liberal 
judicial activism. As they explain, "discarding expected applica-
tions in favor of abstract principles, as influenced by social 
movements, transfers tremendous power from the enacters of 
the Constitution to future interpreters. A Constitution that was 
established to place limits on future government actors would 
not delegate power so generously.""" 
This begs the question of what abstract provisions in a con-
stitution are designed to do-are they designed only to limit fu-
ture generations, or are they also designed to delegate the articu-
lation and implementation of important constitutional principles 
to the future? I shall return to this important question when I 
consider McGinnis and Rappaport's theory of supermajority 
rules. For the moment, however, my argument is addressed to 
Berman's claim that originalists, and particularly conservative 
originalists, abandoned original expected applications when they 
turned to original meaning originalism. McGinnis and Rappa-
port suggest that this is not so; indeed. using original expected 
application to limit the scope of constitutional principles is par-
ticularly important especially with respect to the cultural and 
moral issues that divide liberals and conservatives today. 
Where subsequent experience shows that the framers' gen-
eration was clearly mistaken "'as a factual matter""1 - for exam-
ple, about whether certain deposits were gold, McGinnis and 
Rappaport agree that we are not bound by original expected ap-
plications of the text. But where we think that the framers were 
mistaken morally, a different presumption should apply, and 
original meaning should stay close to original expected applica-
80. McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note I. at 37R. 
81. !d. at 379. 
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tion: "[W]here a legal provision purports to incorporate moral or 
policy beliefs and those beliefs are open to several interpreta-
tions, one is much less justified in concluding that the expected 
applications of people at the time were mistakes. "82 Quite the 
contrary: "It is more likely that later interpreters are mistaken 
about the content of the provision that was adopted than that in-
terpreters at the time were mistaken about the meaning of the 
provisions they wrote. "83 
McGinnis and Rappaport are not worried only about run-
away judges. They are also concerned that later generations will 
assume the authority to determine the meaning of the Constitu-
tion's abstract guarantees for themselves. "[D]iscarding expected 
applications in favor of abstract principles, as influenced by so-
cial movements, transfers tremendous power from the enacters 
of the Constitution to future interpreters. "84 "[I]t is a little diffi-
cult to see what is left of a recognizable originalism, not to men-
tion the amendment process, if social movement[ s] have such 
substantial discretion to apply constitutional provisions as they 
see fit. "85 "[W]hy," they ask, "would one adopt a fixed constitu-
tion if it can be changed so easily by social movements?"86 Put 
another way, McGinnis and Rappaport object to discarding reli-
ance on expected applications because it makes original meaning 
originalism a form of living constitutionalism. 
IV. ORIGINAL MEANING AND DELEGATION 
TO THE FUTURE 
A. Do SUPERMAJORITY RULES PRECLUDE 
DELEGATION TO THE FUTURE? 
McGinnis and Rappaport criticize the text and principle ap-
proach by invoking their own defense of originalism based on 
supermajority rules. The argument goes something like this: The 
best justification of original meaning originalism is not democ-
racy, or the rule of law, or judicial restraint. It is that originalism 
leads to superior consequences. 87 Construing the Constitution 
according to its original meaning leads to superior consequences 
82. /d. 
83. /d. 
84. /d. at 378. 
85. /d. at 381. 
86. /d. 
87. /d. at 371. 374; McGinnis & Rappaport. A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism. 
101 Nw. U.L. REV. 383 (2007). 
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because the Constitution was passed according to an superma-
jority rule. A supermajority rule leads to superior consequences 
because it requires the concurrence of many different people 
with many different viewpoints. 
In order to take advantage of the superior consequences of 
supermajority rules, we must preserve their meaning over time. 
That means applying them according to the rules of interpreta-
tion in place at the time they were adopted.88 McGinnis and 
Rappaport do not offer any evidence of what rules of interpreta-
tion people in 1868 would have used. Nevertheless, they assume 
that the people who adopt supermajority rules are likely to be 
risk averse and they would not have agreed to delegate the ap-
plication of these rules to future generations.89 Hence it follows 
that there can be no strong divergence between original meaning 
and original expected application. 
McGinnis and Rappaport's assumptions are not borne out 
historically either in the American experience or in the experi-
ence of other nations. Contrary to their assumptions, constitu-
tional framers and ratifiers very often use open-ended language 
that quite deliberately delegates questions of application to fu-
ture interpreters, and they did so in 1868. Precisely because su-
permajority rules must appeal to a broad range of people, fram-
ers will use abstract and general language to paper over 
disagreements that would emerge if more specific language were 
chosen. In the alternative, constitutional framers will remain si-
lent about particular issues to avoid destroying a supermajority 
coalition. 
The 1787 Constitution contains many artful silences and de-
cisions by its framers to agree to disagree. These ambiguities 
were necessary to its ratification, and as soon as the ink was dry 
on the document its framers and ratifiers began disagreeing 
about many of its central features, including most prominently, 
the scope of powers given to the new federal government. For 
example, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, both of 
whom attended the Federal Convention-and who co-authored 
the Federalist Papers! -immediately began to disagree about 
Congress' ability to charter a national bank. 
88. McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note L at 374. 
89. /d. at 372. 380. 
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B. DID THE FRAMERS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
DELEGATE TO THE FUTURE? 
This feature of constitutional drafting is particularly impor-
tant in understanding the Fourteenth Amendment, the source of 
many of the most important contemporary disputes about consti-
tutional rights. The framers of section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment deliberately chose a text with fairly abstract princi-
ples and vague standards that would delegate most issues to the 
future while choosing much more determinate rules for sections 
2 through 4 of the same amendment. This difference in language 
is not accidental; it is characteristic of how and why people draft 
constitutions that large numbers of people with very different 
views must agree to. 
The Fourteenth Amendment was simultaneously a new ad-
dition to the Constitution. a campaign proposal for the 1866 
elections and an armistice to be imposed on the defeated South. 
Sections 2 through 4 of the Amendment, written mostly in de-
terminate rules, formed the major terms of the armistice, and 
were the subject of the most vigorous debate. They offered a 
new formula for apportionment for the House of Representa-
tives, rules securing the payment of Union debt and the non-
recognition of Confederate debt, and restrictions on the eligibil-
ity of former rebels for national political office. Section 1, by 
contrast, was a general statement of principles that established a 
new theory of citizenship designed to secure basic rights for the 
freedmen, while Section 5 empowered Congress to pass new civil 
rights legislation enforcing these principles. 
Congress chose general phrases in Section 1 because of the 
conflicting interests and values of moderates and radicals within 
the Republican Party and because of concerns about how more 
specific guarantees of rights for blacks would play in the 1866 
elections and the ratification campaign. The Fourteenth 
Amendment served as the Republican's platform for the elec-
tions of 1866, and "[l]ike all American party platforms, the Re-
publican Platform for 1866 had to be sufficiently ambiguous and 
broad to attract quite divergent segments of the nation's elector-
ate."90 Moderates and radicals chose open-ended "language ca-
pable of growth"91 that papered over their differences and al-
lowed them to present a unified front that would appeal to a 
90. WILLIAM E. NELSON. THE FO\JRTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL 
PRI]'o;CIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 143 ( 1988). 
91. Bickel. supra note 66. 59-63. 
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wide range of constituencies. Moderates could report to their 
constituents that phrases like "privileges or immunities" and 
"equal protection" did not require integrated facilities and did 
not threaten laws against interracial marriage; radicals could 
point to the broad guarantees of equal citizenship to push for fu-
ture reforms.92 By deliberately using language containing broad 
principles, specific applications would be left to future genera-
tions to work out.93 
McGinnis and Rappaport's assumption that supermajority 
rules lead to risk averse adopters who demand fidelity to original 
expected applications has it almost exactly backwards. Superma-
jority requirements make it so easy to scuttle a proposed 
amendment that rights guarantees are likely to be framed in 
broad abstract terms that different parties can read according to 
their own understandings and expectations. Supermajority rules. 
in short, are sometimes more likely to produce delegations to the 
future- whether through silences or vague abstractions- than 
rules that require only simple majority support. 
C. WHY DO CONSTITUTIONS HAVE ABSTRACT RIGHTS 
GUARANTEES? 
For the moment, however, let me put aside these political 
considerations, and the particular context of the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. McGinnis and Rappaport assume 
that supermajority rules would lead constitutional drafters and 
adopters to choose provisions (and interpretive rules) that dele-
gate as little as possible to the future. I disagree. In fact, there 
are several reasons why constitution drafters might deliberately 
choose (and adopters support) open-ended standards in a Con-
stitution that requires supermajorities to amend. These reasons 
flow from the purposes for having constitutions in the first place. 
Justice Scalia has argued that a constitution's "whole pur-
pose is to prevent change- to embed certain rights in such a 
manner that future generations cannot readily take them away," 
because societies may not progress, or mature, but rather "rot. '' 94 
92. /d.; See also CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st Sess. 3148 (1866) (Remarks of Rep. 
Stevens) (describing the Fourteenth Amendment as a ··mutual concession" and compro-
mise "among men as intelligent. as determined. and as independent as myself. who. not 
agreeing with me. do not choose to yield their opinions to mine."). 
93. NELSON. supra note 90. at 143-45. 
94. Scalia. Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws. in A MA ITER OF 
INTERPRETATION. supra note 42. at 3. 40. Thus. Scalia argues that we should look to the 
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If he is right, then it would be puzzling why so many constitu-
tions-not only the U.S. Constitution, but also most post-World 
War II constitutions-would contain abstract and relatively 
open-ended rights guarantees. Of course, this incongruity is why 
expectation originalists argue that we must interpret these provi-
sions, despite their apparent language. to prevent them from be-
ing open-ended.9' Nevertheless, if this feature of constitutional 
language occurs repeatedly in constitutions in different times 
and places, we might conclude one of two things. Either constitu-
tional drafters and ratifiers are not as risk averse as McGinnis 
and Rappaport assume they are, or, they think that the best re-
sults come from using abstract principles and standards and leav-
ing difficult issues of application for later generations to decide. 
Implicit in Scalia's theory of constitutions as preventing rot 
is a narrative of decline: because the future may be tempted to 
stray from the hard won victories of the past, later generations 
must be held to the concrete practices and expectations of earlier 
generations, who, at least by comparison, are more noble and 
moral. 
Something important is missing in this vision, precisely be-
cause it cannot explain why constitution makers-not only the 
Founding Fathers, but most constitution makers in the two cen-
turies that followed them- would have drafted broad and ab-
stract guarantees of rights and liberties. The widespread adop-
tion of these open-ended rights provisions suggests that Scalia is 
incorrect about the goals of constitutionalism. The ''whole pur-
pose" of constitutions cannot be simply to forestall political 
judgment by later generations on important issues of justice, to 
preserve past practices of social custom or judgments of political 
morality, or to freeze existing assessments of rights in time. 
When we view these open-ended rights provisions together with 
the more rule-like structural features of constitutions, we can see 
that they serve a somewhat different goal. They are designed to 
channel and discipline future political judgment, not forestall it. 
original expected application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause because we 
need protection against "the moral perceptions of a future. more brutal generation ... 
Scalia. Response, in A MATIER OF INTERPRETATION. supra note 42. at 129. 145 [herem-
after Scalia, Response]. 
95. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1. at 378--81 (arguing for reading ab-
stract principles close to original expected applications): Scalia. Response. supra note 42. 
at 129. 135 (arguing against reading the Bill of Rights as aspirational): id at 145 (argumg 
for reading the 8th Amendment according to original expected application). 
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There is an important difference between blocking future 
judgment and disciplining it, between freezing certain results in 
place and creating channels for future development. In the latter 
case, we do not necessarily assume that later generations will be 
either more noble or less noble than existing ones.% Rather, we 
seek to structure future political decision making so that it is 
most likely to adapt itself to changing circumstances in ways that 
promote fairness, justice, political stability and other goods of 
political union.97 Even if-like America's own Founders-we are 
optimistic that later generations will progress morally, later gen-
erations will still need such disciplining features, and these fea-
tures may even assist them in achieving progress. 
Channeling political judgment, as opposed to freezing moral 
expectations in time, inevitably delegates important questions of 
justice and fairness to the future. This is most obvious in the case 
of the structural provisions of constitutions, which set ground 
rules for everyday politics and for later state building activities. 
But it is also true of rights-based provisions; the latter not only 
serve structural goals (think about rights of jury service and po-
litical participation) but also shape the tradition of future discus-
sion and mobilization about rights. 
Structural and rights-protecting features of constitutions 
channel future judgments about political morality in several 
ways. First, structural and rights-based provisions help prevent 
dominant or concentrated majorities from oppressing diffuse or 
politically weaker minorities. Federalism and separation of pow-
ers are good examples; so too are guarantees of equality and lib-
erty. These elements may range from relatively concrete rules to 
more general and abstract principles and standards. Rights pro-
visions may have to be open-ended because we do not know 
what kinds of majorities and minorities will develop over time or 
what kinds of rights future minorities will need to avoid oppres-
sion. Although freedom of political expression and suffrage are 
central protectors of minority rights, they may not always be suf-
ficient- by definition, minorities are not majorities. In any case, 
96. In any case. the framers of the American Constitution were optimists who be-
lieved in Enlightenment values of human progress. although they well understood the 
recurrent temptations of power. selfishness. and avarice in the political struggles of his-
tory. 
97. For a good discussion. on which the next few paragraphs are based. see 
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER. CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 12-20 (2001); 
Christopher L. Eisgruber. Should Constitutional Judges Be Philosophers?. in EXPLORING 
LAW'S EMPIRE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 5. 19-21 (Scott Hershovitz. 
ed .. 2006) [hereinafter Eisgruber. Should Constitutional Judges Be Philosophers?]. 
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the American Constitution as drafted did not guarantee suffrage 
as a positive right, and even the Constitution as amended still 
merely limits certain kinds of restrictions on suffrage. 
Other constitutional features-like the system of checks and 
balances and guarantees of equal treatment, due process, and le-
gal and political accountability- help preserve political stability 
and keep the enterprise of governance going when people dis-
agree strongly about what is just or unjust. Finally, supermajority 
requirements on adopting and amending constitutions have an 
important admonitory function. Rather than preventing the ex-
ercise of political judgment, it forces majorities to think hard 
about the consequences of what they want to do because they 
and their descendants will have to live with what they put in 
place for a long time.98 This keeps majorities from focusing on 
short -term consequences- that might threaten political stability 
or have undesirable path-dependent effects-over long term 
consequences. It also creates a sort of temporal veil of ignorance. 
It encourages existing majorities to imagine themselves as poten-
tial minorities in the future. It also encourages them to imagine 
that their descendants may be part of different groups or regions 
or have different sets of interests and allegiances. 
Because constitutions are not designed primarily to prevent 
moral rot but rather to shape, channel, and discipline future po-
litical judgment, it makes perfect sense that constitutions regu-
larly contain open-ended rights provisions. We need not and 
should not assume that the scope of these provisions must stay 
close to original expected applications to do their work. Protec-
tion of basic rights and basic guarantees of justice may be par-
ticularly difficult because new situations continuously arise that 
the adopting generation cannot foresee. Moreover. our judg-
ments of what is just and unjust are often dependent on sur-
rounding factual assumptions about social, economic and politi-
cal life. If those assumptions change, so too will our judgments. 
The changes may become quite significant over time if constitu-
tional language lasts many years. 
Thus, constitution makers may reasonably decide that it is 
better to adopt language that shapes the future discourse of de-
bates about rights without trying to fully determine everything in 
advance. In drafting constitutional rights provisions, constitution 
makers may not do much more than provide a constitutional 
98. Lawrence G. Sager. The Incorrigible Constitution. 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893. 951-
53 (1990). 
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grammar and vocabulary, a set of basic principles and textual 
commitments, and a practice of constitutional argument in which 
people reason about their rights. That is more or less what the 
American constitutional tradition has produced. In this tradition, 
the concrete judgments of the framing generation are quite im-
portant-in part because they set the tradition in motion and 
they explain the larger purposes behind guarantees of liberty 
and equality-but they are not decisive. Later generations have 
something to add to the understanding of these guarantees 
through the ways that they understand and apply the textual 
commitments and principles of earlier generations.99 A central 
lesson of constitutional design is that the present cannot control 
everything that the future may do, and it should not try. Rather 
it should try to set up a system that both disciplines and nour-
ishes the future without conclusively determining its shape. 
D. BASIC LAW, HIGHER LAW AND OUR LAW 
Finally, McGinnis and Rappaport's argument against dele-
gation to the future fails to mesh with other important functions 
of the American Constitution. A successful constitution like 
America's must serve many different and overlapping functions. 
For convenience, I divide them into three categories: A constitu-
tion like America's must simultaneously work as basic law, as 
higher law, and as our law. 
By basic law I mean that the Constitution sets up a basic 
framework of government that promotes political stability and 
allocates rights, duties, powers, and responsibilities. A constitu-
tion also serves as basic law in the sense that it is foundational 
law (or supreme law) that trumps other law to the contrary. To 
99. We might look to original expected applications as a floor for rights that protect 
the equality and liberty of individuals and minorities. This is the point of Jed Rubenfeld's 
constitutional theory. which has both a descriptive and a normative claim. Rubenfeld's 
descriptive claim is that the American constitutional tradition has continued to uphold 
certain paradigm cases of rights and equality protections although these protections have 
sometimes greatly expanded. His normative claim is that this should be so. because main-
taining paradigm cases is part of what it means to make a normative commitment. JED 
RUBENFELD. REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY (2005) [hereinafter RUBENFELD. 
REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY]: JED RUBENFELD. FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001) [hereinafter RUBENFELD. FREEDOM AND 
TIME]. 
Our previous analysis suggests why Rubenfeld's descriptive and normative claims 
make considerable sense. Even if the moral and political judgment of future generations 
progresses rather than rots or decays. future generations might retain these paradigm 
cases as central examples of what they see themselves as committed to. Maintaining 
those central examples establishes that they have these commitments and helps ground 
and channel the development of their commitments over time. 
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operate effectively as basic law, a constitution does not have to 
be just. But it must preserve political stability and channel politi-
cal and legal decisionmaking so that the governmental system 
can sustain itself over time. 
The American Constitution is far more than basic law in this 
sense. Americans also view their Constitution as a source of im-
portant values, including justice, equality, democracy, and hu-
man rights. They view the Constitution's guarantees as objects of 
aspiration; the Constitution either offers or refers to a standard 
that stands above ordinary law, criticizes it, restrains it, and 
holds it to account. Fidelity to the Constitution requires that we 
aspire to something better and more just than the political, social 
and legal arrangements we currently maintain. Hence the Con-
stitution trumps ordinary law not simply because it is legally or 
procedurally prior to it, but because it represents important val-
ues that should trump ordinary law, supervise quotidian acts of 
governmental power, and hold both law and power to account. 
Thus, we say that the Constitution is not merely basic law, it is 
also higher law; that is, it is a source of inspiration and aspira-
tion, a repository of values and principles. People sometimes use 
the terms "basic law" and "higher law" interchangeably; for ex-
ample, the German Basic Law strongly protects human dignity, 
and Bruce Ackerman has famously argued that constitutional 
amendment outside of Article V is an example of "higher law-
making."!()') I want to separate the two expressions because they 
point at different constitutional functions. The German Basic 
Law is both basic law and higher law in my sense, and constitu-
tional amendments-whether inside or outside of Article V-
might involve the creation of both new basic law and new higher 
law. 
Finally, it is not enough that the Constitution serve as basic 
law-a framework for governance, or as higher law-a source of 
aspirational standards and values. It must also be our law. The 
people who live under it-the American people-must under-
stand the Constitution as their law-not the law of Turkey, or 
the law of France or the law of South Africa. The South African 
Constitution may be widely admired as an example of contem-
porary constitution-making; but it is not our law. The Constitu-
tion works as our law when we identify with it and are attached 
to it, whether or not we consent to it in any official or legal 
sense. The Constitution works as our law when we view it as our 
100. 1 BRCCE A. ACKERMAN. WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). 
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achievement and the product of our efforts as a people, which 
simultaneously involves a collective identification with those 
who came before us and those who will come after us. 
Viewing the Constitution as "our law" has a curious conse-
quence: it helps us imagine ourselves as part of a collective sub-
ject persisting over time, the collective subject- We the Peo-
ple-whose law the Constitution is and to whom the 
Constitution belongs. Many features of a political culture can 
cause people to think of themselves as a collective subject that 
persists over time; but, at least in the United States, our Consti-
tution also performs this function. Thinking of the Constitution 
as our law- the law of We the American people- involves a 
narrative conception that appeals to collective memory-to a 
stock of stories, symbols and understandings that bind people 
together and make them a people. Put another way, viewing the 
Constitution as "our constitution" is a constitutional story- a 
constitutive narrative through which people imagine themselves 
as a people, with shared memories, goals, aspirations, values, du-
ties, and ambitions. 
Viewing the Constitution as our Constitution simultane-
ously constitutes us as the people to whom our Constitution be-
longs. It is a "constitution" of We the People. It accepts and en-
dorses a constitutional story about who Americans are and what 
America is-we are the people who broke away from Great 
Britain and who created and ratified the Constitution to secure 
our liberty, and so too will be our successors. Viewing the Con-
stitution as our Constitution constructs a collective subject with a 
collective destiny that engages in collective activities. It binds to-
gether people living in different times and different places as a 
single people. It allows us to see the hopes, desires, actions, am-
bitions, and achievements of people who lived long ago as our 
hopes, desires, actions, ambitions, and achievements. 
The success of this constitutional story is central to the pre-
sent generation's attachment to the Constitution as their Consti-
tution-even though they never consented to it or voted for it-
and therefore to the Constitution's sociological legitimacy. At-
tachment is a different attitude than consent. We consent to 
something we have a choice in; but we can become attached to 
something that we live with or live in over time. 101 
101. Jack M. Balkin. The Declaration and the Promise of a Democratic Culwre. 4 
Widener L. Symp. J. 167 (1999). 
464 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 24:427 
The method of text and principle, I believe, serves the mul-
tiple functions of a constitution-as basic law, higher law, and 
our law-far better than other forms of originalism. An original-
ism that strongly distrusts delegation to future generations and 
demands that open-ended provisions must be closely connected 
to original expected application is defective in all three respects. 
That kind of originalism makes the most sense if we think of the 
Constitution only as basic law. It tries to turn open-ended prin-
ciples and standards into something more concrete and rule-like, 
something whose effects will hopefully be more predictable and 
(in many cases) more constraining. But that is not the only way 
that constitutions could serve as basic law. As I argued previ-
ously, constitutions can also channel and give incentives for po-
litical stability and adaptation rather than merely block and con-
strain decisionmaking. In fact, the former is a far better way to 
understand the basic law function of a constitution. 
Even if tying constitutional principles closely to original ex-
pected application works tolerably well as basic law, it fails ut-
terly as higher law and as "our law." The idea of higher law 
views the Constitution as a repository of ideals morally superior 
to ordinary law and toward which ordinary law should aspire. It 
makes the Constitution an object of political and moral aspira-
tion and offers a potential for redemption. Thus the higher law 
function of constitutionalism has a temporal dimension: the 
higher law is a set of principles that critiques present political ar-
rangements and that we must try to realize over time. 
The very notion of as~iration presumes the opposite of 
Scalia's narrative of decline. 02 It presupposes that each genera-
tion should strive to do better than the previous ones did. The 
idea of redemption assumes that the political arrangements of 
the past have features that must be redeemed. 
Aspirationalism is Janus-faced. It recognizes that a constitu-
tion always exists in a fallen condition, that it inevitably contains 
compromises with evil and injustice. At the same time, it main-
tains that the constitution and the constitutional tradition con-
tain elements and resources that can assist in their eventual re-
demption. Implicit in this notion of aspiration is the willingness 
to gamble on the future. It requires faith in future generations 
entrusted with working out and developing the Constitution's 
guarantees over time. Constitutional redemption requires faith 
102. Not surprisingly. Scalia himself has little tolerance for the notion that constitu-
tional guarantees could be aspirational. Scalia. Response, supra note 94. at 134-36. 
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in the constitutional tradition's ability to grow and improve, 
without any guarantees of success. Far from a fear that future 
guarantees will rot, an aspirational Constitution requires a stead-
fast belief that the evils of the present can and will be recognized 
and remedied, if not in our day then in the days to come. 
Finally, a constitutional theory that distrusts delegation to 
the future fails as "our law." The Constitution is our law when 
we feel attachment to it and when we feel that we have a stake in 
it even if we did not consent to it officially. The Constitution is 
our law when we feel that it reflects our values sufficiently well 
that we can identify with it as ours; or, because we feel we have a 
say in what the Constitution means, we have faith that it could 
and will come to reflect our values better over time. 103 Thus, the 
idea of the Constitution as our law also has a temporal dimen-
sion. It requires an identification between ourselves, those who 
lived in the past and those who will live in the future. And it re-
quires faith that the Constitution is either good enough as it is to 
deserve our respect and attachment or that it eventually will be 
redeemed. 
For the Constitution to be "our law" it must do two things 
simultaneously. First, it must connect past generations to present 
ones through a process of narrative identification. It must allow 
us to see ourselves as part of a larger political project that 
stretches back to the present and forward to the future. The 
Constitution succeeds as our law when we can identify ourselves 
with those who framed and adopted it-we when are able to see 
ourselves as part of them and them as part of us. Second, the 
Constitution must allow us to identify our present principles and 
commitments with the principles of those who lived before us. 
Constitutional traditions achieve this by encouraging people in 
the present to call upon the past-and the struggles and com-
mitments of the past-as their past and as their struggles and 
commitments. This understanding of the past frames our present 
situation and explains how we should go forward into the future. 
This identification between past and present allows us to say that 
we are continuing the work of those who came before us when 
we apply the Constitution's text and principles in light of our 
current circumstances. 
Doing this necessarily requires delegation to the future, be-
cause each generation must see itself as given the task of apply-
103. For a more extensive discussion. see Jack M. Balkin. Respect-Worthy. supra 
note 36. at 498-501. 
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ing constitutional principles in its own time. We understand our 
present situation and the possibilities and needs of the future 
through the trajectory of our interpretation of the meaning of 
the past-both the principles we committed ourselves to achiev-
ing and the evils we promised ourselves we would not permit 
again. When we in the present perform this task, we carry for-
ward the imagined political project that metaphorically connects 
us to those who came before us. Their principles are our princi-
ples, and, the Constitution they left us is our Constitution, re-
flecting not only their past commitments but also our present 
ones. 
A theory of interpretation that refuses to allow this delega-
tion does not allow the Constitution to be ours because it does 
not allow us to see our present day values in the Constitution as 
the application or fulfillment of past principles and commit-
ments. If people feel that the Constitution's principles are not 
their principles, but simply imposed on them as a straitjacket 
from an alien past, the Constitution is not theirs, and it offers 
them little hope that it will come to be theirs in the future. 
E. Do SUPERMAJORITY PROCEDURES PRODUCE 
BETTER RULES? 
Finally, let me say a few words about McGinnis and Rappa-
port's more general project of grounding original meaning in the 
nature and superior consequences of supermajority rules. I think 
that the basic idea is quite intriguing, but I have a few doubts 
about the current version of the argument. 104 
To begin with, McGinnis and Rappaport claim that consti-
tutional entrenchments based on supermajority rules are likely 
to have better consequences. Better than what? Entrenching leg-
islation passed by simple majorities, presumably. If so, does that 
mean that increasing the supermajority requirements also in-
creases the chance that the rules are optimal? For example, 
would a seven-eighths majority produce better rules than a 
three-fourths majority? What about unanimity? McGinnis and 
Rappaport have not considered the possibility that some super-
majority procedures might produce better or worse conse-
104. See also Ethan J. Leib. Why Supermajoritarianism Does Not Illuminate the In-
terpretive Debate Between Originalists and Non-Originalists, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 113 (2007). http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/7/ 
(noting a series of difficulties with McGinnis and Rappaport's supermajority justifica-
tion): Ethan J. Leib. Supermajoritarianism and the American Criminal Jury. 33 HASTII'GS 
CONST. L.Q. 141. 153-54 (2006) (offering various problems with supermajority rules). 
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quences than others, and that some supermajority rules-like a 
seven-eighths rule or a unanimity rule-might actually produce 
results inferior to simple majorities. 
This is important because the U.S. Constitution has actually 
used different rules for different parts of the Constitution. Indi-
vidual provisions of the 1787 Constitution required simple ma-
jorities in the Philadelphia Convention; the whole Constitution 
came into effect after simple majorities in any nine states. Later 
amendments under Article V require concurrence of two thirds 
of each House of Congress plus three quarters of the states then 
in the Union. One major anomaly is the Fourteenth Amend-
ment-the Amendment whose provisions are most often at stake 
in civil rights litigation. It was passed by a rump Congress with 
less than full representation-Southern Congressmen and Sena-
tors were excluded- and Congress refused to readmit Confeder-
ate states unless they agreed to ratify the new amendment. 105 
McGinnis and Rappaport need to explain whether all three of 
these adoption rules are equally good for the purposes of their 
argument, and why that should be so. 
Second, supermajority rules may not produce rules with su-
perior consequences precisely because so many different people 
need to agree on common language. Supermajority procedures 
produce two opposite effects. One is the temporal veil of igno-
rance I mentioned earlier. Because supermajority rules are hard 
to change later on, people will write try to write rules for condi-
tions they may not be able to predict, and without knowing how 
their successors will be situated. The second effect is rent-
seeking due to threatened hold-ups. Organized groups will exer-
cise a veto power unless they can get lock-ins that satisfy their 
interests. Some of these lock-ins may benefit everyone in the 
105. My colleagues Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Amar disagree about whether the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was legal or illegal. Compare 2 ACKERMAN. WE 
THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS. 99-119. 207-34 (1998). with AMAR. supra note 12. 
364-80. Note. however. that even if we assume that the Reconstruction Congress·s deci-
sions were perfectly legal. the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted according to what 
was in effect a different rule. because the degree of political support necessary for ratifi-
cation was far less than Article V would normally require. 
As Ackerman points out. had the Southern states been seated. the 14th Amendment 
would have required 162 votes (out of 243) in the House and 48 votes (out of 71) in the 
Senate. The measure received only 120 votes in the House and 33 in the Senate. 
ACKERMAN. supra. at 174. CONG. GLOBE. 39th Cong .. 1st Sess .. 3149 (1866) (House 
vote: yea 120. nays 82. not voting 32): id. at 3042 (Senate vote: yea 33. nay 11. absent 5). 
S1xty-one Southern Representatives and twenty-two Southern Senators were excluded. 
ACKERMAN. supra. at 456-57 n.26. Hence if Southern votes had counted. the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted by less than a majority of the full House and Senate. 
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long run, while others do not, and still others prove unworkable 
or cause enormous problems later on. When William Lloyd Gar-
rison famously argued that the United States Constitution was 
"a covenant with death, and an agreement with hell," he meant 
that the Framers in the North had been forced by those in the 
South to agree to provisions that recognized and protected slav-
ery. These provisions, including the infamous three-fifths clause 
and the electoral college, gave the slave states extra political 
power that allowed them to pass legislation protecting slavehold-
ing interests. 
In fact, we can generalize Garrison's point: All constitutions 
are agreements with hell. They always require very serious com-
promises with evil, injustice, or, at the very least, inefficiency, in 
order to meet the present day demands of stakeholders who 
want to lock in their particular advantages, however evil, unjust, 
or inefficient that lock-in might be. It is true that people with 
other interests will oppose them if those lock-ins damage their 
interests sufficiently. But they will not act as a check if the pro-
posed rules do not threaten their particular concerns. Because 
slaves, women, Indians, immigrants, and working men without 
property were not represented at the bargaining table in the 
creation of the U.S. Constitution, even a Constitution that re-
quired supermajority acceptance would not reflect their distinc-
tive objections to the evil, unjust, and inefficient lock-ins put in 
place. More generally, if the rules for drafting and adopting the 
Constitution are themselves unfair and undemocratic, some 
groups will be able to lock-in advantages that are evil, unjust or 
inefficient that a fair supermajority process would not have pro-
duced. Hence, McGinnis and Rappaport's argument must be not 
that any supermajority process produces superior rules, but that 
a sufficiently fair process does. They need to give an account of 
why the process that produced the U.S. Constitution was suffi-
ciently fair to generate the benefits they claim. 
It is quite true, as Akhil Amar has pointed out, that the rati-
fication process between 1787 and 1791 was perhaps the most 
democratic that had ever existed up to that point. 106 But that 
does not mean that it was sufficiently fair from today's perspec-
tive, or, more to the point, from the perspective of the minimum 
degree of fairness required by McGinnis and Rappaport's the-
ory. The various lock-ins for slaveholders-including the Elec-
toral College and the three-fifths rule-suggest some of the 
106. AMAR. supra note 12. at 16-18. 
2007] CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 469 
problems that later emerged. Strong evidence that supermajority 
procedures did not have their desired effect comes from the fact 
that the political system almost fell apart onl~ a decade later as a 
result of the deadlocked election of 18001 7 -the framers had 
failed to account for the rise of political parties. And the best 
piece of evidence that supermajority procedures did not produce 
anything close to optimal rules is that the political system actu-
ally did fail in 1860, leading to a bloody civil war and the deaths 
of half a million soldiers. The Civil War is the major counter-
example to McGinnis and Rappaport's thesis, and if they want to 
develop their ideas in the future they need to take account of it. 
McGinnis and Rappaport argue that the Fourteenth, Fif-
teenth and Nineteenth Amendments cured any defects in the 
original system. Would that it were so. The Fifteenth Amend-
ment was effectively a dead letter for years until the success of 
later social movements, the civil rights revolution and the pas-
sage of the Voting Rights Act. Similarly, the Fourteenth 
Amendment was quickly transformed from a potential guaran-
tee of equal citizenship for blacks into a device for protecting 
corporations and entrenched economic interests; here again, it 
would take the work of later social movements to reinterpret the 
Fourteenth Amendment so that it protected the civil rights of 
blacks and later women. What cured defects in the original sys-
tem- to the extent they have been cured- was not the interpre-
tation of these amendments consistent with original expected 
application. Rather, it was the work of social movements whore-
jected these overly limited interpretations of the Constitution. 
Moreover, McGinnis and Rappaport's argument about blacks 
and women says nothing about the long term effects of political 
malapportionment prior to Reynolds v. Sims!("' or the continuing 
political malapportionment in the Senate or the electoral col-
lege.109 
Third, and finally, new supermajority rules may not produce 
superior results if the status quo is particularly dangerous or un-
workable. Supermajority rules may not eliminate evil, unjust, or 
inefficient lock-ins if the parties who oppose them are effectively 
over a barrel and need political agreement so much- for exam-
ple, to prevent financial collapse. foreign invasion, or civil war-
that they are willing to compromise their scruples away. This 
107. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN. THE FAILL'RE OF THE FOL'NDIC'JG FATHERS (2005). 
108. Reynolds v. Sims. 377 U.S. 533 (1964 ). 
109. See LEVINSON. supra note 20. at ~9-62. 
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well describes the conditions at the time of the Founding. Eco-
nomic conditions were very bad following the Revolution, and 
the mercantile classes in the North were eager to reach a deal 
that would preserve their interests. The Framers were deeply 
concerned about insurrections. There had almost been a military 
coup at Newburgh, New York, in 1783; and Shay's rebellion in 
western Massachusetts had finally been put down only months 
before the Framers met in Philadelphia. For many members of 
the founding generation, almost any deal would have been better 
than the status quo. The United States was a weak power with a 
small population and long borders that were difficult to defend. 
It was potentially easy pickings for the great colonial powers of 
Europe. (Indeed, the country was successfully invaded by Great 
Britain and its capital city set aflame less than thirty years later 
in 1814.). Threats from inside and outside the country may have 
led the ratifiers to take what they could get, rather than hold out 
for the best possible set of rules judged either by contemporary 
standards or the standards of the time. At the close of the Phila-
delphia convention, Benjamin Franklin famously stated that he 
would sign the Constitution "with all its Faults" because it was 
the best that the country could probably have produced under 
the circumstances. 110 
V. ORIGINAL MEANING AND PRECEDENT 
One interesting consequence of the differences between my 
view of original meaning and McGinnis and Rappaport's in-
volves the status of non-originalist precedents. In fact, we largely 
agree on this question, but because we disagree about how to 
understand and apply original meaning, we arrive at very differ-
ent places. 
McGinnis, Rappaport, and I agree that a system of prece-
dent was assumed by the constitutional structure, although prac-
tices of precedent-what constitutes a precedent (as opposed to 
dictum), what force precedents should have, and so on, may 
have changed over time. 1ll This fact presents no special problems 
for me, because I allow a fair amount of subsequent constitu-
110. The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 reported by James Madison. 
(Sep. 17. 1787) in The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/ 
avalon/debates/917.htm; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
641-43 (Max Farrand. ed .. Rev. ed. 1937); Benjamin Franklin's Speech at the Conclusion 
of the Constitutional Convention (Sep. 17, 1787). in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION 3-4 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993). 
111. McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note 1. at 376. 
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tional construction to implement constitutional text and princi-
ple. However, it does create a problem for McGinnis and Rap-
paport because they believe that the practice of precedent is jus-
tified by the combination of original meaning and interpretive 
rules in place at the time of the founding. 112 If the interpretive 
expectations about precedent in place in 1787 differed markedly 
from those we have today, it is not clear why McGinnis and 
Rappaport could accept our existing practices. They offer two 
possible examples of practices at the founding that do not obtain 
today: One is that precedents could be modified by statute; a 
second is that precedents should be followed only when they re-
solved ambiguities, but not to preserve clear errors. m 
Because McGinnis and Rappaport's argument for original-
ism calls for following original interpretive rules and practices, 
legislatures should be able to displace decisions like Brown v. 
Board of Education by statute. Moreover, where decisions-like 
Loving v. Virginia, Craig v. Boren, Bolling v. Sharpe, or Rey-
nolds v. Sims-are clearly inconsistent with original meaning 
(that is, McGinnis and Rappaport's version of original meaning, 
not mine), these precedents should deserve no special respect 
and may be overturned. That is not, however, what McGinnis 
and Rappaport say: Instead, they suggest that "modern prece-
dent rules, as authorized by federal common law and influenced 
by the structure of the Constitution, might establish stronger 
protections for some precedent." 114 They need to say a bit more 
about why this would be legitimate under their theory. 
Like all originalists, McGinnis and Rappaport must consider 
under what conditions they would retain precedents that are in-
consistent with original meaning as they define it. What gives 
this question particular importance for McGinnis and Rappa-
port, however, is that, unlike me, they want to maintain a fairly 
strong connection between original meaning and original ex-
pected application. They do not offer a full-scale theory of 
precedent; however, their brief remarks suggest a test much 
stricter than that of originalists like Justice Scalia, who will main-
tain non-originalist precedents where there has been consider-
able public reliance. McGinnis and Rappaport argue that 
"[w]here it is clear that a precedent has been widely and deeply 
accepted so that overturning it would lead to a constitutional 
112. /d. at 376. 
113. Id. at 376-78. 
114. I d. at 376. 
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amendment, a strong argument exists for the Court to continue 
to adhere to the precedent, even if it represents a clear error."115 
In other words, we should keep non-originalist precedents if 
overturning them would lead to a constitutional amendment that 
overturned the new decision.116 They offer the example of the 
1970's sex equality cases. They assert that "had the Supreme 
Court not interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to provide 
equal rights to women, such rights almost certainly would have 
been adopted by constitutional amendment." 117 
I am unsure whether this example is a good one; as Justice 
Brennan pointed out to the other Justices when they were con-
sidering Frontiero v. Richardson, 11 x the drive for the ERA had 
stalled before the Court began applying heightened scrutiny to 
sex classifications. 11y Certainly there is no guarantee that the 
ERA would have passed but for the Supreme Court's sex equal-
ity decisions. Moreover, the test they offer does not ask whether 
an amendment would have passed but for the Court's anticipa-
tory interventions. Instead, the test is whether if the Court's sex 
equality cases were overruled today, the country would enact the 
115. /d. 
116. McGinnis and Rappaport's position follows from their views about supermajor· 
ity rules. They argue that original meaning should control interpretation because super-
majority rules have superior consequences; to enjoy the benefits of these rules we must 
interpret and apply these rules according to the interpretive expectations of the genera-
tion that created them. But if we allow judges to displace these rules with doctrines that 
were not even created by a majority. we lose their superior benefits. See McGinnis & 
Rappaport. supra note 87. at 390 ("[t)he doctrines fabricated by the Supreme Court jus-
tices are likely to lead to worse consequences than doctrines that flow from the original 
meaning of the Constitution.") 
117. McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note I. at 376. 
118. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion). 
119. On March 6. 1973. Brennan wrote Powell explaining that waiting for the 
ERA-which was unlikely to gain the necessary ratification by three quarters of the 
states-would be a waste of time: 
(W]e cannot count on the Equal Rights Amendment to make the Equal Protec-
tion issue go away. Eleven states have now voted against ratification (Arkansas. 
Connecticut. Illinois, Louisiana. Montana. Nevada, North Carolina. North Da-
kota. Oklahoma. Utah. and Virginia). And within the next month or two. at 
least two. and probably four. more states (Arizona. Mississippi. Missouri. and 
Georgia) are expected to vote against ratification. Since rejection in 13 states is 
sufficient to kill the Amendment it looks like a lost cause. Although rejections 
mav be rescinded at any time before March 1979. the trend is rather to rescind 
ratification in some states that have approved it. I therefore don't see that we 
gain anything by awaiting what is at best an uncertain outcome. 
Letter from William J. Brennan to Lewis F. Powell. Jr. (March 6. 1973). (Justice Harry 
Blackmun Papers. Box 163, Folder 9: on file with The Library of Congress). Brennan 
added that "whether or not the Equal Rights Amendment eventually is ratified, we can-
not ignore the fact that Congress and the legislatures of more than half the States have 
already determined that classifications based upon sex are inherently suspect." ld. Bren-
nan emphasized this point in his Frontiero plurality opinion. 411 U.S. at 687-88. 
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ERA. It might, but then again it might not, especially if people 
today viewed the consequences as fully equal deployment of 
women in military combat, unisex bathrooms and same-sex mar-
riage. McGinnis and Rappaport do not tell us what degree of 
confidence we need to have that such an amendment would pass 
today. If they would require "almost certain[ty],"' 20 virtually 
nothing would pass the test because the supermajority rules in 
Article V make it so easy for a minority to block an amendment. 
A determined minority only need win more than a third of one 
house of Congress or a majority in one house of 13 state legisla-
tures. It is easy to imagine political forces in contemporary 
America that would still oppose a general, abstract guarantee of 
sex equality like that contained in the ERA. 
I do not know whether McGinnis and Rappaport mean 
their remarks to offer necessary or sufficient conditions for re-
taining nonoriginalist precedents. If they are offering a necessary 
condition, their test-whether reversing a nonoriginalist decision 
would lead to constitutional amendment reinstating that deci-
sion-offers a very high hurdle to meet. That becomes particu-
larly important if, like McGinnis and Rappaport, one has a fairly 
narrow conception of what is consistent with original meaning. 
McGinnis and Rappaport acknowledge that it is very difficult to 
amend the Constitution today, partly because it has proved so 
successful, and partly because the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
revised it inconsistent with original meaning."' Even taking the 
latter feature into account, I seriously doubt that the country 
would today pass an amendment to secure the right of blacks 
and whites to marry (Loving), the right of married couples to use 
contraceptives (Griswold), the right of people to advocate law 
breaking (Brandenburg), or the right of people to use profane 
language on their clothing (Cohen). And that doesn't even 
scratch the surface of a multitude of doctrines relating to crimi-
nal procedure, executive power, or procedural due process. 
The problem is that Article V's supermajority rules require 
more than widespread consensus-they also require consider-
able political mobilization. It is quite hard to get people mobi-
lized over reversing particular decisions that don't directly affect 
their values or interests. It has happened before- the Eleventh 
Amendment overturned Chisholm v. Georgia 122 - but that was in 
120. McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note 1. at 376. 
121. McGinnis & Rappaport. mpra note 87. at 393. 
122. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793): Scalia. Response. supra note 94. at 148. 
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a ve_~ di~ferent worl~ in ~~ich suffrage and rights of 
1
J?Olitical 
partiCipatiOn were qmte hmited by today's standards. -- If the 
Court overturne~ Lo~i~2$ v. Virginia 1 "~ or Brandenburg~- ~~io 125 
or Cohen v. Califorma or even Gnswold v. Connectzcut- to-
day, it is not at all clear that these decisions could be reinstated 
by Article V amendment. Decisions that affect very important 
structural matters or that have strong symbolic impact are more 
likely to get enough of the populace aroused (although they can 
also generate significant countermobilizations that might ulti-
mately block an amendment); decisions that lie in the interstices 
of doctrine-the sort of decisions that law professors care about 
most-are far less likely to generate sufficient public mobiliza-
tion to meet McGinnis and Rappaport's test. 
Thus, if McGinnis and Rappaport are offering a necessary 
condition, they seem to be committed to overturning much of 
the work of the civil rights revolution and significant parts of the 
New Deal-including the powers of the modern Presidency-
because it is very unlikely that most of these accomplishments 
would be reinstated by constitutional amendment. It is impor-
tant to recognize that this would not mean only striking down 
decisions that limit certain laws; it also strips the federal gov-
ernment of its power to pass legislation (and issue administrative 
regulations) protecting civil rights, the environment, workplace 
safety, and the rights of workers. One cannot know the exact 
contours of the change because McGinnis and Rappaport's crite-
ria for overturning nonoriginalist precedents are inherently 
speculative. At the very least, McGinnis and Rappaport owe us a 
more detailed account of what parts of our current constitutional 
structure would survive their test. 128 
Another, less drastic solution for McGinnis and Rappaport 
would take advantage of the fact that precedent was an expected 
function of courts in 1787. Hence the Constitution- which was 
approved by a supermajority rule-already accounted for the 
123. A second example would be Scott v. Sanford. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). but 
that took more than an amendment-it took a civil war. Moreover. as noted previously. 
the debate over the Fourteenth Amendment focused on the terms of the armistice that 
would be imposed on the defeated South. 
124. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
125. 395 u.s. 444 (1969). 
126. 403 U.S. I5 (1971). 
127. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
128. If McGinnis and Rappaport are merely offering a sufficient condition. on the 
other hand. we need far more information about which nonoriginalist precedents should 
survive. As with Scalia"s position. which I criticized in Abortion and Original Meaning. 
supra note 2. the plausibility of their version of originalism will turn on this question. 
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fact that some precedents would be inconsistent with original 
meaning, and that sometimes the costs of overturning such 
precedents would be too great. This would allow them to retain a 
wide range of nonoriginalist precedents when, in their view, reli-
ance was significant, producing a position that in practice would 
be much closer to Scalia's. Moreover, it would have the addi-
tional advantage that keeping nonoriginalist precedents under 
these circumstances would not be a "pragmatic exception" 129 to 
the theory of originalism- as it is for Scalia- but would rather 
be built into the theory of original meaning. 
I can see two potential problems with this approach. First, it 
would still face many of the same difficulties as Scalia's "prag-
matic exception." McGinnis and Rappaport would still view 
some of the most admirable achievements of American constitu-
tional law as mistakes, only now they would be mistakes that can 
survive because of the originalist commitment to judicial prece-
dent. Nevertheless, it is not clear why they should not read these 
precedents very narrowly and refuse to extend them further. 
Moreover, under Scalia's view almost any mistake-even Roe v. 
Wade and Lawrence v. Texas-could be retained if we wait long 
enough and enough people come to depend on it. We depart 
from the object of fidelity- the Constitution's original mean-
ing-whenever the departure becomes widely accepted and reli-
ance grows up around it. Scalia's pragmatic exception to original 
meaning has the likely consequence that in each generation 
more and more of positive constitutional law falls into the cate-
gory of mistakes, and less and less is faithful to original meaning. 
That is to say, it is a theory of originalism that makes the claimed 
object of fidelity increasingly irrelevant to constitutional law as it 
is actually practiced. It produces a theory of constitutional fidel-
ity that makes the grudging acceptance of infidelity-if it is suffi-
ciently widespread- both possible and inevitable. If McGinnis 
and Rappaport want to build non-originalist precedents into 
their theory, they need to explain how they would avoid these 
problems. 
Second, this solution tends to undermine McGinnis and 
Rappaport's argument that we should interpret the Constitution 
according to its original meaning because supermajority rules 
produce better consequences than ordinary legislation. Judicial 
decisions that are inconsistent with original meaning deviate 
from rules created under supermajority procedures; they come 
129. Scalia. Response. supra note 94. at 140. 
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from unelected judges who do not even represent a majority, 
much less a supermajority. Hence if we accumulate non-
originalist precedents because of reliance, we will increasingly 
lose the benefits of supermajority rules. I do not think it is suffi-
cient to respond that this expected loss is already factored into 
the original choice of a common law system at the founding. The 
founding generation could not know which or how many non-
originalist precedents would later emerge and generate signifi-
cant reliance, and some judicial mistakes can be far more costly 
than others. In any case, McGinnis and Rappaport need to work 
out the details of their theory and give specific applications be-
fore we can conclude that it offers a superior alternative to 
Scalia's approach. 
The great irony of all this is that, on the most basic issues of 
the role of precedent, McGinnis and Rappaport and I do not 
really disagree very much. We all think that precedents inconsis-
tent with original meaning deserve no special respect, we just 
disagree about what original meaning requires. I also agree with 
McGinnis and Rappaport that a common law style system of 
precedents is implicit in the constitutional framework. Over 
time, judges will articulate and implement the Constitution 
through doctrine. Indeed, not only judges-the political 
branches also participate in constitutional construction by creat-
ing new institutions and practices, and by passing legislation that 
articulates and enforces constitutional principles. It does not fol-
low, however, that we should retain precedents and construc-
tions that are markedly inconsistent with the Constitution's text 
and its underlying principles. 
The Constitution's text and its underlying principles should 
be the object of fidelity in constitutional interpretation. That is 
what we should remain faithful to; and that is what remains con-
stant over time; even though the implementations, institutions 
and constructions built around it may change markedly as the 
years pass. A system of precedent should serve the Constitution, 
and not the other way around. It should implement and articu-
late the Constitution's textual commitments and great principles, 
not displace them. How we treat precedents should flow from 
our theory of constitutional fidelity rather than being an add-on 
or a offsetting device to reconcile decisions that we would be too 
politically embarrassed to disown. 
We should retain decisions of the civil rights era like Brown, 
Loving, Craig, Brandenburg v. Ohio, and Cohen v. California, 
and the New Deal decisions like United States v. Darby and 
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Wickard v. Filburn, not because they are mistakes that we are 
stuck with, but because they are good interpretations of text and 
principle. We do not keep them because they are unfaithful but 
practically necessary or widely accepted. We keep them because 
they are faithful; we keep them because they are reasonable if 
occasionally imperfect implementations of constitutional text 
and principle. 
This marks the real difference between my views on prece-
dent and McGinnis and Rappaport's. McGinnis and Rappaport 
are worried that social movements will "spin the constitutional 
text as they choose with no limits except their ability to persuade 
the Court that their gloss should be adopted." 130 They then add: 
"Precedent, by contrast, at least limits the departures from the 
Constitution to those that have already occurred and does so 
based on widely held values of stability and continuity. " 131 They 
do not see the irony of this juxtaposition. Brown, Loving, Craig, 
and the New Deal decisions became precedents in the first place 
because political and social movements demanded change and 
argued for different interpretations of the Constitution. Once 
these precedents were adopted and established, they served 
"widely held values of stability and continuity." McGinnis and 
Rappaport's attitude toward social movements seems to be that 
we should resist their interpretations until they persuade courts 
to accept them, at which point we should work to preserve them 
if enough people rely on them. They accept the work of the so-
cial movements of the past, while distrusting any social move-
ments in the future. They do this because they do not see any le-
gitimate connection between the creation of new constitutional 
doctrine and the work of political and social mobilizations. They 
see only raw passion and base politics rather than the processes 
of constitutional redemption at work. 
I shall have more to say about social movements later on in 
this essay. For the moment, let me posit that we should judge the 
work of social movements not by the power of their political in-
fluence, but by the quality of the constitutional interpretations 
they offer. Social and political mobilizations play an important 
role in shaping Americans' views about the meaning of their 
constitutional commitments, and this may lead to changes in 
constitutional doctrine. However, these doctrines are correct-if 
they are correct-not because political movements have sup-
130. McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note 1. at 376. 
131. /d. 
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ported them, but because they are good implementations of text 
and principle. If, for example, political and social movements 
persuaded judges that Jim Crow laws were perfectly accept-
able-which, in fact, they did once before at the turn of the 19th 
century- that would not make the new doctrines good imple-
mentations of text and principle. On the other hand, social 
movements sometimes succeed because they correctly see that 
the world has changed and that we must implement constitu-
tional principles differently than we had before. When constitu-
tional doctrine responds to their arguments, we should value 
these new decisions not because they are precedents, and not 
because social movements supported them, but because these 
decisions better implement constitutional text and principle in 
changing times. 
Conversely, because precedent's purpose is to serve consti-
tutional text and principle, we should not preserve precedents 
that are outmoded and deeply unjust and unworkable. Experi-
ence has taught me that precedents are much more flexible over 
time than most people imagine when they are first announced. 
Courts are often able to come up with new distinctions within 
doctrine that reshape its direction and its effects over time. Even 
so, we should not retain precedents that are not reasonable im-
plementations of text and principle. Citizens should feel free to 
oppose these precedents and press for their reversal through 
lawful means. Courts have a different institutional role from citi-
zens. They must strive to maintain rule of law values of predict-
ability and non-arbitrariness; therefore, they should be consid-
erably more forgiving in assessing what constitutes a reasonable 
implementation of text and principle. This will require them to 
maintain many legal positions they would reject if presented in a 
case of first impression. Nevertheless, courts should not hesitate 
to modify or overturn precedents, even precedents of long stand-
ing, that they are convinced are no longer reasonable implemen-
tations of the Constitution. 
These views distinguish me from those non-originalists who 
":ould support a strong theory of st~re decisis, eve~ ~an~ e~ge­
Cially) for precedents that they beheve are non-ongmahst.- I 
132. David Strauss. for example. has argued that '"the common law approach, not the 
approach that connects law to an authoritative text. or an authoritative decision by the 
Framers or by ·we the people."' simultaneously '"best explains. and best justifies, Ameri-
can constitutional law today." David A. Strauss. Common Law Constitutional Interpreta-
tion. 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877. 879 (1996). Although an approach that makes precedent 
central allows us to reject "morally unacceptable traditions." we ''should be very careful 
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have two objections to this approach. First, many of the prece-
dents that non-originalists fear are not consistent with original 
meaning are actually consistent with it. By conceding that deci-
sions they admire have no basis in the Constitution's text and 
principles, non-originalists face an unnecessary difficulty in justi-
fying the legitimacy of these decisions. They must rely on a the-
ory of super-strong protection for precedents that they concede 
are not faithful to the constitutional text. 
This over-reliance on precedent leads to my second objec-
tion: Non-originalists will find it very difficult to explain why 
they seek to overturn other precedents that they don't like. If we 
must preserve Roe v. Wade 133 -because it was decided in 1973 
and was continuously reaffirmed-why not Washington v. 
Davis 134 , which was decided only three years later? If Roe is a 
"superprecedent" in 2007, thirty-four years after it was decided, 
why wasn't Plessy v. Ferguson a "superprecedent" in 1954, some 
fifty-eight years after it was decided? 
Stare decisis seems to me a particularly weak and defensive 
justification for non-originalists; one argues that we should re-
spect precedents because one is not willing to assert that the 
cases are faithful to the Constitution. This makes it very difficult 
for non-originalists to argue that we should overturn other 
precedents that either were not faithful implementations of the 
Constitution when decided or have proved themselves to be bad 
implementations over time. 
In the alternative, one might argue that the development of 
doctrine through precedent simply is the standard of fidelity to 
the Constitution- that the common law system of precedent is 
constitutive of constitutional fidelity. But this makes it difficult 
for non-originalists to deny the equal fidelity of precedents they 
about rejecting judgments made by people who were acting reflectively and in good faith. 
especially when those judgments have been reaffirmed or at least accepted over time:· 
!d. at 891. 895. Indeed. Strauss has argued provocatively that adding text to the Constitu-
tion through Article V amendment is generally ··either unnecessary or ineffective:· 
David A. Strauss. The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendment. 114 HARV. L. REV. 
1457. 1468 (2001). On the other side of this debate is Michael Stokes Paulsen. who argues 
that reliance on precedent is "'intrinsically corrupting"' and essentially incompatible with 
a theory of original meaning. Michael Stokes Paulsen. The Intrinsically Corrupting Influ-
ence of Precedent. 22 CaNST. COMMENT. 289 (2005). McGinnis and Rappaport and I fall 
somewhere between these two positions: we assume that some common law development 
of constitutional doctrine was implicit in creating a system of federal courts (and state 
courts) that would construe the meaning of the Constitution. 
133. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
134. 426 u.s. 229 (1976). 
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do not like that were produced by the same common law process 
of development. 
To my mind, originalists like Justice Scalia and the non-
originalists he criticizes find themselves in much the same situa-
tion. Both feel it necessary to argue for respecting (what they 
mistakenly regard as) non-originalist precedents. And they face 
a symmetrical difficulty. By accepting some nonoriginalist 
precedents as a "pragmatic exception" to originalism/35 Scalia 
makes it more difficult to explain why he does not accord the 
same respect to others, like Roe v. Wade, that he despises but 
that have been repeatedly sustained for many years. His criteria 
of reliance threaten to become ad hoc and a reflection of his 
politics. By relying so heavily on stare decisis to defend prece-
dents they (incorrectly) concede are unfaithful to the Constitu-
tion's original meaning, non-originalists make it difficult to ex-
plain why they do not support other precedents of equal vintage. 
Their criteria of support also threaten to become ad hoc and a 
reflection of their politics. 
There is something a little strange about living constitution-
alism becoming so dependent on a strong theory of precedent. In 
part, this happened because living constitutionalists in the pre-
sent generation have found themselves on the defensive against 
conservative social movement energies. (One of the ironies of 
McGinnis and Rappaport's suspicion of social movements is that 
many of the conservative decisions of the recent past are the re-
sult of decades of social movement organization by the Right.) 
Like most social movements before them, these conservative 
mobilizations have called for a return to the Constitution's text 
and to the principles of the founding generation, even if their no-
tions of what that entails are disputable. 136 Faced with incessant 
demands for constitutional revolution, living constitutionalists 
have resorted to arguing for preserving the status quo, and for 
respecting older precedents created in politically more liberal 
times. But earlier social and political movements helped produce 
the doctrinal changes they now defend; those movements would 
not have succeeded if courts had applied so strong a theory of 
precedent. Arguments for respecting precedent make the most 
sense when directed at persons who do not share your constitu-
tional views, but in that case they are a modus vivendi, not an 
independent criterion of constitutional fidelity. The best argu-
135. Scalia. Response. supra note 42. at 140. 
136. See Post & Siegel. supra note 43. at 558--{iS. 
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ment for decisions living constitutionalists admire is not that 
they are settled precedents; it is that they are faithful implemen-
tations of the Constitution's textual commitments and underly-
ing principles. 
VI. THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN TEXT 
AND PRINCIPLE 
Randy Barnett, Mitch Berman and Ethan Leib raise impor-
tant questions about the relationship between text and princi-
ples. 
A. CONSISTENCY WITH THE TEXT, ARTICULATION 
AND SUPPLEMENTATION 
Barnett is concerned that recourse to underlying principles 
will displace the text. 137 In one passage of Abortion and Original 
Meaning, I noted that "[w]hen the text is relatively rule-like, 
concrete and specific, the underlying principles cannot override 
the textual command. "138 Read in isolation, one might worry that 
this implies that when the text is not rule-like, concrete, and spe-
cific-i.e., when it states a standard or an abstract principle-the 
principles underlying the text could override the text. That is not 
Barnett's view, nor is it mine. 
Fidelity to text and principle means that we try to figure out 
whether a text states a relatively concrete and determinate rule 
or a relatively vague standard or abstract principle. When it 
states a rule, we apply the rule because that is what the text re-
quires; and when it states a principle, we apply the principle be-
cause that is also what the text requires. In each case we apply 
the text to new circumstances, but the way we apply the text is 
different because of the kind of legal norm the text provides. 
Changes in circumstances cannot alter the minimum age for the 
President or the number of Houses of Congress, because the text 
states a clear and determinate rule. But changes in circumstances 
can alter how we apply the Equal Protection Clause because 
here the text states a standard or an abstract principle. Note, 
however-and here Barnett is also correct-when we apply or 
implement a standard or principle, we must make sure that the 
application or implementation remains consistent with the con-
stitutional text. 
137. Barnett. supra note 1. at 412. 
138. Balkin. supra note 2. at 305. 
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It may sometimes be difficult to know whether a given in-
terpretation of a principle contradicts the constitutional text or 
merely articulates it. Barnett gives us an easy case where we 
could tell the difference: he supposes that one principle underly-
ing the Second Amendment's right to bear arms is the promo-
tion of public safety. 139 One can promote public safety in many 
ways, however, including confiscating all privately held arms 
from the citizenry. Nevertheless, that would contradict the tex-
tual grant of a right to bear arms and so it is not a permissible 
application of the underlying principle.140 When we argue from 
principles underlying the text, we must always return to the text 
to check our arguments. 
However, to the extent that the text is vague, it may not of-
fer very much of a check. Suppose, for example, that a legisla-
ture agrees that the right to bear arms protects the principle of 
public safety and the individual's right to possess weapons. Nev-
ertheless, it insists that these principles are perfectly consistent 
with imposing reasonable regulations on the sale, purchase, pos-
session, and use of firearms, and even with banning the private 
ownership of particularly dangerous weapons. Does this imple-
mentation of the principles behind the text contradict the textual 
grant of "the right to bear arms" or does it merely articulate it? 
In close cases, it may be difficult to tell. If we think the legisla-
ture's implementation is unreasonable, we will say that it contra-
dicts the text. But if we think the implementation is reasonable, 
we will say that it merely articulates it. even if we do not think it 
is the best implementation. 
Indeed, precisely because the constitutional text may be 
vague as to some questions, figuring out how to implement un-
derlying principles properly may be the best guide to what the 
text requires of us. In other words, in some cases-perhaps the 
most controversial cases-our judgments of whether an imple-
mentation of a constitutional principle contradicts the constitu-
tional text will depend largely on (1) whether we think we have 
correctly identified the proper principle, (2) whether we have 
correctly identified the principle's appropriate scope and reach, 
and (3) whether we think the particular application at issue is a 
reasonable implementation of the principle. 
139. Barnett. supra note 1, at 412-13. 
140. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (striking down 
general ban on private possession of handguns for self-defense.). 
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Moreover, a particular text may enact more than one consti-
tutional principle, and these principles may sometimes conflict. 
Suppose for example, that we discover that the Free Speech 
Clause protects both the principle of democratic deliberation 
and the principle of individual self-expression. These principles 
may not conflict in a wide range of cases, but they may in some 
cases. Here are two examples: In the first, Congress seeks to 
limit campaign contributions to preserve democratic deliberation 
and prevent corruption of democratic self-government. The de-
mocracy principle may conflict with the self-expression principle 
if we think that the latter includes the right to make campaign 
contributions of any size. In the second example, Congress seeks 
to ban indecent art that has no relationship to democratic delib-
eration. The self-expression principle will conflict with the de-
mocracy principle if we think that the latter protects only speech 
related to democratic deliberation and leaves other expression to 
the democratic political process. The text of the Free Speech 
Clause will not resolve this conflict for us-it says that Congress 
can make no law that abridges the freedom of speech, but we 
must figure out the contours of the "freedom of speech." We can 
resolve the conflict by preferring one principle over the other or 
by interpreting their scope and reach so that they do not conflict. 
The text may give us considerable help in some situations, but in 
many other cases, perhaps most cases, it will not. That is why we 
so often need recourse to other modalities of constitutional ar-
gument-including history, structure, precedent, consequences, 
and ethos, to help us out. 
The example of structural argument suggests another quali-
fication. Just as a some texts point to multiple principles, there 
are some constitutional principles that are not tied to any par-
ticular text. We infer them from the interaction of many differ-
ent texts-for example, the principle of separation of powers, 
the principle of checks and balances, and the principle of democ-
racy. Indeed, in some cases, we infer constitutional principles 
from the structure and logic of the system of government that 
the text brings into being. 
For example, the principle of checks and balances is ad-
vanced by specific institutional instantiations in the Constitu-
tional text. The President may veto legislation, the Senate must 
advise and consent to the appointment of federal judges and sen-
ior Executive officers, and so on. But the principle of checking 
and balancing power -like the principle of separation of pow-
ers-extends beyond these specific instantiations and may apply 
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to situations not specifically mentioned in the text. Can the 
President exit from treaties without Congressional consent? Can 
Congress limit the President's ability to remove officers in inde-
pendent administrative agencies, like the Federal Communica-
tions Commission or the Federal Reserve Bank? No matter 
which way we decide these questions, we will be extending one 
principle or the other to cases the text does not contemplate or 
provide for. In these situations, it is not clear whether the appli-
cation of the principle contradicts the text or merely supplements 
it. 1 ~ 1 Once again, the text may not be of much help, and we must 
turn to the other modalities to resolve the question. 
Finally, consider the First Amendment, which by its lan-
guage refers only to Congress. From early on, however, courts 
assumed that the First Amendment (including both the speech 
and religion clauses) applied to all three branches of govern-
ment.1~c The argument was based on structural principles: other-
wise executive and judicial officials might undermine the guaran-
tees of free speech and press (not to mention free exercise). 
Does this structural argument supplement the constitutional text 
or contradict it? We cannot look to the text to decide this ques-
tion; rather the conclusion must follow from our sense of the 
proper scope of the free speech principle in light of structural as-
sumptions about how the constitutional system should function. 
We should not think of "text and principle" as a simple 
model where individual principles sit beneath specific clauses or 
texts. Rather, constitutional principles play multiple roles, with 
multiple relationships to the text. They undergird, they articu-
late. they supplement; they give unity to the entire Constitution 
and preserve its logic and its stability over time. 
To sum up: Although underlying principles cannot contra-
dict texts, there are many possible relationships between text 
and principle. A text can point to more than one principle, and 
these principles can conflict. Some principles derive from the in-
teraction of multiple texts, and some principles emerge from the 
141. I do not pretend that the distinction between contradiction and supplementa-
tion is always clear in practice. As a deconstructionist. I am well aware that supplements 
can be ··dangerous:· and can sometimes either undermine or prove more important than 
the thing they supplement. At the same time. a deconstructionist would also note that 
supplements cannot easily be discarded: what appears to be merely a supplement can 
also prove central or crucial to the thing it supplements. 
142. See Magill v. Brown. 16 F. Cas. 408. 427 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1833) (No. 8.952) (hold-
ing that the First Amendment ""wholly prohibits the action of the legislative or judicial 
power on the Union on the subject matter of a religious establishment. or any restramt 
on the free exercise of religion.") 
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structure and logic of the constitutional system. Although prin-
ciples may not contradict constitutional texts. they may articu-
late or supplement them. Because the text is sometimes vague or 
silent, we need to use principles in constitutional argument, and 
we need to supplement and implement text and principles with 
other modalities of constitutional argument. 
I do not believe that Barnett would disagree much with 
what I have just said. Nor would most originalists or living con-
stitutionalists for that matter. I raise the issue because the rela-
tionship between text and principle is more complicated than his 
brief remarks might seem to suggest. And that complexity mat-
ters particularly for the example of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which is the major focus of Abortion and Original Meaning. 
One thing that concerns Barnett is my frequent reference to 
the "equal citizenship" principle behind the Fourteenth 
Amendment. He is right that I see this principle as central to un-
derstanding the Amendment. But he objects that "there is no 
free floating 'Equal Citizenship Clause' in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Section 1 contains four moving parts that must 
carefully be considered and applied in light of their underlying 
principles."143 Barnett worries that talking about a general prin-
ciple of equal citizenship may lead us to interpretations that con-
tradict one of the multiple clauses in section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Once again, he is correct that interpretations em-
ploying the principle should not contradict the original meaning 
of the text. But I would insist that the Fourteenth Amendment's 
provisions read together also have a structural logic to them. A 
general principle of equal citizenship emerges from their interac-
tion. In other words, just as the principle of separation of powers 
and checks and balances emerges from different parts of the 
Constitution, so too the principle of equal citizenship emerges 
from the various clauses of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. That conclusion is strengthened, I might add, when we 
read the Amendment together with other parts of the Constitu-
tion, including the Bill of Rights, the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Nine-
teenth, Twenty-Third, Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ments. (We could also add the Bill of Attainder, Titles of 
Nobility, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses from the 1787 
Constitution.) 
At this point readers may wonder whether I mean to resur-
rect Justice Douglas much mocked "penumbras and emana-
143. Barnett. supra note 1. at 414. 
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tions" that were the basis of decision in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut.144 I do not, but the reason is not because Douglas dared to 
make a structural argument using the text of the Bill of Rights. 145 
Rather, it is because he made the wrong structural argument. 
The Fourteenth Amendment was designed to articulate a "new 
birth of freedom" 146 and a new theory of citizenship that guaran-
teed basic rights and equality before the law. That political the-
ory built on previous features of the Constitution-some struc-
tural, and some explicitly rights-protecting-and it in turn was 
built upon by later additions. Considering these features to-
gether makes perfect sense. The case for a principle of equal citi-
zenship in the Constitution is, I would submit, as strong as the 
case for almost any other structural principle in the Constitution. 
Again, none of this is necessarily inconsistent with Barnett's 
basic point. We still must decide whether any purported applica-
tions of the equal citizenship principle contradict specific clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. But when we view the amend-
ment's provisions together (and supplemented by later Amend-
ments like the Fifteenth and the Nineteenth, which correct limi-
tations in the original section 2), we may decide that a particular 
interpretation does not contradict the individual clauses but ar-
ticulates or supplements them in constitutionally appropriate 
ways. 
B. MUST ALL CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES HAVE BEEN 
INTENDED BY THE ADOPTERS? 
Mitch Berman raises a different concern about the relation-
ship of text and principle. He reads me as saying that the only 
principles we can derive from the text are those specifically in-
tended by the persons who created the text. Hence he calls it the 
method of "text and original principle. "147 If this is what the 
method of text and principle requires, he believes, living consti-
tutionalists should reject it and remain non-originalists. 
Berman argues that my approach can only employ princi-
ples that "the framers and ratifiers actually 'sought to en-
dorse"'148 By contrast, Berman argues that a non-originalist living 
144. 381 u.s. 479 (1965). 
145. For a better attempt see Akhil Reed Amar. The Bill of Rights as a Constitution. 
100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991). See also AMAR, supra note 23. 
146. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19. 1863). in 7 COLLECfED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 22-23 (Roy P. Basler ed .. 1953). 
147. Berman, supra note 1, at 393-94. 
148. Id. at 392 (quoting Balkin, supra note 2. at 303). 
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constitutionalism "would permit interpreters to eschew [those 
principles] ... in favor of" principles "that the text can bear 
[and] that better suit[] our contemporary needs and moral val-
ues. 
,149 
Because both Berman and Leib150 attribute the former posi-
tion to me (and both view it as a major concern) I should make 
clear aspects of my argument that I did not emphasize in Abor-
tion and Original Meaning, in part because of the specific goals 
of that piece. I do not believe that the principles underlying the 
Constitution may include only those "the framers and ratifiers 
actually 'sought to endorse."' Nevertheless, I think it is very im-
portant to look to history to derive underlying principles, even 
(and perhaps especially) principles that nobody in particular in-
tended. 
In Abortion and Original Meaning I spent considerable time 
trying to show that the particular principles I relied on- the 
principles prohibiting caste legislation, subordinating legislation, 
and arbitrary and unjust distinctions-had a strong pedigree in 
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment. I did this in part to 
rebut the widespread assumption that the principles on which 
reproductive rights are grounded have no basis in our Constitu-
tion's text and history or in the purposes behind the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 151 But, as I shall now argue, neither living constitu-
tionalism nor original meaning orignalism requires that all con-
stitutional principles must have been specifically intended by 
some group of framers or ratifiers. 
Berman argues that the Constitution needs "new" underly-
ing principles-particularly in the context of debates about 
rights. 152 That may stem from his assumption that whatever un-
derlying principles we find through historical investigation will 
have to be stated at a fairly low level of generality and will be 
closely tied to the expected applications of the persons who 
framed or ratified clause. For example, Berman questions 
whether agnostics or atheists would be protected by the Free 
Exercise Clause if we discovered that the clause was originally 
intended to prevent discrimination among religious believers.153 I 
149. /d. 
150. Leib. supra note L at 354-56. 
151. I also sought to rebut a similar assumption about the antisubordination litera-
ture. Balkin. supra note 2. at 292. 
152. Berman. supra note 1. at 393-94. 
153. /d. at 392. Indeed. given the demographics of the country at the time of the 
Founding. the original intention might have been narrower still: to protect against dis-
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think this conflates deriving principles from original expected 
application with deriving principles from original meaning. It is 
tied to an old and familiar debate about the level of generality at 
which we should construe the framers' and ratifiers' purposes. 
As I shall argue presently, that debate is still beholden to the 
theory of original intention or original understanding. But if 
what matters to us is the original meaning of the text, then the 
principles underlying the constitutional text should be as general 
as the text itself. 
Therefore I suspect that many of the cases where Berman 
thinks we would need a "new" principle actually involve nothing 
more than contemporary applications of underlying principles 
stated at the appropriate level of generality. For example, I think 
that the principle against class legislation might protect homo-
sexuals from discrimination even if nobody knew there were 
such things as homosexuals in 1868, or, if they knew what homo-
sexuals were, would have opposed the extension of the principle 
to that social group. One does not need a "new" principle for 
this case; rather one needs to apply the class legislation principle 
correctly to present-day circumstances given present-day under-
standings. 
The framers and ratifiers may have stated a wide variety of 
principles at various levels of scope and generality, or they may 
have stated no principles at all that have come down to us. The 
appropriate question, however, is what principles are incorpo-
rated in the text the framers and ratifiers made into law. Thus, 
for me the key issue is encapsulated in Berman's suggestion that 
constitutional principles must be ones "that the text can bear. "154 
We want to make sure that in our eagerness to articulate new 
principles we do not wind up with a play on words. The reason 
why we look to history-where it is available-is to act as a 
check on our assumptions about what "the text can bear." We 
use history to see whether the issues or problems that concerned 
the framing generation are structurally or analogically similar to 
ones we face today. If so, then we can have somewhat more con-
crimination among various Christian sects. perhaps extended to all religions within the 
1 udeo-Christian tradition. It is worth noting. however. that of the state constitutions in 
force at the time of the founding. only Delaware's and Maryland's explicitly limited pro-
tection to Christians. while five others restricted their protections to believers in God. 
See Michael W. McConnell. The Origins And Historical Understanding Of Free Exercise 
Of Religion. 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409. 1455 n.237. 1457 n.242 (1990) (collecting state con-
stitutional provisions). 
154. /d. at 384. 
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fidence that the principles we articulate are principles that the 
text embodies. 
The reason we must avoid a play on words, then, is not sim-
ply because we think law should preserve meaning over time. It 
is because the Constitution must serve as "our law"- it must not 
be merely the law of our current generation, but a law that con-
nects our present political commitments with the commitments 
of previous generations. We must be able to see ourselves as 
embarked on a common project that begins in the past and that 
we carry forward into the future. The fact that we share a com-
mon text certainly helps connect past to present. But shared po-
litical commitments over time involve more than common texts: 
looking to history helps us articulate a narrative that allows us to 
view ourselves as continuing the aspirations and commitments of 
the past in present-day circumstances. 
Berman and I do not really disagree that the principles un-
derlying the Constitution do not have to have been specifically 
intended by anyone. That is most obvious in the case of struc-
tural principles that are not necessarily tied to a specific piece of 
text but that we infer from the interaction of various parts of the 
Constitution and from the structure and logic of the constitu-
tional system. Some of these structural principles were surely 
recognized and promoted by various framers and ratifiers. But 
others could not be, in part because they were not salient to the 
persons who wrote and ratified the document, and in part be-
cause some important structural issues only arose as the consti-
tutional system developed over time. The generation that pro-
duced the 1787 Constitution was quite talented, but they were 
not fortune tellers; they put in place a document that they them-
selves understood to be a great experiment in self-governance, 
and they could only offer their best guesses as to how things 
would operate in practice. Sometimes one only figures out how a 
machine or a system or any other complex structure works-and 
should work- by watching it operate over time. Charles Black 
once famously argued that even if there had been no Free 
Speech Clause in the Constitution, the Constitution's structure 
and its commitment to representative government demanded 
protec~ion of at least speech on topics related to public govern-
ance.15' That would be so whether or not any framers or ratifiers 
of the 1787 Constitution specifically believed that a principle of 
155. CHARLES BLACK. STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP l:-.1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
39-45 (1969). 
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free expression undergirded the Constitution prior to the adop-
tion of the Bill of Rights. 
In addition, the Constitution was not drafted at a single 
time. Currently its various amendments stretch over two hun-
dred years. New amendments may alter the relationships be-
tween other parts of the Constitution, sometimes in expected 
ways, but sometimes in quite unexpected ways. L'" The Recon-
struction Amendments altered the relationships between the 
federal government and the states, and between the federal 
courts and state legislatures, in ways that did not become clear 
for generations. Subsequent constitutional constructions can 
have path dependent effects on how the constitutional system 
operates. Four good examples are the creation of the party sys-
tem-which the framers originally opposed- the creation of the 
federal civil service in the 19th century, the rise of the adminis-
trative state in the first half of the 20th century, and the devel-
opment of permanent standing armies and naval forces stationed 
around the world in the second half of the 20th century. 
For all of these reasons, structural principles might emerge 
from the constitutional system that no single person or genera-
tion intended. We should always look to history to see how the 
generation that produced a constitutional text expected that the 
constitutional system would operate in light of the text. But this 
does not exhaust all of the structural ideas behind the Constitu-
tion. We must look to other generations as well as the founding 
generation to understand how constitutional structures should 
work (and how they might fail to work). 
Of course, in his remarks, Berman is not particularly think-
ing about structural constitutional arguments. He is thinking 
about the Equal Protection Clause. This is a case where constitu-
tional principles involve rights as opposed to structures, and 
where the principles are more closely connected to particular 
texts rather than derived from the logic of the Constitution as a 
whole. Even though the relationship of text to principle is differ-
ent, my basic answer is still the same: The principles underlying 
the text do not have to be specifically intended by anyone in par-
ticular. At the same time history remains quite important to dis-
covering those principles. 
156. What is true for structural principles may also be true for principles underlying 
particular texts. The Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments may alter our understanding 
of the principles underlying the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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When we interpret a written Constitution, we work on the 
assumption that the persons who had the authority to make the 
constitutional text law were trying to achieve something in 
choosing some words over others. The goal of interpretation is 
to try to find out what that achievement is. The text that the 
framers and ratifiers produced contains rules, standards, and 
principles. (Standards need not be principles-and often are 
not- but for purposes of this discussion I shall consider them to-
gether).157 When the text states a determinate rule-for example, 
that there are two and only two houses of Congress-we apply 
that rule because the language chosen requires it. When the text 
states a standard-say that searches must not be "unreason-
able"- we apply the standard because the language chosen re-
quires it. Finally, when the text states a principle-say "equal 
protection of the laws"- we apply the principle because the lan-
guage chosen requires it. Our basic interpretive obligation is the 
same for standards and principles as it is for rules. 
It is usually easier to know when we have applied a rule cor-
rectly than a principle (or a standard), but we cannot shirk the 
difficulty by pretending that an abstract principle is actually a de-
terminate rule. One might view my critique of original expected 
application in just this way: people who want to use original ex-
pected application to secure the meaning of constitutional prin-
ciples are trying to turn a principle or standard into something 
that is more like a rule-a rule that says that, where possible, we 
should apply the identifiable sets of expected applications we 
find in history. People might try to convert a principle into a rule 
because they dislike uncertainty and want constraint. The desire 
for certainty and constraint is entirely understandable, but we 
cannot achieve them in so easy a fashion. Not, at least, if we 
want to be faithful to the text. 
When we are dealing with abstract principles in the text, his-
tory becomes important in at least two ways. First, we need to 
look to history to know what kind of legal norm the text en-
acts-whether it offers a rule, a moral or legal principle, or a 
157. ··congressmen must be mature adults'" states a standard but not necessarily a 
principle. although we can sometimes explain or justify the standards we use in terms of 
principles. Doctrinal tests may include a series of standards that decision makers must 
balance-like the relative burdens to the parties in a petition for an injunction. or the 
noncommercial nature of a challenged fair use- but the factors need not be principles. 
Finally. we might use the behavior of a paragon as a standard for conduct. i.e .. that one 
should behave like the paragon. Once again we can turn this standard into a set of prin-
ciples by generalizing from the paragon's behavior. 
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standard. 158 The words of the text may employ a generally recog-
nized term of art, which in turn enacts a rule, principle, or stan-
dard. And assuming that the text employs a standard, it may 
employ a historical standard: e.g., the practices of common law 
courts up to 1787, or a traditional standard: e.g., the evolving 
practices of custom or of the common law. 
In fact, it is even possible that the same text employs rules, 
principles, and standards, including standards of several different 
kinds. My discussion of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 159 
suggests that this clause is a very complicated text. It combines a 
determinate rule (incorporate the individual rights provisions of 
the existing Constitution plus any that are later adopted) plus a 
principle of equality (protect basic rights of citizenship equally as 
between citizens) plus a traditional standard (protect basic rights 
of citizenship as the American people come to understand them 
over time). 
History is important precisely because it may not be obvious 
what kind of norm the text requires. Amending the U.S. Consti-
tution-not to mention the adoption of the 1787 Constitution it-
self-requires the cooperation of a very large number of people 
who are geographically dispersed; hence idiosyncratic meanings 
are very unlikely, and without convincing evidence to the con-
trary we may assume that the words of a Constitution should be 
understood in their ordinary, everyday sense.160 But our ordinary, 
everyday sense today may not be the ordinary, everyday sense of 
the time of adoption, and so history may be relevant. The Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause is a case where knowing the history 
helps us understand why the framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment chose the particular words they did. 
Second, when the text employs standards or principles, we 
face an additional question. What standards or principles does 
the text require? In one sense the answer is quite simple. If the 
words say that states may not deny "equal protection of the 
laws," the principle is that states must not deny the equal protec-
tion of the laws. But what does that mean? To answer this ques-
tion, we will have to cash out the principle of "equal protection 
of the laws" in terms of subsidiary principles. I have called these 
158. As Keith Whittington explains, the original meaning of the legal text is always 
an empirical question in this sense. Keith Whittington, Dworkin's "Originalism ": The 
Role of Intentions in Constitutional Interpretation, 62 REV. POL. 197. 213-14 (2000). 
159. Balkin. supra note 2. at 313-14. 328-33. 
160. See Eisgruber. Should Constitutional Judges Be Philosophers?. supra note 97. at 
11. 
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subsidiary principles underlying principles but perhaps an 
equally helpful way to think of them is as aids or heuristics that 
help flesh out the textual commitment to moral or legal principle 
that we find in the text. Underlying principles are not identical 
with the words of the text-they do not constitute the text, as the 
words "equal protection of the laws" do. They underlie the text 
because they both support the text and explain the point of the 
text.l61 
Here again history can help us. We can look to contempo-
raneous statements of principle and to the aspirations of sup-
porters and advocates of the text. We can also look to the gen-
eral evils or problems that the generation that produced the text 
sought to address. This evidence helps us construct principles 
that help us explain the textual commitment to "equal protection 
of the laws." I use the term "construct" advisedly; we cannot al-
ways simply plug in the statements of various framers and ratifi-
ers as the relevant principles. Their statements may merely be 
statements about their expected applications of the text. 
The principles underlying the text should be at roughly the 
same level of generality as the text (understood to include any 
generally recognized terms of art). If the text uses general lan-
guage, the underlying principles that support and explain the 
text should as well. The reason is simple. As I noted before, be-
cause the Constitution required the cooperation of a very large 
number of people widely dispersed geographically, we must as-
sume that its words were to be used and understood in their or-
dinary sense. Absent strong evidence to the contrary, we assume 
that people choose general language if they want to endorse 
general principles, and more specific language if they want to 
commit themselves to narrower principles. Generally speaking, 
the best way to commit yourself to abstract principles and open 
ended standards is to put abstract principles and open-ended 
standards in the text; the best way to prevent that sort of com-
mitment is to avoid using that sort of language. 
There has been a very long debate in American constitu-
tional theory about the proper level of generality at which to 
construe the framers' and ratifiers' purposes, presumably on the 
161. Compare this account with what I have said about (some) structural principles: 
the latter do not necessarily explain the text but rather follow from the structure of gov-
ernment the text brings into being. These structural principles ··underlie"' the constitu· 
tiona! text in a different way than principles that are tethered to a particular text that 
points to a principle or a set of principles. 
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grounds that these purposes are somehow controlling. 162 This de-
bate asks the wrong question if it focuses on psychology and not 
on what the text enacts. The proper level of generality for the 
constitutional principles in the text is the one we find in the text 
itself. 
For example, people have long debated whether the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits only racial classifications- because a 
primary object of the Amendment was to secure equal citizen-
ship for blacks-or whether it .protects other groups-say 
women and homosexuals-from state discrimination. I regard 
this as an easy question. Obviously the Framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment sought to give the freedmen equality. But if 
the Fourteenth Amendment's framers had wanted to institute a 
principle that banned all racial classifications-and no more-
they could have said so. They would have chosen different words 
than they did. Indeed, if you look at the Fifteenth Amendment, 
you can see that they knew exactly how to ban certain classifica-
tions based on race and prior condition of servitude. However, 
they did not do this in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
They sought to establish principles of equal citizenship, which 
they saw as something both more and less than a total ban on ra-
cial classifications. In fact, the Committee of Fifteen that drafted 
the Fourteenth Amendment rejected the colorblindness princi-
ple when it was offered to them. 1"3 Instead the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment used the very general language of 
''equal protection of the laws" and "privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States." Any underlying principles we as-
sociate with those texts must be as general as the words them-
selves. Racial classifications are prohibited by the text of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that such classifications 
violate the principles behind the text, in this case, the principles 
162. See, e.g.. Bruce A. Ackerman. Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 
(1992): Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority. 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349 (1992): 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF. ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 73-80 
(1991): Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf. Levels of Generality in the Definition of 
Rights. 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1065-67 (1990): Mark V. Tushnet. Following the Rules 
Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781. 
791 (1983): Raoul Berger. A Response to D.A.J. Richards' Defense of Freewheeling Con-
stitutional Adjudication. 59 IND. L.J. 339. 370-72 (1983): Paul Brest, The Fundamental 
Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholar-
ship. 90 YALE L.J. 1063. 1090-92 (1981): Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle. 56 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 469.498--500 (1981). 
163. ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITCTION 82-87 (1992); BENJAMIN 
B. KENDRICK. THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON 
RECONSTRUCTIO:" 82-85. 106-07 ( 1914 ). 
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guaranteeing equal citizenship, and prohibiting class and caste 
legislation. 
Or to give another example: a person supporting the Four-
teenth Amendment may have stated that the purpose of the 
Amendment was to constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 
1866. 164 Even if many people made this claim, it does not follow 
that the Equal Protection Clause (or section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment) is limited to this function. The words chosen are 
"equal protection of the laws," which are stated at a much higher 
level of generality. Unless we have strong evidence that the term 
"equal protection of the laws" was a generally recognized term 
of art that was equivalent to the terms of the 1866 Civil Rights 
Act, we should reject this statement of principle as a candidate 
for the principle underlying the text. To be sure, the principles 
w~ construct should ,grobably protect as much as the 1866 C~vil 
Rights Act protects. · But the language of the Equal ProtectiOn 
Clause suggests that these principles should protect far more 
than that. It is entirely correct to say that one of the purposes of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was to constitutionalize the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. But we should not say that this purpose was 
the principle underlying the words chosen. 
The examples I just gave are fairly easy ones. In practice it 
may be difficult to know whether a principle is at roughly the 
same level of generality as the text. First, talking about compa-
rable levels of generality offers a metaphor, not a mathematical 
formula. Second, our initial assumptions about the generality of 
a standard may be altered by historical knowledge about how 
language was used at the time, for example, whether the text 
uses commonly accepted terms of art. As a result, there will usu-
ally be a kind of reflective equilibrium between our assessment 
of the generality of the text's language and our assessment of the 
historical evidence of the context that produced it. There will of-
164. See BERGER. supra note 45 (using such statements to argue that scope of Four-
teenth Amendment was limited to protecting the rights guaranteed by the Civil Rights 
Act.). 
165. Jed Rubenfeld has made this point in terms of constitutional commitments. 
RUBENFELD. REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY. supra note 99: RUBENFELD. FREEDOM AND 
TiME. supra note 99. Rubenfeld argues that when people create constitutional texts. they 
commit themselves and those who come after them to certain principles. When they do 
so in abstract language. we should read them as committing to results in a certain set of 
basic or paradigm cases and to general principles to be worked out later on. However the 
principles are worked out. they must still account for the earlier. paradigm cases. This 
could be an absolute requirement-as Rubenfeld suggests-but it might also merely be a 
rule of thumb that helps ensure that there is a continuitv of commitment that allows dif-
ferent generations to identify with each other over time.· 
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ten be controversy when we use history to discern underlying 
principles. Nevertheless, we must do the best we can with what 
we have. 
In Abortion and Original Meaning, I attempted to identify 
several principles that I claim underlie the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause. I argued that the text of the 
Equal Protection Clause prohibits class legislation, caste legisla-
tion, "special" or "partial" legislation, and arbitrary and unrea-
sonable distinctions between persons or citizens. Each of these 
principles, I claim, are at roughly the same level of generality as 
the words of the clause, and although they overlap, each has a 
slightly different focus. My evidence for these principles comes 
from the public explanations that the people who drafted the 
Fourteenth Amendment gave for what they were trying to do. I 
noted previously that we cannot necessarily identify these state-
ments of purpose with the principles underlying the text if these 
statements of purpose are relatively concrete and the text is 
quite general. However, in the case of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the persons who drafted and supported the Amendment 
spoke about their purposes in quite general terms and they re-
peatedly and deliberately used very abstract language to explain 
their goals. 166 They matched their explanations to the text's level 
of generality. They spoke about equal citizenship, about ending 
caste and class legislation, about equality before the law, and 
about protecting basic rights of citizenship. People defending the 
Amendment stated their goals in terms of very general princi-
ples, and that helps explain why they chose such general lan-
guage in the first place. Moreover, evidence of their concrete his-
torical expectations also helps us understand why they made 
these general statements of principle. 167 
166. Balkin. supra note 2. at 313-16. 
167. I give pride of place to Senator Jacob Howard's speech explaining the Four-
teenth Amendment's provisions for several reasons. One is that it is the official public 
introduction of the Amendment before the Senate. Howard was a member of the Com-
mittee of Fifteen that drafted the bill. and he was also the floor manager of the Amend-
ment. who was given the specific task of explaining its underlying purposes to Congress. 
His speech was also reported in the press, and portions were even reprinted on the front 
page of the New York Times on May 24, 1866, the day after the speech. See Bryan H. 
Wilden thai. Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original Understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in 1866-67. 68 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (abstract avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=963487); MICHAEL KENT 
CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS 128. 250 n.281 (1986). As early as 1954 William Crosskey had pointed to cov-
erage of Howard's speech in both the New York Times and the New York Herald. Wil-
liam W. Crosskey. Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limita-
tions on State Awhority. 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 102--D3 (1954). 
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Not every part of the Constitution offers such a rich histori-
cal record. The First Amendment's Speech Clause lacks the 
same degree and type of evidence that we have for the Four-
teenth Amendment. We have evidence about official legal pro-
tection for speech in 1791 which is not very speech protective. 
We have evidence of historical practices of speech protection 
which run contrary to the law on the books and are far more lib-
ertarian.168 And we have some general statements of principle by 
the generation that produced the First Amendment. Neverthe-
less, in comparison to the Fourteenth Amendment, the historical 
record is far sparser. History gives us relatively little help in de-
termining what principle or principles underlie the words "free-
dom of speech." And for some clauses and portions of the Con-
stitution, the historical record is sparser still. 
Nevertheless, our task is the same: we must still try to figure 
out what principle or principles the text enacts using whatever 
sources and forms of reasoning are available to us. Where the 
history is available, as in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
we should certainly use it. But we do not look to history because 
we are bound by the original or intended purposes of either the 
framers or the ratifiers. We look to history because we want to 
know what standard or principle the text they produced enacts. 
If we faced a piece of constitutional text where historical evi-
dence of purpose was completely lacking, we could not do what I 
have tried to do with the Fourteenth Amendment. We would be 
Equally important. however. is the fact that Howard makes the case for the words of 
the text in terms of very general principles that explain why the very general words of the 
text were used. That is. the principles he offers as the reasons for the text tend to be 
stated at pretty much the same level of generality as the text itself. Senator Howard's 
speech is not a conclusive statement of the principles underlying the Fourteenth 
Amendment: it is one piece of evidence. although. given the context in which it was of-
fered. a fairly powerful piece of evidence. 
168. Leonard Levy's work emphasized the speech restrictive features of law at the 
founding. criticizing the previous portrait offered by Zachariah Chaffee. See LEONARD 
W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985) (rev. ed. of LEONARD W. LEVY. 
LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960)): ZACHARIAH CHAFEE. FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1941). Levy's critics have pointed out that actual practices were far more 
equivocal. See David A. Anderson. Levy vs. Levy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 777 (1986): David 
M. Rabban. The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early 
American History. 37 STAN. L REV. 795 (1985): Philip Hamburger. The Development of 
the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control of the Press. 37 STAN. L REV. 661 (1985): Wil-
liam T. Mayton. Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression. 84 
COLUM. L REV. 91 (1984): David A. Anderson. The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 
UCLA L .REV. 455 (1983). Philip Kurland and Thomas Emerson noted that the historical 
evidence is mixed and that it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions from it. Philip B. 
Kurland, The Original Understanding of the Freedom of the Press Provision of the First 
Amendment. 55 MISS. LJ. 225 (1985): Thomas I. Emerson. Colonia/Intentions and Cur-
rent Realities of the First Amendment. 125 U. PA. L. REV. 737 (1977). 
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thrown back on other resources. We would try to figure out the 
underlying principles by reasoning from the text and from other 
parts of the Constitution, from any historical context we could 
discover, from structural considerations, from later interpreta-
tions of the text, and from considerations of justice and political 
morality. Our conclusions would no doubt be subject to dispute 
and uncertainty, but that is hardly unusual in constitutional in-
terpretation even when we have a very rich historical record. 
These considerations help resolve one possible difference 
between Berman and myself. I have used historical investigation 
to offer a series of principles underlying the Fourteenth 
Amendment's text, principles that I claim have roughly the same 
level of generality as the text. But the text does not say "no class 
legislation;" it says "equal protection of the laws." That means 
that the principles I find in history do not exhaust the meaning of 
the clause. 1"9 They are particular attempts, situated in history, for 
figuring out what principles the clause enacts. If you like, you 
can think of them as heuristics, aids to understanding the text 
and its principled commitments. Given the history, my best guess 
is that a commitment to equal protection of the laws includes a 
commitment against class legislation, caste legislation, arbitrary 
and unreasonable distinctions, and special or partial laws. But it 
follows from my arguments that there could be other constitu-
tional principles embodied by the Equal Protection Clause that 
no particular person living in 1868 intended but that we come to 
recognize through our country's historical experience. That is, 
although we may use history to recognize these principles, they 
need not have been originally intended principles. 
Moreover, even if the facts of history do not change, and 
even if we uncover no new historical sources, what history means 
to us and the way it appears to us continually do change, because 
we ourselves are moving through history and continually see 
what happened in the past through new perspectives. (Indeed, 
the source materials we think relevant may change based on 
those changing perspectives). We inevitably recognize and con-
ceptualize what happened in the past from the standpoint of our 
own cultural memories and experiences. These are always 
changing- new things happen to us or become salient to us while 
older events and memories are reinterpreted or forgotten. 
Hence, elements of the past always look salient to us in ever new 
ways, even if specific source materials do not change. 
169. I am indebted to Ronald Dworkin for this formulation. 
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History seems freshly (and differently) relevant as time 
passes not because the facts of history have altered, but because 
what facts are important to us and what they mean to us change 
as we and our country go through various crises, conflicts, con-
troversies, and transformations. We see the problems and the 
difficulties, the fears and the commitments, the goals and the as-
pirations of people in the past in terms of our present controver-
sies and experiences. So the past always seems relevant to us, in 
ways that may differ markedly from how previous generations 
apprehended our common history. History always looks new to 
us because we ourselves are constantly changing; our perspec-
tives are constantly shifting under our feet. We are always mov-
ing through history and viewing the past from ever new perspec-
tives, in light of contemporaneous events that are themselves 
ever receding before us. 
I suspect that many living constitutionalists are suspicious of 
any form of originalism because they worry that the past offers 
insufficient resources for vindicating our values in the present. 
Ethan Leib's account of the "anxiety of living constitutionalism" 
reflects this concern- the fear that the past is really against us, 
and that the aspirations and principles of those who lived in the 
past are insufficient to do justice in the present, because they 
were created by people who were very unjust to each other, and 
who held many views-about social equality, for example-that 
we today would think outmoded, wrongheaded and reactionary. 
But when we enter into an appropriate spirit of charity to-
ward the past, when we see it as striving or aspiring to the goals 
of the Preamble- for example- we get a very different view of 
the resources of history. 170 Viewed sympathetically as people at-
170. I have tried to explain the project of interpretive charity toward the past in this 
way: 
When the Constitution speaks in grand general phrases like ·•equal protection." 
or ··due process." it speaks to generations long after those who drafted it. It asks 
those future generations to look beyond the compromises and hesitancies that 
are inevitable in any age. and to do justice in their own time. We must regard 
the grand phrases of due process and equal protection as promises that we have 
made to ourselves as a people. They are promises. made in times of injustice. 
that respond to injustice. albeit haltingly and imperfectly. They are promises 
that cannot always be carried out fully in their own era: but they are promises 
that we nevertheless pledge ourselves to as a people so that someday they may 
redeemed by future generations. In this way our Constitution becomes more 
than a collection of rules and doctrines: it becomes a document of redemption. 
Just as we may see the concrete practices of justice of those who framed and 
ratified the Constitution as compromised and imperfect. so we must recognize 
that others will someday see our own attempts at justice as equally flawed and 
deficient. That is why we owe it to previous generations to understand and ap-
ply their constitutional aspirations in their best light. We must carry on the work 
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tempting a feat of political change unheard of in prior human 
history, the 1787 framers were putting in place the most democ-
ratic constitution of their time; the radical Republicans of 1868 
were casting aside a system of chattel slavery and replacing it 
with a new system premised on the foundation of free and equal 
citizens. Their larger principles, expressed in the abstract lan-
guage they chose, offer resources for articulating our present 
concerns, if we are willing to view these aspirations with sympa-
thetic eyes, and in a spirit of magnanimity. We should under-
stand these great principles as promising their eventual redemp-
tion in history, and we should understand our role as helping to 
move that redemption forward. 171 When we engage in a project 
of redemptive constitutionalism, their principles truly are our 
principles, their project is our project, and their Constitution is 
our Constitution. That is how one exorcizes what Ethan Leib 
calls the anxiety of living constitutionalism. We must replace it 
with an optimistic and vibrant constitutionalism that is not 
ashamed of the past and seeks to build on its best attributes 
rather than to flee from it. 
that they could only begin. If we read this document as fulfilling their best aspi-
rations rather than chaining us to their worst fears. we do them greater honor 
than any slavish adherence to their concrete practices could: and perhaps. if we 
are fortunate. we may merit an equal charity from the generations that come af-
ter us. 
Jack M. Balkin. Judgment of the Court. in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
SHOCLD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S MOST 
F AMOCS CIVIL RIGHTS OPINION 77. 81 (Jack M. Balkin ed .. 2001 ). 
171. Compare Abraham Lincoln's speech on the Dred Scott decision in the Lincoln 
Douglas debates. in which he treats the Declaration of Independence with similar char-
ity: 
Chief Justice Taney [and] Judge Douglas argue that the authors of [the Declara-
tion] did not intend to include negroes. by the fact that they did not at once. ac-
tually place them on an equality with the whites. Now this grave argument 
comes to just nothing at all. by the other fact, that they did not at once. or ever 
afterwards. actually place all white people on an equality with one or an-
other. .... I think the authors of that notable instrument ... did not mean to as-
sert the obvious untruth. that all were then actually enjoying that equality, nor 
vet. that thev were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact they had 
no power to -confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right. so that 
the enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit. They 
meant to set up a standard maxim for free society. which should be familiar to 
all. and revered by all: constantly looked to. constantly labored for, and even 
though never perfectly attained. constantly approximated, and thereby con-
stantly spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness 
and value of life to all people of all colors everywhere. 
Abraham Lincoln. Speech on the Dred Scott Decision at Springfield, Illinois. the Lincoln 
Douglas Debates (June 26. 1857). in 1 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES. LETTERS. 
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS. THE LINCOLN DOUGLAS DEBATES 398--99 (1832-1858) 
(Library of America ed. 1989). 
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Earlier I noted that constitutional protection of homosexu-
als might be justified on the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibi-
tion on class legislation. The historical materials I drew upon to 
establish that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited class legis-
lation have been known to legal historians for many years. But 
the idea that they might say something about the struggle of ho-
mosexuals for equal rights was not obvious to most people in 
1940 or 1960. It becomes possible to see this in the history only 
after one lives in a world in which homosexuals assert them-
selves, demand equal civil rights, and claim that they are being 
unfairly singled out for special burdens and discriminations by 
society. Indeed, understanding that this is what the gay rights 
movement is doing is the product of an imaginative interaction 
between past memories and present meanings. 
Berman thinks that it may be particularly important to liv-
ing constitutionalism that we can find "new" principles underly-
ing the Constitutional text that nobody thought of before. He 
imagines that principles that underlie the text will be much more 
specific than the general words of the text, that new situations 
will always arise that nobody recognized as problems before, and 
so we will always need a stable of "new'' principles as time 
passes. Berman worries that we may need new principles to pro-
tect atheists under the Free Exercise Clause, or women or ho-
mosexuals-or some new social group as yet undefined-under 
the Equal Protection Clause. But if underlying principles must 
be stated at the same level of generality as the text itself, and if 
our understanding of the relevant principles-and of the rele-
vant history-is always changing as we move through history, 
these concerns may be greatly overstated. So, for example, as 
genetic engineering develops and as the possibility of genetic 
discrimination becomes increasingly salient to us, what the his-
tory of the Fourteenth Amendment means to us will also change 
as we move forward in history. It is perfectly plausible that some 
day the Equal Protection Clause-and its prohibition on class 
legislation- might limit the state's ability to engage in genetic 
discrimination; to impose special burdens on people who share a 
common genetic marker, even if they correspond to no social 
group that existed in 1868.172 Indeed, I think that day is already 
here. 
172. See Jack M. Balkin. How New Genelic Technologies Will Transform Roe v. 
Wade, 56 EMORY L.J. 1143 (2007): VICTORIA F. NOl"RSE. IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER 
V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR-TRIL'MPH OF A\IERICAN EGGE!'IICS (forthcoming 2008). 
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There are other reasons why principles that the framers and 
adopters did not think of can nevertheless be consistent with the 
text. First, the text might point to the possibility of new princi-
ples. The Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities 
Clause and the Ninth Amendment's reservation of unenumer-
ated rights are declaratory texts. They contemplate the protec-
tion of rights that the American people come to regard as fun-
damental, even if they were not specifically recognized as 
protected in 1868 (or 1791 ). Assuming that these rights involve 
substantive constitutional principles, those principles were not 
specifically intended when these texts were adopted. 
Second, if subsequent amendments incorporate previous 
textual language by reference or duplicate the same language in 
a new context the original text may come to stand for principles 
that no one expected at the time it was originally enacted.173 
Consider the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. "Due process of law" was a generally rec-
ognized term of art in both 1791 and 1868, but its scope changed 
over the years. In 1791 the Fifth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause included both a guarantee of fair procedures and a guar-
antee against the destruction of vested rights by the government. 
By the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, the term "due proc-
ess of law" also included the idea that laws should be fair and 
impartial and not class legislation. 174 Thus the principles embod-
ied in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause over-
lapped with those in the new Equal Protection Clause. Although 
the 1791 version of the Due Process Clause was adopted before 
the antebellum conception of due process became generally ac-
cepted, I would argue that it is a principle that the text can bear. 
The best evidence for that is that the principle against class legis-
lation fits the language of the identical wording in the Four-
teenth Amendment. If that is so, then Chief Justice Warren was 
not far off the mark in Bolling v. Sharpe175 when he commented 
that "the concepts of equal protection and due process, both 
stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually 
exclusive."176 That means, among other things, that the federal 
173. This is the central claim of AMAR, supra note 23. 
174. See Ely. supra note 72. at 337-38; Saunders, supra note 72. at 257-58 & n.58: 
Yudof. supra note 72. at 1376 ("The idea that laws should be general and not tainted by 
considerations of class or caste was widely recognized and accepted before the fourteenth 
amendment was enacted .... It was part-and-parcel of the presumed fairness of govern-
mental processes, of due process of law."). 
175. 347 u.s. 497 (1954). 
176. /d. at 499. 
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government is bound by the obligation of fair and impartial laws 
and the prohibition against class legislation. There are several 
other textual and structural arguments for the federal govern-
ment's obligation to provide equal protection of the laws-in 
fact so many that the result is over-determined; 177 but this one is 
a particularly straightforward textual argument. 
The Second Amendment offers a final example of how an 
old text might bear new principles. There is considerable dispute 
whether in 1791 the amendment protected an individual right of 
self-defense or only a collective right of republican citizens to 
band together in militias to overthrow a tyrannical government. I 
happen to think the evidence points toward a right that included 
both the right to participate in militias and an individual right of 
self defense. Even assuming that this was not the case, by the 
time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, people generally 
assumed that the right to bear arms included an individual right 
of self-defense. That right was one of the individual rights incor-
porated into the Fourteenth Amendment.178 Thus, even if an in-
dividual right of self-defense was not intended in 1791, it is a 
principle that the text can bear today. 
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
Several of the commentators worry about the possibility 
that the Constitution will be hijacked by powerful social move-
ments or political parties who will produce constitutional doc-
trines and practices that are unfaithful to the Constitution. 179 For 
this reason they are particularly concerned about two aspects of 
my argument. The first is my claim that the citizen's, not the 
judge's perspective, should be the standard case of constitutional 
interpretation. The second is my claim that the method of text 
and principle helps explain why the work of previous political 
177. See, e.g.. Akhil Reed Amar. Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747. 766-73 
(1999) (pointing to the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal 
Title of Nobility Clause. the federal Bill of Attainder Clause, and the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause): Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections 
on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation. 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221. 1297 
n.247 (1995) (arguing from the Bill of Attainder Clause): Mark A. Graber, A Constitu-
tional Conspiracy Unmasked: Why "No State" Does Not Mean "No State," 10 CONST. 
COMMENT. 87 (1993) (offering a structural argument based on the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause). 
178. AMAR. supra note 23. at 216-18, 220-23. 261-66. 
179. Berman. supra note 1. at 393-94: McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note I. at 376-
81. 
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and social movements of which Americans are most proud-for 
example, the civil rights movement and the women's move-
ment-has been faithful to the Constitution. 
Together. the commentators raise two basic objections. The 
first objection is that political and social movements do not use 
the method of text and principle.m1 The second is that it is dan-
gerous to adopt a constitutional theory that incorgorates and jus-
tifies the work of political and social movements. 1 
A. DO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS MAKE ARGUMENTS FROM 
CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT AND PRINCIPLE? 
Mitch Berman argues that many social movements have not 
made claims based on constitutional text and principle. 182 Instead 
they often make claims based on simple policy grounds, and they 
reject constitutional arguments offered by their opponents. For 
example, the labor movement in the 1930's argued that the fed-
eral government had the power to guarantee collective bargain-
ing rights and regulate wages and working conditions; their op-
ponents argued that the federal government lacked power under 
the Commerce Clause and was restricted by the Due Process 
Clause. Second. even if social movements claim that they are be-
ing faithful to constitutional text and principle, they are likely to 
get the history wrong because "social movements do not view 
their task as maintaining fidelity to the past."181 Their use of ar-
guments from constitutional text and principle may be merely 
rhetorical. Social movements are primarily interested in social 
change, not constitutional fidelity. 
These criticisms are historically inaccurate. Social move-
ments in the United States have regularly drawn on the constitu-
tional text and its underlying principles to justify social change. 184 
The American political tradition has featured a strong belief in 
emancipatory rights consciousness based on foundational texts, 
including the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Consti-
180. Berman. supra note 1. at 393-94. 
181. Berman. supra note 1. at 394: McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note 1, at 376--81. 
182. Berman. supra note 1. at 393-94. 
183. /d. at 393. 
184. Hendrik Hartog. The Constillltion of Aspiration and "The Rights that Belong to 
Us All,,. 74 1. AM. HIST. 1013. 1014 (1987) ('"Constitutional rights consciousness suggests 
a faith that the received meanings of constitutional texts will change when confronted by 
the legitimate aspirations of autonomous citizens and groups."): Reva B. Siegel, Text in 
Contest: Gender and the Constillltion from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 297 (2001) (discussing why textual arguments have been so important to citizens 
and social movements throughout history). 
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tution. 1x5 This "'emancipatory vision of natural rights, rooted in 
the subversive and utopian messages that people read into con-
stitutional texts 'has justified continued struggle by groups in the 
face of (presumably temporary) judicial and political defeats.'"Ix~> 
As Reva Siegel has pointed out in her studies of the women's 
movement, throughout our history ordinary citizens have called 
on the text of the Constitution as a foundation and source of 
their rights, claiming that the text has meaning that differs from 
official understandings. 1x7 Precisely because the Constitution 
views We the People as its authors, ordinary citizens have as-
sumed the right to claim the Constitution as their Constitution 
and its meanings as their meanings. They have felt authorized to 
insist that legal officials must conform existing law to the Consti-
tution's true meaning. 
The importance of the constitutional text as the launching 
pad for arguments about rights in the American political tradi-
tion comes from historical contingency, not logical necessity. It 
emerged from several different features of our history: the tradi-
tion of common law evolution in which new rights claims were 
viewed as naturally emerging out of older customs and commit-
ments, the American belief in natural rights as a source of inspi-
ration and aspiration, and the influence of Protestantism and its 
assertion that ordinary believers have authority to decide what 
the Bible and other sacred texts mean for themselves. 1xx 
Not only have social movements regularly called upon the 
constitutional text, they have also called upon the enduring po-
litical principles of the generations that went before them, par-
ticularly the founding generation. 1s9 Woman suffragists, for ex-
ample, invoked the Revolutionary slogan of "no taxation 
without representation" to explain why women deserved the 
vote. 190 Martin Luther King described the work of the founding 
generation as a "promissory note" 191 that had to be made good in 
185. Hartog. supra note 184. at 1016. 
186. Jules Lobel. Losers, Fools & Prophets: Justice as Struggle. 80 CORNELL L. REV. 
1331. 1356 (1995) (quoting Hartog. supra note 184. at 1016). 
187. Siegel. supra note 184. 322-23. 
188. See Hartog. supra note 184. at 1016-17 ("An American emancipatory tradition 
of constitutional meaning must be rooted in the subversive and disruptive and utopian 
messages that people read into constitutional texts and drew from diverse and contradic-
tory sources. including English common law. liberalism. Enlightenment philosophy. post-
Reformation theology. and the medieval peasant's vision of self-ownership and free-
dom.") 
189. See Siegel. supra note 184. at 337. 
190. /d. 
191. Martin Luther King. Jr.. I Have a Dream. in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE 
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the present, arguing that the struggle for civil rights was ·'a 
dream deeply rooted in the American dream." 192 The dream in 
King's famous speech was "that one day this nation will rise up 
and live out the true meaning of its creed" enunciated in the 
Declaration of Independence.193 NRA president Charleton 
Heston identified today's gun owners with the founding genera-
tion and its commitment to liberty. 19~ And Christian conserva-
tives have invoked both the founding era's commitments to reli-
gious liberty and to belief in Divine providence as the basis of 
f I~ ree government. · 
It is hardly surprising that social movements have so often 
made arguments based on the Constitution's text and what they 
regard as its enduring underlying principles. As I noted previ-
ously, the Constitution's success and its legitimacy stem from the 
fact that the Constitution is not only basic law but also higher 
law. To be successful as higher law, the Constitution must in-
clude aspirational elements that people can use to critique exist-
ing features of social life. Social movements naturally look for 
these aspirational elements in the constitutional text to support 
their claims for change. When they look to the Constitution in 
this way, they naturally adopt the rhetorical tropes of restoration 
and redemption that are characteristic of our history. 
Perhaps even more important, for the Constitution to be 
successful and legitimate, it must be not only basic law and 
higher law, it must also be "our law." To be successful and le-
gitimate, ordinary citizens must see the Constitution as some-
thing that belongs to them and that they are attached to, even if 
they did not formally consent to it. 
First, this means that citizens must be able to interpret the 
document for themselves so that it speaks to their current ideals 
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING. JR. 217. 217 (James M. Washing-
ton. ed .. 1986 ). 
192. !d. at 219. 
193. !d. 
194. Charleton Heston. NRA Keynote Address (May 2. 1999). available at 
http://www.varmintal.com/heston4.htm ("The Founding Fathers guaranteed this free-
dom. because they knew no tyranny can ever arise among a people endowed with the 
right to keep and bear arms. That's why you and your descendants need never fear fas-
cism. state-run faith. refugee camps. brain-washing. ethnic cleansing. or especially sub-
mission to the wanton will of criminals.") 
195. See, e.g .. DAVID BARTON. ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS. THE CONSTITUTION 
AND RELIGION (3d. ed. 2004): CBN.COM. Faith of our Fathers: God and the American 
Revolution, http://www.cbn.com/spirituallife/churchandministry/churchhistory/faith_fathers. 
aspx: David Brody. Finding God's Signature in Washington. http://www.cbn.com/ 
cbnnews/cwn/070204washington.aspx. 
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and concerns. Because the Constitution is theirs, they can speak 
truth to power: they can criticize officials for failing to live up to 
what the Constitution means, rightly interpreted. 
Second, the notion that the Constitution must be "our" 
Constitution refers not only to the current generation but to a 
transgenerational "we." It requires that citizens must be able to 
see themselves as part of a larger political project that extends 
over time and of which they form a part. The Constitution's text, 
which each generation inherits and must expound, is the most 
obvious embodiment of this larger common political project. 
The fact that Americans see ourselves as part of a transgenera-
tional "We the People" naturally leads people to identify with 
people in the past, and with their hopes, struggles, principles and 
commitments in order to make sense of current controversies 
and the direction of legal and political change. Social movements 
thus make appeals to the continuing commitments of the past in 
order to explain what is legitimate or illegitimate about current 
conditions. They do so not only because this helps them make 
sense of the present in terms of the past, but also because these 
commitments are part of what they hold in common with other 
members of the political community they are trying to persuade. 
Thus, when the suffragists used the slogan "no taxation without 
representation," they understood their fight for the vote as justi-
fied by the principles of the Revolution; and they were trying to 
persuade their contemporaries-including men who already had 
the vote-to live up to their common commitments and princi-
ples. 
When Berman views social movement arguments for resto-
ration and redemption as nothing more than rhetorical tropes, 
he misses how this way of talking and thinking contributes to so-
cial movements' self-understanding as engaged in an enterprise 
that is larger than themselves and their current concerns, an en-
terprise that unites past, present and future generations, and an 
enterprise that therefore deserves to command the respect and 
agreement of other members of a political community that 
claims to be organized under the Constitution. This rhetoric is 
not just rhetoric, it is just rhetoric-appropriate rhetoric for the 
American constitutional enterprise, a way of talking and think-
ing that leads people to see the Constitution's fate and future as 
something that concerns them and therefore enhances the suc-
cess and the legitimacy of the constitutional project.'96 Precisely 
196. Robert Post and Reva Siegel call this legitimacy-enforcing relationship between 
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because people feel they can make claims on the Constitution as 
their Constitution, even in the face of official pronouncements to 
the contrary, they are invested in the Constitution and in the 
project of its development, restoration, and redemption. That is 
why the rhetoric of text and principle is so familiar in the history 
of so many American social and political movements, and that is 
why the rhetoric of text and principle supports the success and 
the legitimacy of the Constitution, even for generations that are 
increasingly distant from the founding generation. 
The rhetoric of text and principle is at work both in social 
movements that claim that the Constitution protects basic rights 
and structures and in movements that claim that the Constitu-
tion merely permits reform rather than requires it. Examples of 
the latter include the early Republican Party, which claimed that 
Congress could ban slavery in the territories, and the early 20th 
century labor movement, which argued that the federal govern-
ment should pass labor legislation that protected fair working 
conditions and guaranteed the right of collective bargaining. In 
each case opponents objected that what these movements pro-
posed was forbidden by the Constitution. Supporters of these 
movements responded that the Constitution was flexible enough 
to allow democratic majorities to protect important rights and 
create new institutions. 
In fact, both social movements and their opponents-who 
are often social movements themselves-routinely invoke a 
common rhetoric of text and principle against each other; that is 
strong evidence of the pervasive importance of text and principle 
in American political history. Both sides of the struggle over the 
New Deal invoked text and principle. It was not a contest be-
tween an old guard that believed in the Constitution's textual 
commitments and New Dealers who did not. Rather, Franklin 
Roosevelt's argument was the opponents of his New Deal had 
badly misconstrued the Constitution. Rightly understood, the 
Constitution's text and abiding principles permitted the federal 
government to act in the public interest. The Constitution, Roo-
sevelt famously declared, was "a layman's document, not a law-
yer's contract,"197 and as such it "used generality, implication and 
ordinary citizens and their Constitution "democratic constitutionalism." Robert C. Post 
& Reva B. Siegel. Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 2007) 
197. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address on Constitution Day, Washington, D.C.. Sep-
tember 17th. 1937. in John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Pro-
ject [online]. available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15459. 
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statement of mere objectives, as intentional phrases which flexi-
ble statesmanship of the future, within the Constitution, could 
adapt to time and circumstance. "19R 
Nevertheless, one might object that even if social and politi-
cal movements often use the rhetoric of text and principle, they 
often get the text and the principles wrong. When people talk 
about constitutional principles, they don't offer the detailed his-
torical analysis I tried to give in Abortion and Original Meaning. 
Instead, they tend to talk loosely about "what the framers in-
tended" our "what our founding fathers fought for." They offer 
fairly general claims about liberty, equality and democratic gov-
ernment. Members of social and political movements are not 
professional historians, and they tend to use-or reimagine-
history to suit their own often parochial ends. Moreover, even if 
members of social and political movements say they are invested 
in the Constitution and seek to promote what the Constitution 
truly means, some of them may be insincere. They may simply 
use constitutional discourse to promote what they think is good 
or what serves their own interests. 
To the extent this is true, however, it does not pose a par-
ticular problem for my theory of constitutional interpretation. 
Social groups are usually composed of people with different in-
terests, motivations, and understandings. The important ques-
tion is whether we can understand the work of social movements 
as consistent with constitutional fidelity. To do this we must en-
gage in interpretive charity and a sympathetic reconstruction of 
their claims. That means, among other things, that if social 
movements make arguments to the public premised on their and 
the public's common commitment to the Constitution, we should 
try to see whether social movement arguments make sense in the 
terms in which they are offered. 
Moreover, to engage in a sympathetic reconstruction, there 
will inevitably have to be a division of labor between laypersons 
who call on the Constitution and legal professionals who bring 
their claims before judges and other legal decisionmakers. Law-
yers will have to translate and reconstruct social movement ar-
guments in ways that judges and other legal decisionmakers can 
recognize as legal arguments. Put another way, lawyers and 
judges translate claims of constitutional politics into claims about 
constitutionallaw.199 
198. !d. 
199. This is a somewhat different sense of translation than Larry Lessig offered in his 
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In fact lawyers and judges do more than merely passively 
translate, for popular and professional understandings of the 
Constitution mutually influence each other. Famous decisions 
like Brown v. Board of Education 20 ) and Miranda v. Arizona/01 
and well-known legal doctrines like the diversity rationale in af-
firmative action202 or the doctrine of one-person-one-vote203 in-
fluence popular understandings of the Constitution. No doubt 
popular understandings of the Constitution build on what ordi-
nary citizens recognize in the work of lawyers and judges; they in 
turn criticize and reshape these ideas in the popular imagination, 
and these revisions in turn may eventually influence professional 
understandings. Thus, when we speak about social movement 
constitutional interpretations, we actually refer to a complex set 
of interactions. They involve, on the one hand, ordinary indi-
viduals and legal professionals who represent them or who are 
otherwise sympathetic to them; and, on the other hand, the other 
members of the general public and other legal professionals 
whom the first group seeks to persuade or convince. The work of 
social movements occurs in many different places and before 
many different publics; social movement interpretations may 
combine popular and professionally mediated claims that, in 
turn, may influence each other. 
What this means in practice is that lawyers and judges play 
an important role in articulating and vindicating social move-
ment claims about the Constitution. When ordinary individuals 
argue (for example) that the exclusion of women from public life 
violates the Constitution, it will probably fall to lawyers to ex-
plain in greater detail how these claims are consistent with con-
stitutional text and principle in ways that are persuasive to 
courts. To do this, lawyers will probably make more detailed his-
torical and textual arguments than most nonlawyers could make, 
work on constitutional interpretation. Lawrence Lessig. Fidelity in Interpretation. 71 TEX. 
L. REV. 1165 (1993): Lawrence Lessig. Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and 
Theon•. 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995): Lawrence Lessig. Fidelity and Constraint. 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1365 (1997). Lessig was interested in how to translate the concrete 
expectations of the framers into decisions related to present circumstances. My interest 
here is how popular claims about the Constitution-which may not clearly respect a clear 
division between law and politics-must be translated into forms of constitutional dis-
course that judges and legal decision makers would recognize as plausible legal argu-
ments. 
200. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
201. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
202. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke. 438 U.S. 265, 313-15 (1978) (opinion of 
Powell. J.). 
203. Reynolds v. Sims. 377 U.S. 533.558 (1964) (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 
368. 381 (1963)). 
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as well as draw on all the familiar modalities of constitutional ar-
gument. There is nothing particularly unusual about this process 
of translation; it occurs regularly in the legal representation of 
individual and group clients. It is true that most citizens are not 
very good historians, but they are not very good doctrinalists ei-
ther. Rather, they make claims on the Constitution in the way 
that citizens make such claims, and lawyers try as best they can 
to translate these concerns into existing legal forms. Inevitably 
something will be lost in the translation from politics to law, but 
that is the cost of a system that tries to take citizens' claims 
about the Constitution seriously. 
In Abortion and Original Meaning, I offered a history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that explains why some of the claims of 
the women's movement and the pro-choice movement are con-
sistent with the original meaning of the Constitution and its un-
derlying principles. I do not expect that most members of these 
social movements would make exactly the kind of arguments I 
offer; these are, by and large, arguments made by legal profes-
sionals for legal professionals. Nevertheless, I do assert that, 
sympathetically understood, these movements have made claims 
on the Constitution that have a basis in text and principle. 
B. SHOULD JUDGES PAY ATTENTION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION? 
Suppose that I am right that lawyers and judges translate 
constitutional politics into constitutional law, that they turn so-
cial movement claims into legal arguments that might persuade 
legal decisionmakers about how to interpret the Constitution. 
This leads to the second objection: the text and principle ap-
proach creates real dangers for constitutional fidelity because it 
seeks to incorporate the work of social and political movements. 
If judges adopt the text and principle approach, this will make it 
easier for them to respond to the claims of social movements 
who do not respect what the Constitution really means. This will 
lead judges to undermine important constitutional structures, 
deny important constitutional rights and create new rights that 
have no basis in the Constitution.204 Moreover, if the text and 
204. McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note 1. at 376 ("·Balkin would allow social move-
ments to spin the constitutional text as they choose with no limits except their ability to 
persuade the Court that their gloss should be adopted."'): Berman. supra note 1. at 394 
('"that judicial interpretation may follow and endorse nonoriginalist but popularly ac-
cepted constitutional interpretations is. I take it. at least part of what it means for judicial 
interpretation to be ··parasitic'' upon extrajudicial interpretation."). 
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principle approach actually requires judges to respond to social 
movement interpretations, matters will be even worse. Judges 
who feel bound to listen to social movements will be even more 
likely to stray from what the Constitution requires.205 
These objections, I think, rest on a misunderstanding. Noth-
ing in my argument obligates judges to pay any attention to so-
cial movements at all, much less adopt social movements' 
claims.206 There are two basic reasons for this. First, judges' pro-
fessional conception of themselves as deciding cases according to 
law-the law/politics distinction-makes it very important that 
judges not understand themselves as being unduly influenced by, 
much less taking orders from, social movements or other politi-
cal factions.207 Judges of course have opinions about social 
movements and about whether their claims are laudable or per-
nicious. But their job is to decide the legal cases that come be-
fore them, not to take instruction from the various J?rotesters 
who regularly congregate outside their courtrooms.2 Second, 
even if we assumed that judges had some duty to listen to social 
movements, there are simply too many social movements at anJ: 
one time, and their demands often point in different directions. 
If judges had obligations to follow or even respond to social 
movement claims, how would they know which ones to pay at-
tention to? For example, which social movement should judges 
205. Berman. supra note 1. at 394 ("Balkin provides no reason why judicial interpre-
tation should not follow [a movement that persuades the general public to accept its con-
stitutional interpretations). least of all that judicial resistance to a successful extrajudicial 
interpretation not predicated on historical fidelity is categorically mandated."); id. at 394 
(Courts cannot "refuse to sanction" a successful social movement's new constitutional 
interpretations "on the grounds that that understanding lacks historical fidelity and 
therefore legitimacy" either because this misunderstands ·'what social movements are for 
·· or because it rests on "an unrealistic sense of how long courts might (or should) stand 
against successful popular mobilizations."); McGinnis & Rappaport. supra note 1, at 377 
("Balkin ... confus[es] pride and propriety. Even if we assume that the decisions he lists 
are generally deemed to be achievements and sources of pride, that does not make them 
either legal or proper."): id. at 378 ("discarding expected applications in favor of abstract 
principles, as influenced by social movements, transfers tremendous power from the en-
acters of the Constitution to future interpreters. A Constitution that was established to 
place limits on future government actors would not delegate power so generously."). 
206. See Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (Or Fail to Change) the 
Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 29 (2005) ("the 
notion that judges are not supposed to take instruction from social movements-or 'fac-
tions,' as they might have been called by the founding generation-seems to be one of 
the basic assumptions of American constitutionalism."). 
207. /d. 
208. See, e.g. .William H. Rehnquist. Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 Suf-
folk U. L. Rev. 751. 752, 768--69 (1986) (noting that judges may be influenced by public 
opinion but they are not supposed to take direction from politics). 
209. /d. 
2007] CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 513 
have paid attention to in the late 1950's and early 1960's: the civil 
rights movement or the countermobilization that sought to re-
verse Brown v. Board of Education and preserve White Suprem-
acy? Historically we know that social movements have influ-
enced judicial interpretations, but it is not because judges have 
any obligations to listen to them. 
My arguments about social movements involve claims of 
positive constitutional theory and normative constitutional the-
ory. Positive constitutional theory studies how the constitutional 
system works and develops over time: how government and po-
litical institutions influence and interact with each other, and 
how features of politics and institutional structure influence the 
creation and development of constitutional doctrine. Normative 
constitutional theory focuses not on what people actually do but 
what they should do.210 One branch of normative constitutional 
theory concerns constitutional design, and another concerns con-
stitutional interpretation and construction. 
My positive claim is that social and political mobilizations 
have shaped the development of our Constitution. My normative 
claim is that some, but not all of these changes are worthy ob-
jects of pride that demonstrate the best features of the American 
constitutional tradition. Our theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion should be able to explain why the latter changes are faithful 
to the Constitution rather than being deviations or mistakes 
from constitutional fidelity that we must preserve for prudential 
reasons. 
Much of my previous work on constitutional change has 
been positive constitutional theory. 211 In accord with much of the 
political science literature, I have argued that the Supreme 
Court's constitutional doctrines tend to stay in touch with the 
dominant forces in American political life. I tried to offer ac-
counts of how judicial practices are influenced by political par-
ties and social movements. For example, parties and social 
210. Jack M. Balkin. What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory. 90 VA. 
L. REV. 1537. 1537 (2004); Barry Friedman. The Importance Of Being Positive: The Na-
tllre And Function Of Judicial Review. 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257. 1257-58 (2004); Mark A. 
Graber. Constitlltional Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and Ne-
glected Relationship. 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 309.312. 317-18 (2002). 
211. The arguments in the following two paragraphs draw on Jack M. Balkin & San-
ford Levinson. From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State. 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006): Jack M. Balkin. How Social Movements Change (Or Fail 
To Change) the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure. 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 
(2005): Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson. Understanding the Constitutional Revolwion. 
87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001 ). 
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movements influence judicial decisionmaking through partisan 
entrenchment in the judiciary, replacing old judges with newer 
ones whose good faith beliefs about the Constitution more 
closely match those of the party or social movement that secured 
their appointment. Political parties and social movements also 
influence judicial doctrine by changing public opinion, and par-
ticularly elite opinion. Gradually they convert views that may be 
initially considered "off-the-wall" into the political mainstream 
and eventually make them part of constitutional common sense. 
Judges are influenced by changes in constitutional culture be-
cause they live in this culture-not to mention the changing po-
litical culture of the nation-and absorb its assumptions and pre-
suppositions. Moreover, not all judges need be equally 
influenced for these effects to occur. The Supreme Court is a 
multimember body whose decisions in the most contested cases 
are determined by its median or swing Justices. New judicial ap-
pointments can change the median Justice while leaving most of 
the other Justices (and their preexisting views) in place. More-
over median or swing Justices are more likely to be responsive to 
changes in political culture than Justices at the extreme ends of 
the political spectrum. Lower court judges in turn are bound by 
the decisions of the Supreme Court, and precisely because there 
are so many of them, a predictably large number retire and are 
replaced during each Presidential election cycle. 
In short, judicial interpretations of the Constitution can 
change in one of two ways: One can change the culture in which 
the judges decide cases or one can change the judges. In addi-
tion, constitutional constructions by the political branches -like 
the creation of the administrative state-demographic shifts, 
technological changes, and long term alterations in public mores 
shape the terrain in which judges decide cases and create consti-
tutional doctrine. 
McGinnis and Rappaport are worried that if people accept 
my normative theory, judicial decisions will be easily influenced 
by social and political mobilizations that will misrepresent the 
true meaning of the Constitution. This concern seems to misun-
derstand the real causes of social influence on the judiciary, as 
well as the sources of judicial restraint. It seems to assume that 
interpretive theories are a major factor in why constitutional 
doctrines change over time. This greatly overstates the impor-
tance of theories of constitutional interpretation in explaining 
the product of courts. (That is particularly true of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, a multi-member body whose members may have 
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very different theories of interpretation, or no theory at all.). 
Generally speaking, judges have responded to changing social 
and political mobilizations for the institutional reasons I have 
identified above, and they have done so regardless of their nor-
mative interpretive theories. Until the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury, virtually every federal judge and Justice understood them-
selves to be what we would now call an originalist.212 This, 
however, did not stop courts from responding to changing politi-
cal and social mobilizations, and these tendencies continued af-
ter living constitutionalism came into vogue. 
I do not claim that the choice of interpretive theories has no 
effect on judicial behavior. After all, shared basic assumptions 
about interpretation are part of the shared legal culture that 
helps constrain judicial practice. Moreover, as I will discuss in a 
moment, the choice of normative theories may be important be-
cause different theories may offer different normative justifica-
tions for decisions. My point is that theories of interpretation are 
not a significant causal explanation for why doctrines have 
changed as they have. Although law professors might want to 
think it so, the choice between originalism and living constitu-
tionalism has not been the major reason why judicial doctrines 
changed as they did during the twentieth century. If McGinnis 
and Rappaport are worried about runaway social movements 
leading judges astray, theories of constitutional interpretation 
will not prevent this baleful occurrence. As I have explained 
previously, theories of constitutional interpretation simply can-
not be expected to do most of the work of constraining judicial 
behavior. Those constraints come from institutional features of 
the judicial system; and their primary effect is to keep the work 
of courts roughly in sync with the views of the dominant political 
coalition. 
Courts-and in particular, the U.S. Supreme Court-tend to 
respond to political and social mobilizations when these mobili-
zations become so powerful that they start to dominate the na-
tional political process. When that happens, the courts' work will 
tend to cooperate with these dominant forces. If that happens, I 
guarantee that it won't be because those courts adopted my or 
anyone else's views on constitutional interpretation. At most 
courts can act as a drag on changes that threaten to happen very 
212. Howard Gillman. The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the 
Notion of the "Living Constitution" in the Course of American State-Building. 11 Stud. 
Am. Pol. Dev. 191 (1997). 
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quickly, but they will eventually come around because of the ap-
pointments process and long term changes in constitutional cul-
ture. Although it will probably be cold comfort to McGinnis and 
Rappaport, if most courts adopted my interpretive theory of text 
and principle tomorrow, it would probably only have a marginal 
effect on the outcomes of cases in the long run, because other in-
stitutional forces would still do most of the work of judicial con-
straint. All of this, of course, leads to the obvious question of 
why we care about interpretive theory, to which I now turn. 
C. WHAT'S A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
FOR, ANYWAY? 
One of the reasons I have spent so much time thinking 
about the practices of constitutional change is that I do not think 
that one can usefully engage in normative constitutional theory 
without paying at least some attention to what positive constitu-
tional theory teaches us. To put it simply: ought implies can. We 
should not expect from judges-or from the constitutional sys-
tem for that matter-practices of constitutional decisionmaking 
that they simply cannot provide. And we cannot adopt a theory 
of constitutional interpretation that the actual system of consti-
tutional law could never be faithful to. We know that constitu-
tional law and doctrine have changed markedly in many differ-
ent areas over time. We also know that constitutional doctrine 
responds to the work of social movements and political parties 
and tends to reflect the vector sum of the dominant political 
forces of the time. A theory of constitutional interpretation that 
cannot account for these features of our system of constitutional 
decisionmaking will be inadequate to the task. Hence normative 
theories of constitutional interpretation must do different work 
than most law professors currently think they do. 
The most important function of theories of constitutional in-
terpretation is not to constrain judges in difficult and contested 
cases. Constraint mostl~ comes from other institutional features 
of our political system. 13 Rather, normative theories about con-
stitutional interpretation are important because they help us un-
derstand and express claims about the legitimacy or illegitimacy 
of our current constitutional arrangements, precedents, and 
213. Hardly anyone ever litigates the ""hard-wired" features of the constitutional text 
where interpretive theories would have the least to contribute: they focus instead on 
other issues. where the constitutional text is more open-ended. and where history sug-
gests theories of interpretation offer the least constraint over how constitutional law de-
velops in practice. 
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practices. Call these the Constitution-in-practice. In a constitu-
tional culture like our own, many different people have ideas 
about what they think our Constitution stands for. Theories 
about how to interpret the Constitution offer us a language to 
defend and criticize parts of the Constitution-in-practice with the 
hope of moving it closer to our ideals of what the Constitution 
should be. 
Citizens' ability to make claims on the Constitution and to 
demand that existing arrangements conform to their views is im-
portant to maintaining its legitimacy over time and to serving as 
"our law"- that is, as a common object of fidelity and attach-
ment. The Constitution maintains its legitimacy to the extent 
that people with very different commitments can reasonably 
view it as sufficiently worthy of their respect and obedience so 
that all of them can enjoy the benefits of the rule of law, social 
cooperation, and political union.214 Different citizens, from their 
varying perspectives, must be able to see that the constitutional 
system, understood in its best light, is sufficiently just that they 
can accept it as theirs, or-if it is not currently sufficiently just-
they must be able to have faith that it could become so in time.215 
The Constitution-in-practice, however, may fall well short 
of these standards. And things may get worse, not better, over 
time. Therefore citizens must have ways to critique our existing 
arrangements, to talk back to courts and other political actors, 
and to persuade their fellow citizens about what the Constitution 
requires.216 They need tools to help identify what features of ex-
isting arrangements are sufficiently faithful to the Constitution 
and what features are not faithful. 
Theories of constitutional interpretation form part of this 
tool kit. They offer platforms, concepts, and languages for le-
gitimation, critique, persuasion, dissent, and mobilization that 
might promote eventual constitutional reform. These activities-
legitimation, critique, persuasion, dissent, and mobilization- are 
central parts of our shared (and perpetually contested) constitu-
tional culture. They matter both to the legal profession and to 
214. Frank I. Michelman. Ida's Way: Constructing the Respect-Worthy Governmental 
System, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 345. 364-65 (2003): Balkin. Respect Worthy. supra note 36. 
at 492. 
215. I focus on the question of justice here. but people must also believe that gov-
ernment institutions under the Constitution are sufficiently efficacious to secure the 
benefits that come from political union. If people believe th~t the constitutional system 
can no longer guarantee the rule of law. enforce social cooperation. or protect their 
rights, the system also loses legitimacy. 
216. Balkin. Respect Worthy. supra note 36. at 502-05. 
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the political life of our nation. No doubt lawyers, judges, and le-
gal academics will probably develop more sophisticated and 
complicated theories about interpreting the Constitution than 
most ordinary citizens. But citizens in a democracy must also 
have their own understandings and opinions about what makes 
constitutional claims-and existing arrangements-faithful or 
faithless to the Constitution. 
Thus, theories of constitutional interpretation serve two ba-
sic tasks-and the method of text and principle helps us perform 
both of them. First, interpretive theories should let us explain 
why valuable features of our existing constitutional arrange-
ments are faithful to the constitutional project correctly under-
stood. There are many ways that American constitutionalism 
might have evolved, depending on political, social, and economic 
contingencies. One goal of theories of constitutional interpreta-
tion is to explain and justify our existing forms of development 
in hindsight. 
Second, precisely because the Constitution-in-practice re-
sponds to mobilizations, social movements, and political parties 
may have promoted unjust and unconstitutional policies that be-
come widely accepted and part of the Constitution-in-practice. 
(Think, for example, about the construction of Jim Crow as a 
constitutional regime that lasted for the better part of a cen-
tury.). Therefore theories of constitutional interpretation should 
let us produce viable critiques of existing practices in the name 
of a deeper constitutional fidelity. 
This second criterion is particularly important: It is not 
enough to have a theory of constitutional interpretation that ex-
plains why everything that has happened is perfectly fine. Such a 
theory will be nothing more than an apology for the actual; it 
will abdicate our political and moral responsibilities to be faith-
ful to and to continue the constitutional project. 
We need more than a theory that explains why many of the 
changes in our constitutional practices have been faithful to the 
American constitutional project. We also need a theory of con-
stitutional interpretation for dark times-that is, times when our 
views of what the Constitution really means have been sub-
merged and disrespected by the dominant forces in society. Dur-
ing such times citizens and members of oppositional social 
movements must obey positive law, but they do not have to ac-
cept it as correct or faithful to the Constitution. They can protest 
it in the name of the Constitution and work to change people's 
minds. But to do this, citizens need normative leverage to chal-
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lenge the existing practices of constitutional law so that they can 
restore or redeem the Constitution's promises. Citizens need a 
way of grounding their claims about the Constitution that is in-
dependent from the Constitution-in-practice. Interpretive theo-
ries make it possible for people to pledge faith in the Constitu-
tion even though the Constitution-in-practice falls short of what 
they think the Constitution is and should become. 
Above all, citizens need a theory of interpretation for dark 
times because the present is always dark times for somebody's 
vision of the Constitution. Often it is dark times for both sides of 
an ongoing national controversy like abortion or gay rights. For 
example, although I argue that the most faithful interpretation of 
the Constitution protects women's rights to abortion, I know 
that many of my fellow citizens disagree with me. For them, the 
continued enforcement of abortion rights makes a mockery of 
the Constitution, just as for me the limitation or undermining of 
these rights flies in the face of the Constitution's guarantees of 
equal citizenship and fundamental rights. Each of us, in our own 
way, needs ways of talking about the Constitution that do not 
take existing arrangements as presumptively legitimate, that do 
not require us to bow down to the idol of the Constitution-in-
practice. 
You will notice that the first task I set for an interpretive 
theory-legitimation-presumes the standpoint of someone who 
seeks an attractive normative account of the existing constitu-
tional order as it has developed through the play of political and 
social forces. The second task-critique-presumes the stand-
point of a constitutional dissenter. Both of these standpoints are 
necessary to a successful constitutional theory. Moreover, these 
two perspectives actually depend on each other. It is precisely 
because people in the past were dissatisfied with the constitu-
tional order of their day, and mobilized to change people's 
minds about what the Constitution really means that they suc-
ceeded in establishing changes in constitutional culture and con-
stitutional doctrine. These changes have become part of the es-
tablished order that we now try to explain and legitimate. 
Conversely, present-day constitutional dissent usually begins 
with the assumption that at least some of these changes in the 
constitutional order are justifiable, and what the dissenter is do-
ing is following in the footsteps of the successful and honored 
political mobilizations of the past. Today's constitutional dis-
senter hopes to create part of the dominant constitutional vision 
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of the future, the Constitution-in-practice that future interpret-
ers will seek to defend and legitimate. 
The theory of text and principle can serve both of these 
functions of legitimacy. It is a constitutional bulwark that can le-
gitimate the best in the many transformations our constitutional 
system has undergone, and it is a constitutional refuge for dark 
times. It allows people to recognize that valued aspects of the 
Constitution-in-practice have kept faith with the Constitution 
despite the manifold changes in American life since the found-
ing; yet it also preserves a powerful position from which people 
can critique features of our existing practices. It creates a space 
for aspirational claims and for constitutional dissent. It allows 
people to understand their present situation in terms of the Con-
stitution's abiding commitments, it lets people critique the Con-
stitution-in-practice through a return to first principles, and it 
helps people mobilize and persuade others by appealing to 
common values, symbols, and commitments. The central idea 
that we should be faithful to the Constitution's text and underly-
ing principles is both intelligible and plausible to ordinary citi-
zens, while its legal implications are sufficiently complex for con-
stitutional lawyers and theorists to articulate and expand in 
theoretically satisfying ways.217 
If the Constitution is to be "our" Constitution, we must be 
able to see ourselves as part of a project that unites past and pre-
sent generations and projects outward into the future. We must 
be able to see our principles and commitments as the principles 
and commitments of those who came before us and of those who 
will come after us. The Constitutional text is the perhaps most 
conspicuous embodiment of the constitutional project that binds 
past with present and stretches out into the future. And the lan-
guage of restoration and redemption of constitutional principles 
well captures the sense of fidelity to the constitutional project 
over time. Hence it is not surprising that successful social and 
political movements have looked to the constitutional text and 
to enduring principles as a ground for their normative critique of 
present day arrangements. 
Originalism and textualism, in their various forms, have 
been central methods for the legitimation and critique of re-
gimes and practices of belief. And not only in America. I would 
217. In Bruce Ackerman ·s terms. it is a constitutional theory that can make sense 
both from the perspective of ordinary observation and scientific policymaking. BRUCE A. 
ACKERMAN. PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 10-15 (1977). 
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venture to say that in almost every creedal community-every 
community that organizes itself around a set of practices and be-
liefs inherited from the past- a return to origins and to basic 
principles is a standard method for urging reform, even radical 
reform. 21 s 
In a creedal tradition organized around a central (or sacred) 
document, each generation-situated as it is and facing the prob-
lems that it faces-places glosses on the document, and these 
glosses are bequeathed to the future as what the document 
means. Later generations, finding these interpretations inade-
quate to their time, try to remove some of these glosses and re-
turn to the original, redeeming its promise, but what they actu-
ally do is preserve some of the older readings while adding 
newer glosses atop them. The history of creedal texts is the his-
tory of continuous glossing and stripping away of glosses; and 
continuous claims of return, restoration, and redemption that 
are, from the perspective of later generations, yet more readings 
and rereadings that must someday be critiqued, judged, and pos-
sibly undone. 
I do not claim that this is true as a matter of logical neces-
sity. I do claim it is characteristic of the American constitutional 
tradition, and indeed, of many other traditions as well. Repeat-
edly, constitutional dissenters and insurgent movements have 
turned to the constitutional text and to the great deeds and 
commitments of the past-including most particularly of the 
founding generation- as a justification for their assault on the 
status quo. 
My friend and colleague Bruce Ackerman has famously de-
nounced what he calls the "myth of rediscovery"219 in American 
constitutional law-the notion that we can justify major trans-
formations like the New Deal as a return to original principles 
and commitments. In fact, Ackerman argues, American constitu-
tional development features a succession of generations engaged 
in acts of constitution-making that displace and build on older 
ones. 
I agree with Ackerman that the history of American consti-
tutional development has been one of continuous change, but I 
disagree that the "myth of rediscovery" is a myth in the pejora-
218. H. Jefferson Powell. Parchmen£ Mauers: A Medirarion on rhe Consrirurion as 
Texr. 71 IOWA L. REV. 1427. 1433 (1986): Solum. supra note 42. at 1626--27. 
219. ACKERMAN. supra note 100. at 43. 62: Bruce A. Ackerman. Consrirwional Poli· 
lics/Consritutional Law. 99 YALE L.J. 453.488.491 (1989). 
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tive sense that Ackerman means to convey-a false story that 
obfuscates the truth about social life. Rather, myths are stories 
that reveal deep verities about the human condition. So it is with 
our life as a constitutional community. The tropes of fidelity to 
text and principle, and of their restoration and redemption in 
history are not simply fables we tell ourselves. These tropes al-
low us to see the Constitution as a transgenerational project that 
connects different generations and identifies them as a single 
people stretched out over time. The notion that we, like those 
before us, are faithful to the Constitution's text and underlying 
principles, and that our job is to restore and redeem them in 
time, allows the Constitution to achieve simultaneously the mul-
tiple functions that a constitution like America's must perform-
a basic framework for politics and law making; an honored 
source of values and aspirations; and a cherished object of fidel-
ity and attachment that symbolically binds different generations 
to each other and allows them to identify with each other over 
time. In short, fidelity to text and principle allows Americans to 
see the Constitution simultaneously and successfully as basic 
law, as higher law, and as our law. 
VIII. THE TWO RIGHTS TO ABORTION 
Most of the comments on Abortion and Original Meaning 
focused on the first third of the paper, on my theory of text and 
principle. However, Mitchell Berman and Dawn Johnsen also 
offered some criticisms of the second part of the paper, which 
made the substantive case for the abortion right. 
A. DO STATES HAVE A COMPELLING INTEREST IN BANNING 
ALL ABORTIONS? 
Berman points out that states might legally prohibit abor-
tion even if the right to abortion is consistent with the Constitu-
tion's original meaning, and even if the unborn are not persons 
with their own independent constitutional rights. Legislatures 
might argue that protection of unborn life is a compelling state 
interest and preventing abortions is narrowly tailored to vindi-
cate that interest. Berman asks why I did not address this objec-
tion. The reason, as he notes, is that I had already offered a re-
sponse to the argument in my edited collection, What Roe v. 
Wade Should Have Said. 220 My goal in Abortion and Original 
220. WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL 
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Meaning was narrower: to refute the claim that the abortion 
right has no basis in the Constitution's original meaning. Never-
theless, I will offer a slightly different version of my argument 
here; the reason why a total ban on abortions is unconstitutional 
flows from the justifications for the abortion right itself. 
The basic idea is this: Historically, legislatures have never 
treated abortions the same way they do murder, usually offering 
lesser penalties and generally exempting women from responsi-
bility for the crime. Since the sexual revolution in the 1960s, laws 
that have sought to ban abortion in the United States have come 
with a variety of exemptions, and pro-life proposals to reverse 
Roe and ban abortion almost always include at least some of 
them. The Georgia law in Doe v. Bolton (based on the Model 
Penal Code) exempted abortions in cases of incest, statutory or 
forcible rape, and fetal defect. 221 The 1857 Texas law struck down 
in Roe v. Wade did not punish women who self-aborted-for ex-
ample by ingesting abortifacents.222 Perhaps the most common 
exemption in new proposals for criminalizing abortion is the de-
cision to punish the doctor who performs the abortion but not 
the woman who seeks the abortion. 
Politicians (and legislatures, when they actually pass almost 
total bans) offer these exemptions because it has become very 
difficult to get a majority of the population to support abortion 
laws that ban all abortions except where the mother's life is in 
danger and that punish the mother as well as the doctor. In 2004 
South Dakota passed a law that banned all abortions except 
those necessary to save the mother's life, but punished only 
abortion providers. It was subsequently repealed by a state-wide 
referendum. 
These exemptions are not accidental. They reflect the way 
that citizens and government officials reason about abortion, 
about the value of unborn life and, above all, about women's 
sexual responsibility for getting pregnant and their obligations to 
mother. Abortion regulation is about protecting unborn life, but 
EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA"S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 47-52 (Jack M. 
Balkin ed .. 2005) 
221. Doe v. Bolton. 410 U.S. 179. 182-185. 202-205 (citing GA. CODE ANN.§§ 26-
1201. 26-1202.26-1203 (1968)). 
222. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113. 117-19 (1973) (citing Act of Feb. 9. 1854. ch. 49. § I. 
1854 Tex. Gen. Laws 58. 58. reprinted in 3 H. GAMMEL. THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897. 
at 1502 (1898)). The statute was revised in 1857 and was substantially the same thereaf-
ter. See id. at 119 (citing Texas Penal Code of 1857. c. 7. Arts 531-536: G. PaschaL Laws 
of Texas. Arts. 2192-2197 (1866): Texas Rev. Stat.. c. 8. Arts. 536-541 (1879): Texas Rev. 
Crim. Stat.. Arts. 1071-1076 (1911)). 
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it is also about regulating women's sexual freedom and preserv-
ing what abortion opponents see as the values and the responsi-
bilities of motherhood. "Family values" is more than a catch-
word in abortion debates-the exemptions in abortion laws show 
that alongside the question of when life begins are background 
notions of women's proper roles and their expected duties within 
families. 
The history of abortion regulation in America suggests that 
the interest in protecting unborn life is not as compelling to 
states as they may claim. This interest in unborn life can be and 
often is sacrificed for other purposes that are not compelling; 
moreover, abortion laws may also be supported by purposes that 
are constitutionally illegitimate. 
When the state says that it has an interest so important that 
the interest trumps a fundamental constitutional right, courts 
should demand a demonstration that there is a very close fit be-
tween that interest and the means chosen to achieve it-in doc-
trinal terms, that the state meets the requirement of narrow tai-
loring. A statute can fail this test if it is either over- or under-
inclusive, or there are other ways of achieving the states' interest 
that are less burdensome on the constitutional right. 
The reason for the narrow tailoring requirement is that it is 
often difficult to tell why the state is doing what is doing. So if 
the means chosen don't match the ends asserted, that might 
mean one of two things-first that the purpose isn't all that 
compelling, and second that there are other purposes behind the 
asserted purpose. 
A bad fit between means and ends may mean that the state 
doesn't think that the interest is as important as it claims it is, 
because it is willing to trade it off for other goals so easily. Re-
member, the state has already represented that the interest is so 
strong that it must trump a fundamental constitutional right. It 
greatly undermines that claim if the state trades off the interest 
for policies that aren't all that compelling. 
A second possibility is that the state is not being candid 
about its purposes. A bad fit between the state's asserted pur-
pose and the means chosen to achieve it may suggest that the 
real purpose behind the law is different than the state is assert-
ing. It may be a purpose that is not particularly compelling, or it 
may even be an illegitimate or invidious purpose. 
The narrow tailoring inquiry may be especially important in 
the context of abortion. First, courts may not be able to say ob-
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jectively whether protecting unborn life is a compelling interest 
or merely an important interest. What they can do, however, is 
ask whether the state treats protection of unborn life as a com-
pelling interest by looking at the way that the state writes and 
enforces its abortion laws. In addition, because the abortion 
right is based on sex equality, we need some way of knowing 
whether stereotypical judgments about women's proper roles 
have entered into the legislature's calculus of reasons. Looking 
at the poor fit between means and ends helps us to see if this is 
the case. 
None of this assumes that laws must only have one purpose 
or that laws cannot engage in compromises between different 
values. That happens all the time. Rather, the issue is how im-
portant is the one particular purpose that the state claims is so 
compelling that it must trump a fundamental constitutional right. 
We judge how important that interest is by asking what other in-
terests the state is willing to sacrifice it for. If those purposes 
aren't very important-or even illegitimate-that suggests that 
the compelling purpose isn't that compelling. Just as we know 
people by the company they keep, we know the importance of 
purposes by the kinds of purposes for which the state will com-
promise them. 
Incest exemptions are a good example. They undermine the 
claim that the state has a compelling interest in the protection of 
unborn life because they permit the destruction of a fetus if the 
pregnancy violates a social taboo. People generally try to avoid 
that conclusion in two ways. First, they note that incest may oc-
cur through forced or statutory rape. But not all incest does; and 
if that is the real concern, it is met by a rape exception. Second, 
people may offer a public health justification. However, al-
though children produced from incestuous relations may have a 
higher risk of certain genetic defects, it is only a risk, not a cer-
tainty. Most such children are perfectly healthy and may be 
more genetically healthy than many children born to parents un-
related by blood. In any case, if the state is willing to allow abor-
tions of all fetuses produced by incest on the grounds that they 
may have a greater risk of certain defects, it cannot be claiming 
that it has a compelling interest in unborn life in general. It is 
willing to trade off that interest to prevent the mere risk of a cer-
tain number of genetic defects in an otherwise healthy popula-
tion. 
Exemptions for rape also undermine the claim that the state 
has a compelling interest in unborn life. In addition, the rape ex-
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emption suggests that abortion laws-at least those in the real 
world-are also about controlling female sexuality and judging 
when women should be held responsible for the consequences of 
their sexual activity. 
A fetus conceived from rape is no less human and no less 
valuable than one conceived through consensual intercourse be-
tween adults. What justifies the tradeoff of the state's asserted 
compelling interest? Presumably, it is a judgment about mater-
nal responsibility for sex. Women who are the victims of statu-
tory or forcible rape are not responsible for engaging in sexual 
intercourse that led to their pregnancy, and for that reason they 
should have a right to avoid motherhood. But the flip side of 
that theory is that adult women who engage in sex are deemed 
responsible for the pregnancies that result, even if they are due 
to contraceptive failure, and even if the sex was the result of co-
ercion that falls short of the legal definition of rape in the rele-
vant jurisdiction. 
This judgment of responsibility assumes that women should 
not be able to exercise their sexuality as freely as men do, and 
that. unlike men, they have natural and moral obligations to de-
vote themselves to the production and care of children whenever 
they become pregnant for any reason short of being raped. The 
rape exemption- and the lack of an exemption for anything 
short of rape-reveals a deeper set of understandings about the 
duties of motherhood and what women are for. Women who 
have sex and become pregnant are supposed to be mothers; their 
natural and moral obligation is motherhood and they must de-
vote their lives to the production and care of children. Bans on 
abortion prevent them from shirking that responsibility. The 
state does not have a compelling interest in imposing that theory 
of responsibility on women. In fact, it is constitutionally illegiti-
mate for the state to impose that duty of sacrifice and that theory 
of motherhood on pregnant women, for it is directly contrary to 
the theory of sex equality underlying the abortion right. If the 
prohibition on sex equality means anything, it means that al-
though individuals may embrace and value their decision to be-
come mothers, the state may not assume that "[t]he paramount 
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign 
offices of wife and mother. "223 This is the assumption of stereo-
typical judgments of "separate spheres" for men and women that 
modern sex equality law rejects. 
223. Bradwell v. Illinois. 83 U.S. 130. 141 (1873) (Bradley. J .. concurring). 
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Finally, the decision to punish the doctors who perform 
abortions but not the women who seek them makes little sense if 
the goal of abortion bans is to protect unborn life. Probably the 
best way to discourage contract killings is to impose harsh penal-
ties on people who solicit murder for hire. Moreover, criminaliz-
ing medically safe abortions by licensed doctors while exempting 
self-abortions will predictably increase the number of attempted 
self-abortions; criminalizing access to abortions while holding 
women harmless if they seek illegal abortions will predictably in-
crease the number of unsafe abortions performed illegally. This 
will do little to,protect fetal life and it may endanger pregnant 
women as we11.·· 
The exemption of women from criminal penalties for abor-
tion makes more sense against the background of a social story 
in which women are not really responsible for the choice to 
abort. Instead, women are victims of emotion; they make bad 
decisions in a crisis, they are prone to panic, and they are easily 
manipulated by unscrupulous doctors, who apparently have 
nothing better to do than trick women into having abortions that 
they would not have if they were thinking properly. This back-
ground story is deeply tied to stereotypical views about women's 
decisional capacities- the very same stereotypes that usually jus-
tify heightened scrutiny for sex discrimination under the Equal 
Protection Clause.225 
The point of these arguments is not to deny that states do 
not want to protect unborn life or that their interest is unimpor-
tant. It is rather, to show that their interest is not a compelling 
interest that can trump a fundamental constitutional right. 
Moreover, history shows that abortion bans are not only about 
protecting unborn life; they are also about controlling women's 
sexuality and affirming particular views about motherhood and 
women's social roles. The latter purposes violate the Constitu-
tion's guarantees of sex equality and equal citizenship. 
224. Texas' exemption for women who self-abort without the assistance of a doctor 
probably is the least sensible of all. but the most likelv reason was that the 1857 statute 
was not originally about protecting fetal life but rather ·regulating the medical profession. 
225. Reva Siegel points out that legislation that doubts women's capacities to make 
informed decisions about abortion invokes traditional stereotypes about women's roles 
that raise sex equality concerns. See Reva B. Siegel. The New Politics of Abortion: An 
Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions. 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991: 
Reva B. Siegel. Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and 
Evolving Constitlltional Expression. 56 EMORY L. J. 815 (2007). 
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B. THE Two RIGHTS TO ABORTION 
In Abortion and Original Meaning, I argued that there were 
two rights to abortion. The first right is a woman's right not to be 
forced to bear children at risk to her life and health. This right 
continues throughout the pregnancy. The second right is a 
woman's right to decide whether or not to become a mother and 
assume the obligations of parenthood. This right only requires 
that women have a reasonable time to decide whether to become 
mothers and have a fair and realistic opportunity to make that 
choice. Therefore, states could limit the second right after a cer-
tain point in the pregnancy. 
Dawn Johnsen points out, I think correctly, that the second 
right is not simply about maternal responsibilities after preg-
nancy. It also concerns "the physical intrusion that abortion bans 
inflict on women's bodily integrity."226 A focus on motherhood 
"would protect against a government effort to force women to 
adopt children in need of homes, or possibly even to take in fos-
ter children in need of emergency care. "227 However, if we focus 
only on the obligations of parenting after birth, we will fail to 
take into account "the physical and psychological harms inflicted 
on women by government mandated pregnancy and childbear-
ing, including the significant health risks that accompany even 
'normal' pregnancies."228 
In fact, the second right-the right to avoid compulsory 
motherhood- actually involves at least three different kinds of 
protections: 
(1) The government may not force women to un-
dergo the psychological and physical stresses of preg-
nancy to bear a child. 
(2) The government may not force women to pro-
duce offspring in the world who carry the mother's 
DNA and bear a permanent biological tie to the 
mother. 
(3) The government may not impose social and legal 
obligations of duty and self-sacrifice that come with 
motherhood. 
226. Johnsen. supra note 1. at 423. 
227. ld. 
228. ld. 
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These three concerns usually travel together, and the sec-
ond right to abortion protects them all. 229 Nevertheless, the sec-
ond right is premised on a background of social expectations and 
technological possibilities. Given existing technology, if women 
become pregnant through intercourse and do not wish to remain 
pregnant, they must terminate the life of the fetus they carry. 
Existing social norms, fairly or unfairly, demand more of moth-
ers than they do of fathers. Finally, the current economic struc-
ture of wage work is geared toward those who are not primary 
caregivers of small children. If technology, social norms, or eco-
nomic structures changed sufficiently, these three aspects of the 
second right to abortion might come apart, and the nature of the 
right might be very different. We do not, however, live in such a 
world, at least not yet. Nevertheless, Johnsen is correct that what 
I am calling the second right to abortion combines several differ-
ent protections for women; the differences between them may 
become salient as social and technological contexts change. 
Johnsen's other concern is that the two rights formulation 
does not adequately address "the literally hundreds of state laws 
that impose a myriad of obstacles and restrictions on women and 
abortion providers."230 That is where legislatures now direct most 
of their efforts. I did not address the question of abortion regula-
tions short of total bans in Abortion and Original Meaning for 
two reasons. First, as I noted before, my focus was the narrower 
question whether the abortion right is consistent with the Consti-
tution's original meaning; and second, I had already addressed 
the issue in What Roe v. Wade Should Have Said. Nevertheless, 
let me say a few words about how we should think about abor-
tion regulations under a text and principle approach. 
When the state merely regulates abortion rather than im-
posing a general ban, it can violate the first and second rights to 
abortion. If the state burdens the right to terminate pregnancies 
that endanger life and health it violates the first right, and if it 
burdens the right to choose not to become a mother it violates 
the second right. These two rights flow from the Fourteenth 
Amendment's guarantees of sex equality and equal citizenship, 
which govern the state even where it stops short of complete 
criminalization of abortion. 
229. The first right to abortion-which prevents the government from forcing 
women to sacrifice life or health to bear children-also has these three aspects. 
230. !d. at 424. 
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Legislatures and politicians who oppose abortion may hope 
to restrict as many abortions as possible by limiting access to 
abortion or imposing burdensome regulations on abortion pro-
viders. Nevertheless, the state may not attempt to achieve 
through the regulation of abortion providers and pregnant 
women what it may not constitutionally do through an outright 
ban. Courts must subject these restrictions to scrutiny to see 
whether they respect equal citizenship and treat pregnant 
women fairly. 
In particular, the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on 
class and caste legislation applies both to regulations directed at 
abortion providers and to restrictions directed at pregnant 
women themselves. States have legitimate and important inter-
ests in promoting professional medical standards, in protecting 
maternal health, and in protecting unborn life. But they may not 
impose special and burdensome regulations on abortion provid-
ers in order to shut them down. And they may not impose spe-
cial and burdensome restrictions on pregnant women in order to 
discourage them from exercising their constitutional right to 
choose abortion. 
When legislatures single out abortion providers for special 
burdens that are not related to facts that distinguish abortion 
from other medical procedures, they engage in class legislation 
that violates the Fourteenth Amendment. By attempting to limit 
access to abortion providers, these laws compel women to be-
come mothers through indirect means. 231 
Legislatures also violate the prohibition on class legislation 
when they impose special burdens on pregnant women who seek 
abortions that are not related to the differences between abor-
tion and other surgery that women choose. They violate the pro-
hibition on class legislation when they assume that pregnant 
women lack decisionmaking capabilities to choose abortion in 
ways that legislatures do not assume about women's choices for 
other surgical procedures. When legislatures assume that only 
women who are misinformed, emotionally distraught, or men-
tally confused would choose abortion-as opposed to other sur-
231. Tuscan Woman's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531. 548 (9th Cir. 2004). connects 
abortion clinic regulation to sex equality concerns based on the Supreme Court's decision 
in Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs. 538 U.S. 721. 736-39 (2003). Hibbs may have 
altered the prevailing constitutional assumption in Geduldig v. Aiello. 417 U.S. 484 
( 1974). that legislation directed against pregnant women is not sex discrimination. For a 
discussion. see Reva B. Siegel. You've Come A Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist's New Ap-
proach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs. 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871 (2006). 
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geries-they enforce gender stereotypes about women's ability 
to make decisions that are contrary to their traditional family 
roles.c'c 
Individual cases will present different fact patterns. Not all 
regulations of abortion providers are unreasonable or attempts 
to eliminate abortion; some restrictions may survive constitu-
tional scrutiny while others will not. Nevertheless the same un-
derlying principles that apply to the abortion right also implicate 
what states may do in regulating abortion providers and restrict-
ing pregnant women's access to abortion. 
IX. CONCLUSION: REDEMPTIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
On the surface, the theory of text and principle seems to 
rely on nothing more than straightforward claims about what 
makes a text binding law over time. But I hope I have shown in 
this response that the theory is about far more. The American 
Constitution is simultaneously a text, a set of political institu-
tions, a source of values and aspirations, a repository of cultural 
memory, and a transgenerational political project. Lincoln fa-
mously spoke of our constitutional system as a government of 
the people, by the people, and for the people. But if the Consti-
tution belongs to the American people, it also helps constitute 
them as a people that persists over time. It does so by constitut-
ing a common project, a common past, and a common destiny. 
Its legitimacy comes from the fact that it can do this success-
fully- that it can serve simultaneously as basic law, as higher 
law, and as our law. 
Textual theories generally assume that the Constitution is 
binding law because We the People agreed to it. But the genera-
tion that ratified the original Constitution is long dead. Later 
232. In Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart If). 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). the Supreme Court 
upheld the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 against a facial challenge. Jus· 
lice Kennedy's majority opinion argued that governments could ban abortions using in· 
tact dilation and extraction (D&E) because. given ··the bond of love the mother has for 
her child'' id. at 1634. some women might regret the decision to abort if they did not 
know of the nature of the procedure. /d. Banning the procedure will cause some women 
not to have abortions they might later regret. and will force doctors to "find different and 
less shocking methods to abort the fetus in the second trimester. .. /d. Kennedy's assump-
tiOn that the state might ban certain types of abortions because some women might later 
regret them seems to resurrect traditional paternalist attitudes about women's capacity to 
make decisions about sex and reproduction. One might think that the proper remedy for 
lack of information would be to inform the woman and then let her decide if she wants to 
undergo the intact D&E procedure. 
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generations do not consent to the Constitution; we live with it 
and in it. The Constitution is a culture we inhabit, an ocean we 
swim in, a set of institutions we grow up with. It is a project 
started by others that we make our own by defending it, inter-
preting it, arguing about it, putting ourselves on its side. Then we 
become part of the same We the People who wrote and ratified 
it. Then the Constitution becomes our Constitution, and we be-
come the people to whom it belongs. 
We can accept the Constitution as our own if it secures our 
rights and defends our values sufficiently that it is worthy of our 
respect and allegiance, if it is more than just a covenant with 
death and an agreement with hell. If the Constitution-in-practice 
is sufficiently efficacious and just, we can support the constitu-
tional system and expect that everyone else in the political com-
munity should do so as well. But this judgment is not a simple 
quid pro quo. It requires an attitude of attachment to and faith 
in the constitutional project. The Constitution-in-practice will 
not always respect our most cherished values. It will not always 
protect our rights. We will often live in dark times. Rather, the 
Constitution is ours if we are able to have faith that over time it 
will come to respect our rights and our values. The Constitution 
is ours if we can trust in its future and in what future generations 
will do to realize its promises. The Constitution is ours if we can 
believe in its redemption. 
